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Luck egalitarianism is an influential theory of justice that holds that arbitrary 
distributions of native abilities and social circumstances produce objectionable 
inequalities between persons, but responsible choices excuse some inequalities. It 
has recently been strongly criticised by self-described egalitarians. At the same time, 
however, mutual engagement between feminists and luck egalitarians has been 
minimal, in contrast to Rawlsian and feminist debates about the application of his 
theory to gender injustice. My research has two interrelated aims: (1) to contribute to 
the mainstream critical evaluation of luck egalitarianism by (2) developing an 
analysis that focuses on the implicit feminist content in those critiques.
Luck egalitarians offer different versions of the theory, but these are 
underpinned by commonalities, including the aim to make distributions reflect 
agents’ responsible choices; the presupposing of particular institutions; and an 
individualistic ontology that misrepresents the social causes of inequality. The heavy 
significance luck egalitarianism attaches to choice effectively licenses the traditional 
sexual division of labour since many agents continue to make choices, in accordance 
with prevailing social norms, which reproduce it. Respect and recognition are goods 
that luck egalitarianism requires some individuals to forfeit in exchange for material 
aid. This trade-off is unacceptable, highlighting the need for a satisfactory 
egalitarianism to be pluralistic in its understanding of human goods. Luck 
egalitarianism is compatible with the political marginalisation of certain social 
groups due to its emphasis on equality as an ideal about distributions, rather than 
relations between citizens. The need for egalitarianism to be sensitive to inequalities 
in multiple domains, not just the material, is underlined. Rival theories to luck 
egalitarianism invoke people’s basic needs and citizens’ obligations to one another as 
alternative bases for determining fair distributions. These more complex accounts of 
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Introduction
Lu c k  e g a l ita r ia n ism  o b se r v es  that individuals are differentiated from one 
another from the start: some are bom into poor families, others rich ones; some are 
bom blind or with other disabilities, while others are blessed with normal physical 
abilities; some are endowed with natural talents and gifts for playing basketball or 
the violin with flair, while others lack special talents. These differences, say luck 
egalitarians, are contingent, just the result of a natural lottery. Some of the great 
inequalities of opportunity, wealth, and happiness between individuals derive from 
mere chance, from these natural and social contingencies. Intuitively, it does not 
seem fair that some people rise to the top while others sink to the bottom due, in part, 
to the chance distribution of such factors.
According to luck egalitarians, then, egalitarian political morality suggests 
that inequalities between agents that are a product of their voluntary choices should 
be acceptable, but inequalities traceable to factors over which agents have no control 
are objectionable and should be eliminated or compensated. Natural differences in 
physical and mental abilities and talents, and social differences in circumstances are 
the two general types of unchosen factors to which luck egalitarianism is alert. Luck 
egalitarianism has been characterised as a ramped-up version of the principle of 
equality of opportunity. That familiar norm objects to discrimination on the basis of 
gender, race, ethnicity, and class, and condemns the unequal outcomes such 
discrimination produces. Luck egalitarianism includes but goes beyond this norm by 
broadening the bases which give rise to morally objectionable inequalities. Luck 
egalitarianism has proved a popular and compelling version of the ideal of equality 
because it takes account of and responds in a sophisticated way to the misfortunes in 
life that we think of as arbitrary and beyond our control. At the same time, it also 
responds to the intuition that it is unfair to deprive people of resources or welfare that 
they have earned or accumulated through choices and actions that they voluntarily 
undertook.
Luck egalitarianism is a philosophically interesting theory of equality. 
Moreover, were it implemented, it has radical implications for social change since, 
on all reasonable assumptions about the random distribution of the blessings and 
curses in life, luck egalitarianism implies a major redistribution of resources or
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welfare. As one writer notes, “Most luck egalitarians think that the economic 
regimes of contemporary liberal societies should be significantly more redistributive 
than those regimes have usually been in practice, and more redistributive than the 
prevailing political morality would allow” (Scheffler 2003a: 7n). If we are 
egalitarians, then, it seems an appealing theory. Thus, surprise and consternation 
surround the fact that the recent literature contains a considerable number of strong 
criticisms by self-described egalitarian philosophers. Few eyebrows are raised when 
writers from traditionally anti-egalitarian political traditions such as conservatism 
and right-libertarianism criticise egalitarian theories and programmes.1 But when the 
objections issue from the expected constituency of such radical ideas for social 
justice, something decidedly odd is going on.
Challenging luck egalitarianism
Elizabeth Anderson coined the term Tuck egalitarianism’ in 1999. According 
to Anderson, luck egalitarianism accords a central role to the phenomenon of luck, 
with unappealing results for its overall ideal of equality. Its twin norms are that we 
may subtract from the fortunate that portion of their resources or welfare that 
everyone acknowledges is undeserved, and should give to the unfortunate only to the 
extent that they did not bring their misfortune upon themselves. If they did, then that 
is their tough luck, and the rest of society has no obligation to help. The following 
passage encapsulates some of Anderson’s chief concerns:
Recent egalitarian writing has come to be dominated by the view that 
the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved 
bad luck -  being bom with poor native endowments, bad parents, and 
disagreeable personalities, suffering from accidents and illness, and so 
forth. I shall argue that in focusing on correcting a supposed cosmic 
injustice, recent egalitarian writing has lost sight of the distinctively 
political aims of egalitarianism. The proper negative aim of egalitarian 
justice is not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, 
but to end oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. Its 
proper positive aim is not to ensure that everyone gets what they
1 Such as Cavanagh (2002); Kekes (1997); and Narveson (1998).
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morally deserve, but to create a community in which people stand in 
relations of equality to others (1999a: 288-89).
Anderson argues that luck egalitarianism divides people into two main categories: 
victims of bad brute luck, and victims of bad option luck or bad choices. Luck 
egalitarianism directs us to help the victims of bad brute luck. But such assistance 
comes packaged with demeaning judgments about the physical and mental attributes 
of the recipient. Victims of bad choices, on the other hand, are not entitled to 
assistance or compensation under the theory. Whether this means women who 
choose the unpaid work of care-giving over a lucrative career, or risk-loving 
mountaineers who tackle a demanding peak and find themselves stranded, luck 
egalitarianism requires agents to bear the costs of those choices alone, provided 
choices are fully voluntary and taken with an awareness of the likely consequences. 
According to Anderson, this norm means luck egalitarianism permits and even 
requires us to abandon needy people, at the same time as it licenses the accumulation 
of great wealth. Luck egalitarians “ask only that people start off with equal 
opportunities to achieve welfare or access to advantage, or that they start off with an 
equal share of resources. But they accept the justice of whatever inequalities result 
from adults’ voluntary choices” (1999a: 291). For Anderson, this is an untenable 
position for a theory purporting to articulate a vision of equality.
Objections to luck egalitarianism have been voiced by others reasonably 
regarded as ardent egalitarians.3 The criticisms tend to cluster around the following 
themes. First, the importance accorded to individual choice and personal 
responsibility in luck egalitarianism raises concerns. In general, luck egalitarianism 
depends on determining what portion of an individual’s advantage is due to her 
choices, and what portion due to unchosen circumstances. This is a deeply 
complicated exercise and many doubts are registered -  including, it should be said, 
by luck egalitarians themselves -  about whether it is possible to do so. More 
importantly, critics insist, the question arises whether it is desirable to do so, since it 
seems overly harsh for egalitarians to refuse to help someone in need just because the 
neediness arises from her own fault or negligence. Some wonder, in all this, what
2 As will be discussed in chapter one, Ronald Dworkin (1981a; 1981b) develops and employs the 
concepts o f ‘brute’ and ‘option’ luck in his theory.
3 These include Armstrong (2003; 2005); Hinton (2001); McKinnon (2003); Mason (2000); Matravers 
(2002); Miller (1997; 1995b); Phillips (1999; 2004; 2006); Price (1999); Ramsay (2005a); Scheffler 
(2003a; 2003b; 2005); Williams (2002a); Wolff (1998; 2002); and Young (2001).
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has happened to the norm traditionally associated with egalitarianism: namely, 
equality of outcome. This thought leads on to a second, related, theme about the 
moral value that luck egalitarianism attaches to particular ends. As a political 
morality rooted in the liberal tradition, luck egalitarianism is committed to neutrality 
towards people’s conceptions of the good. Some critics suggest, however, that some 
goods seem more important than others from the point of view of egalitarian justice. 
In some cases, this has translated into a desire for a more substantive form of 
egalitarianism which identifies objectively important goods or goods required for 
human flourishing. This sets up a tension with luck egalitarianism since it tends to 
treat all ends as morally equivalent, regarding individuals’ preferences as 
authoritative and sovereign.
Third, while luck egalitarianism is not concerned exclusively with economic 
inequality, the attention paid to interpersonal comparisons of individual resources or 
welfare tends to encourage a focus on the distribution of private property. Critics 
argue that this ignores or obscures the non-material dimensions of inequality, such as 
the fact that middle-class white men predominate in positions and roles that 
command power, authority, and respect, while women and non-whites are 
disproportionately excluded. The ways in which social goods other than private 
property are shared (or not shared) around are also important issues for egalitarian 
justice. The fourth concern, voiced in various ways, asks: since when is the ideal of 
equality primarily about distribution anyway? What, if anything, does luck 
egalitarianism say about the hierarchical structures and institutions in society -  
political, cultural, as well as economic -  that constitute some people as naturally 
superior to others? The suggestion here is that luck egalitarianism attributes too 
much importance to the concept of distribution and consequently fails to ask about, 
examine, or theorise the social relations of power that reproduce patterns of 
inequality.
The Project
This thesis examines the theory of luck egalitarianism and the growing 
critical literature it has recently attracted. I argue that luck egalitarianism represents 
a sophisticated discourse that has interrogated many interesting questions relating to 
human inequality. Nevertheless, the main concepts it employs to explore problems 
of inequality end up obscuring other urgent questions and issues, including those just
9
outlined. There is an important paradox here: if luck egalitarianism offers a radical 
doctrine aimed at eliminating many of the unjust and troubling inequalities we see 
before us today, why do considerable numbers of its apparently natural constituency 
-  self-described egalitarians -  reject its chief principles and vision? My thesis aims 
to identify, describe, and unravel this paradox, and does so at a particularly 
auspicious time. Luck egalitarianism has been the dominant discourse in egalitarian 
debates for more than twenty years. But the critical perspectives are themselves now 
well established, and indeed, have given rise to counter-responses from luck 
egalitarians and their followers. It is now possible to submit the criticisms and 
counter-criticisms to robust consideration.
The theory of luck egalitarianism is contested on at least three general levels: 
its overall vision or ideal of equality; the principles it describes and promotes; and 
the assumptions about human beings and society that underpin these. Throughout 
my analysis, certain questions about these components recur. First, with respect to 
the overall vision of equality, we can ask: What are the constitutive features of an 
equal society? Is the absence of certain types of people from certain sectors of the 
economy, government, or cultural activities compatible with this vision? Second, 
with respect to the principles articulated and promoted as the constitutive framework 
of, and means to, achieving that vision, we can ask: What value(s) does it place at the 
centre of the conception? Which ones are treated as less important and central, and 
what significance should be attached to that? Third, with respect to the sociological 
assumptions and theses that underpin the project, we can ask: To what causes does it 
attribute inequality? How does it account for the reproduction over time of various 
forms of inequality between social groups?
The first and last components in particular are not often presented explicitly 
by luck egalitarians, but must be inferred and extracted through careful reading of the 
texts. Specific objections to luck egalitarianism raise concerns at one, two, or all 
three general levels, since these are interconnected. The structure of the thesis is not 
therefore to consider the vision in one chapter, the principles in another, and the 
sociology in a third, but rather to treat these as structuring themes running throughout. 
As I have suggested, the recent literature is notable for the fact that challenges to 
luck egalitarianism are made in the name of equality itself, not some other political 
value such as liberty. The trick is to try to understand where, precisely, the rival
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conceptions of egalitarianism diverge, and what is at stake in adopting one account 
over another.
A distinctive element of my analysis is its focus on feminism. The 
relationship between feminism and liberalism, while never easy, has at least one 
important success to its name: a sustained and sincere engagement between the two 
traditions has produced important advances on many key terms in political discourse, 
including individualism, freedom, rights, power, the public and private spheres, 
equality, and social justice. In the contemporary literature, attempts by feminists to 
challenge, alter and extend Rawls’s theory of justice and his corresponding 
engagement with the feminist criticisms represent a leading example. This debate in 
itself has produced a significant body of literature,4 and it is only one strand within 
the influential and far-reaching feminist literature of recent decades.
Oddly, however, luck egalitarians and feminists have not engaged with one 
another in this same sustained and critical way. Even Anderson’s critique is not 
written from a self-consciously feminist perspective, though she has written on 
specifically feminist topics elsewhere.5 With a few important and recent exceptions,6 
feminists qua feminists have not engaged directly with luck egalitarians, and the 
latter seem to have repaid the compliment by largely ignoring the traditional feminist 
criticisms. Thus, throughout my analysis, I highlight feminist perspectives and 
demonstrate where critics could usefully draw on these to inform and sharpen their 
objections.
Before I describe the substantive arguments and structure of the thesis, it 
should be noted that there is one issue I do not address. This is the question of John 
Rawls’s status vis-a-vis luck egalitarianism. As is well known, Rawls’s major work, 
A Theory o f Justice (1999), presents an egalitarian liberal theory. It describes two 
principles of justice. The principle of liberty stipulates that everyone has an “equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others” (1999: 53). The second principle concerns the 
distribution of social and economic advantages, and has two parts. ‘Fair equality of 
opportunity’ stipulates, as the name suggests, that positions and offices be open to all.
4 Contributions include Baier (Baier 1987); Card (Card 2001); Held (Held 1993); Kymlicka 
(Kymlicka 1991); Munoz-Darde (1999); Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2003); Okin (Okin 1991, 1994);
Rawls (Rawls 1993); and Smith (Smith 2004).
5 See, for example, Anderson (1990).
6 Including Levey (2005); Phillips (2004; 2006); Robeyns (2003a); Schwartzman (2000; 2006); and 
Young (2001).
11
The ‘difference principle’ stipulates that departures from equality should be to the 
advantage of the worst-off group. Rawls argues that these two principles of justice 
would be arrived at by parties who are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’ deprived 
of knowledge of their particular circumstances, interests, and beliefs. This prevents 
the parties from knowing how they might stand to gain or lose from certain social 
arrangements, and so facilitates a disinterested and impartial selection of 
fundamental principles of justice to govern their collective life. These conditions of 
ignorance, impartiality, and rational choice define what Rawls calls the ‘original 
position.’
Some suggest that Rawls is straightforwardly the first luck egalitarian (e.g. 
Kymlicka 2002). Others argue that this is a misinterpretation of his theory, which 
constitutes its own unique category (e.g. Hinton 2001; McKinnon 2003; Scheffler 
2003a). Each side is able to marshall evidence and arguments to support its case, and 
it may be more appropriate for a writer whose main point is not to contribute to this 
debate but rather to examine luck equality and its critics to make the judgment call. 
For the remainder of the thesis, I shall simply assume that Rawls is not a luck 
egalitarian. The advantages of this decision include brevity and clarity. Henceforth, 
when I use the term Tuck egalitarianism’ I mean it to refer primarily to Ronald 
Dworkin, G.A.Cohen, Richard Ameson, and a few others less central to my analysis. 
The term ‘liberal egalitarianism’ will be reserved for a broader tradition of liberal 
conceptions of justice that includes both Rawls and his followers, plus Dworkin, 
Cohen, Ameson, and their followers.
The structure of the argument
Chapter One -  Luck Egalitarianism: The theory of luck equality emerged 
around 1980 in Anglo-American political philosophy. In chapter one, I set out the 
theories of equality offered by Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Cohen, and Ameson. With 
the exception of Sen, these theorists are widely regarded as the most important 
representatives of luck egalitarianism. The literature is dominated by what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘equality of what?’ debate after a seminal article by Sen 
(1982). This refers to theorists’ offering rival ways to identify and measure 
objectionable inequalities between individuals. The two most developed versions are 
the theory of equality of resources, which is propounded by Dworkin and others, and 
the theory of equality of welfare, modified versions of which are favoured by Cohen,
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Ameson, and others. The assumption is that identifying the correct ‘currency’ or 
‘space’ of equality will allow us to determine which individuals’ claims are most 
urgent and enable us to equalise people in the way that ultimately matters morally. 
From the luck equality perspective, this represents a, perhaps the, key task for the 
egalitarian project. In the first part of the chapter, I identify some of the major 
disagreements pursued by luck egalitarians. The second part then balances this by 
pointing out some of the important similarities in their views.
Chapter Two -  Feminist Challenges to Liberal Conceptions o f Justice and 
Luck Egalitarianism: In this chapter, I begin to fill the gap highlighted earlier by 
demonstrating how some traditional feminist criticisms of liberal thought apply 
specifically to luck egalitarianism. I focus on four critical themes: the male bias 
apparent in the liberal ‘self; the problem of respecting individual choice given that a 
background of unequal power deforms women’s choices; the importance accorded to 
economic inequality within mainstream approaches to social justice and the 
corresponding marginalisation of cultural inequality; and the perceived limitations of 
the concept of distribution as the dominant paradigm of social justice. I argue that 
the concerns commonly raised by feminists apply just as well -  and sometimes more 
so -  to the luck egalitarian tradition. Moreover, I argue that these criticisms resonate 
in the specific objections to luck egalitarianism, even when these have not been 
engaged from explicitly feminist directions. Remaining chapters employ theories 
and concepts introduced in chapter two to illuminate and sometimes extend these 
objections.
Chapter Three -  Gender Equality, Choice, and the Sexual Division o f 
Labour: How does luck egalitarianism conceptualise the causes of inequality and are 
these accounts adequate? In exploring this question, I employ Andrew Mason’s 
(2000) argument that the luck egalitarian refusal to compensate inequalities traceable 
to agents’ genuine choices encounters difficulties when it comes to women’s choices 
to take up traditional feminine roles of mothering. Dworkin’s egalitarianism is too 
restrictive because it fails to take adequate account of the way that women’s choices 
are heavily socialised. Mason argues that in order to do justice to women, an account 
of equality such as Dworkin’s needs to be supplemented with an egalitarian ethos 
that precludes sexist socialisation. This conjecture leads to my second question: to 
what extent is the more substantive egalitarianism promoted by Mason compatible 
with neutrality between conceptions of the good? While siding with Mason and
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others who argue that an unsupplemented luck egalitarianism cannot eliminate 
women’s economic subordination and dependence, I argue that his line of thought 
edges us towards a perfectionist form of egalitarianism. This exposes a tension 
between liberal egalitarianism, which has tended to be anxious to avoid this, and 
feminism, which has been more receptive, in light of concerns about women’s 
adaptive preferences.
Chapter Four -  Respect and Types o f Injustice: The conventional wisdom is 
that liberal political theory in general, and liberal egalitarianism in particular, is 
distinguished from other political traditions by its commitment to treating all persons 
with equal respect. Notwithstanding this, critics have argued that luck egalitarianism 
fails to treat all citizens with equal respect in the process of identifying objectionable 
inequalities. Two such arguments are made by Jonathan Wolff (1998; 2002) and 
Timothy Hinton (2001). In this chapter, I connect their ‘respect objection’ to a 
contemporary literature which argues that misrecognition, no less than economic 
inequality, is a key form of injustice. Drawing on Nancy Fraser’s dualistic model of 
social justice, which argues that maldistribution and misrecognition are two 
irreducible harms that agents may suffer, I argue that this is echoed in the respect 
objection to luck egalitarianism. Furthermore, the respect objection must be rooted 
in this redistribution/recognition approach if it is to have real force against luck 
egalitarianism. Otherwise, the objection is reasonably understood as citing problems 
merely with the implementation of luck equality, not its central principles. I believe 
Wolff and Hinton intend a more radical critique of its principles, which implies that 
they should make their reliance on Fraser’s dualistic framework (or something 
similar) explicit.
Chapter Five -  Relational Equality, Citizenship, and Democracy: It is not 
obvious that luck egalitarianism is opposed to social or political hierarchies. This 
sounds like a hazardous claim, yet it is one that has been advanced, in different ways, 
by several critics. The idea behind these claims is that luck egalitarianism fails to 
appeal to a more fundamental understanding of equality as an ideal governing the 
social relationships between citizens and social groups. This chapter critically 
analyses this ‘relational equality’ objection. I demonstrate that Elizabeth Anderson, 
Samuel Scheffler, and David Miller articulate versions of this ideal and that there is a 
significant degree of overlap in their concerns. However, the ideal suffers from 
ambiguity and I attempt to tease out what theoretical work it does (or potentially can
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do) in describing a vision of egalitarian justice. In section two, I outline an argument 
by Ameson that ‘relational equality’ can be assimilated to the ‘equality of x’ 
formulation that distributive egalitarians propose. I reject this interpretation as based 
on a misunderstanding, and argue that relational equality is better understood as 
regulating or controlling distributions. In section three, I argue that appeals to the 
qualities and virtues of citizens form a distinct strand of the notion of relational 
equality. Such appeals have been criticised for lack of substance. Although I find 
some merit in this claim, I argue that emphasising citizens’ interactions is valid in 
light of the fact that such discussions are virtually absent from luck egalitarian theory. 
In section four, I argue that the most promising but so far least developed way to take 
the relational equality notion forward is to elaborate it as an argument about political 
equality, focusing on equal inclusion, voice, and participation as constitutive of a 
society in which citizens relate to one another as equals. I argue that Dworkin’s 
conception of political equality is unsatisfactory since it appears to be compatible 
with the political marginalisation of some social groups.
Chapter Six -  Sufficiency, Priority, and Pluralistic Egalitarianism: The 
chapters to this point will have argued that luck egalitarianism is inadequate in a 
number of important ways. By way of rebuttal, luck egalitarians contend that some 
rival conceptions tend to collapse into sufficiency positions. In this final chapter, I 
explore this counter-claim, focusing on Richard Ameson’s contrast between his own 
prioritarian approach to distributive justice and what he calls moderate sufficiency. I 
argue that, in the traditional opposition between egalitarianism and sufficiency, 
egalitarianism emerges as superior. However, things are not so clear in the more 
complex opposition that Ameson proposes. Moderate sufficiency is the label he 
applies to a disparate group of theories, including, for our purposes here, Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Elizabeth Anderson’s democratic 
egalitarianism. I argue that we should reject Ameson’s contention that these theories 
are predominantly sufficientarian in character, and suggest that ‘pluralistic 
egalitarian’ is a more accurate description. This does not deny that they cater to a 
principle of sufficiency. But it does establish that this is not their only or most 
significant moral commitment. Characterising Nussbaum and Anderson as 
pluralistic egalitarians highlights the parallels with egalitarians who favour 
unconditional basic income as a component of the egalitarian distributive project. 
Egalitarians should say that everyone is unconditionally entitled to have their basic
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needs met, even if they have brought their neediness upon themselves. Though this 
is not the view that luck egalitarians and prioritarians such as Ameson take, it is the 
right one.
The arguments in chapters three through six are somewhat self-contained, as 
each closely examines a particular objection to luck egalitarianism and the associated 
issues. At the same time, the argument these chapters make is cumulative. While I 
do not claim to have produced a wholly articulated rival theory of equality, my thesis 
sketches some of the constitutive visions, principles, and understandings of equality 
that such an alternative requires.
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Chapter  One  
Luck  E galitarianism
Th e  b a sic  id ea s  of luck egalitarianism are now well known, for over the 
course of the past twenty-five years, it has established itself as a, perhaps the, 
dominant position within current debates on equality. Section one considers seminal 
contributions by Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and Richard Ameson, who are 
regarded as leading representatives of the view. Work by Amartya Sen is also 
discussed since it has had a great impact on debates; however, I argue that he should 
not be regarded as a “core” luck egalitarian. Their essays offer a set of views about 
equality and distributive justice that intertwine and overlap in intricate patterns of 
claim and counterclaim, example and counterexample. From these texts comes much 
of the substance of luck egalitarianism, furnishing proponents with substantive 
claims with which to grapple, and critics with their main fodder for critique. What 
emerges from section one are some of the main differences that distinguish their 
theories. Section two then balances this by identifying some of the key similarities.
1. The  ‘E q u a lity  of W h a t? ’ D eba tes
Ronald Dworkin and Equality of Resources
In his massively influential two-part essay on egalitarianism, Dworkin 
introduces and explores ‘welfarist’ and ‘resourcist’ conceptions of equality, a 
distinction that has defined much of the ensuing debate. Dworkin invites readers to 
imagine a father who is dividing his estate amongst his children, “one of whom is 
blind, another a playboy with expensive tastes, a third a prospective politician with 
expensive ambitions, another a poet with humble needs, another a sculptor who 
works in expensive material, and so forth” (1981a: 186). Assuming he loves his 
children equally, the father aims to divide his estate so that each child is equal in 
welfare or equally satisfied. This goal suggests he should divide his assets unequally 
since some of his children, such as the blind child, need extra to ensure their 
prospects in life are as good as their siblings. The important consideration is how 
many resources does it take to ensure each person is equally well off? However, the 
playboy with expensive tastes creates a problem for the equal-welfare ideal. Given a 
finite amount of resources, and his voracious appetite for the good things in life,
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resources might need to be siphoned away from the low-maintenance poet or the 
blind sibling in order to keep him as happy as the others. This thought leads us 
towards an ideal of equality of resources: each should get an equal amount of 
resources and people’s expensive tastes should be treated as their own responsibility 
(186-88). This hypothetical example highlights in a simple way the intuitive appeal 
of both basic ideals, but neither emerges as clearly superior. Further analysis is 
required.
Dworkin begins with the ideal of equality of welfare.7 Welfarist 
egalitarianism must determine what sort of preferences to count in assessing people’s 
situation. He distinguishes three kinds of preferences: political, which are 
preferences about how the goods of a society should be distributed amongst its 
members; impersonal, which are preferences about “things other than their own or 
other people’s lives or situations” (192); and personal, which are preferences about 
the situation of the agent herself. The most expansive version holds that all three 
kinds of preferences should count in interpersonal comparisons; thus that all 
preferences should be equally fulfilled to the extent possible. This ideal swiftly 
encounters what is known as the ‘offensive tastes’ objection. Imagine that society is 
arranged so that all racial groups have roughly the same amount. If someone has a 
political preference that blacks get less than whites, then unrestricted welfare 
equality must award extra money to the bigot to spend on his personal preferences so
o
that his overall satisfaction is equal with others. Dworkin argues that this problem 
cannot be avoided by simply outlawing offensive tastes. Even non-offensive tastes 
can lead to counter-intuitive results, from an egalitarian perspective. Consider a 
society where some hold the benevolent view that orphans should receive a little 
extra in life. Under unrestricted equality of success, the result is either that orphans 
will then be better off at the expense of other groups, say cripples; or, if this is ruled
7 Dworkin identifies three versions of welfarism: ‘success,’ ‘conscious state,’ and ‘objectivist’ 
welfarism. He devotes most attention to the first two, commonly known in the literature as 
‘preference satisfaction’ and ‘hedonistic’ or ‘hedonic’ welfarist theories respectively. Success 
theories interpret welfare as a “matter of [someone’s] success in fulfilling his preferences, goals, and 
ambitions, and so equality of success... recommends distribution and transfer of resources until no 
further transfer can decrease the extent to which people differ in such success” (191). Conscious state 
theories interpret welfare as the pursuit of enjoyment or pleasure and the avoidance o f pain or 
dissatisfaction, and so recommend that people should be as equal as possible in enjoyment (221). In 
examining the three versions, Dworkin’s method is to move progressively from the least to most 
restricted, revealing problems at each stage. Since the differences between these versions are not 
important for my purposes, I assume the ‘success’ (or preference-satisfaction) version throughout the 
discussion.
8 See also Rawls’s version of the offensive taste objection (1999: 27); and Cohen’s (1989: 912).
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out for egalitarian reasons, “those who care more about orphans than cripples will be 
given extra resources to make up for the failure to fulfil this discrete preference” 
(200).
A more restricted version of welfare equality -  one that says equalise only 
people’s impersonal and personal preferences -  faces a different problem, according 
to Dworkin. Here we encounter Charles who desperately wants life to be discovered 
on Mars. If we count impersonal preferences, Charles is going to have to be given 
extra to spend on his personal preferences to bring him to the same level as everyone 
else since his Mars preference is never going to be satisfied. A welfare egalitarian 
might reply that we should then rule out impossible impersonal preferences. In 
response to this move, Dworkin supplies Charles with a different preference: that the 
habitat of the rare snail-darter be preserved. Charles’s preference is not impossible 
for his community to achieve, but if it refuses, then this will entail the same costs as 
before -  channelling a large amount of resources to Charles to make up for that 
disappointment. Dworkin identifies two problems with this attempt to defend the 
ideal. First, it violates “conventional ideals of political equality” because the state 
would be taking excessive care to ensure that Charles approves of the world to the 
same level as everyone else even though his position is “eccentric” (203). Second, 
and more importantly, the welfarist substitutes the snail darter for the Mars 
preference on the grounds that the first is a reasonable, though eccentric, preference 
to have. But in doing so, he has had to import “an independent theory about when an 
impersonal preference is reasonable” (203). In other words, welfarist ideals 
eventually have to appeal to a notion of fair shares, which makes the ideal self- 
defeating and collapses the distinction between equality of welfare and equality of 
resources.
This leaves us with the most restricted version of welfarist equality, which 
recommends taking into account only individuals’ personal preference satisfaction. 
This proposal is commonly taken to be the core welfarist view, and is intuitively 
appealing, as Dworkin notes, since it avoids a “fetishistic fascination” for equalising 
money, which is only instrumentally important to people, and instead appears to 
equalises them in a way that matters to everyone (189). The problem with it, 
however, is that not everyone attaches ultimate value to the satisfaction of their 
personal preferences. “People do not care equally about the fulfillment of their 
personal preferences as opposed to their political convictions and impersonal goals”
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(208). Thus, it contradicts what was taken to be its central appeal; namely, that it 
promises to make people’s “lives equally desirable to them” (189).
Dworkin’s two final objections to equality of welfare, which receive by far 
the most discussion in the literature, revisit the issues sketched in the original 
hypothetical example. The first is the so-called ‘expensive tastes’ objection.
Imagine Louis who requires champagne to be happy while others are satisfied with 
cheap beer. Straight equality of welfare says that insofar as the expensive taste 
reduces Louis’s welfare (because he cannot afford a regular supply of champagne), 
we should give him extra resources. But, Dworkin suggests, egalitarians will rightly 
balk at this conclusion. People are not entitled to receive compensation “just because 
their tastes or ambitions are expensive to satisfy” (2003: 192). Or, to put it another 
way, egalitarians hold that while Louis “is entitled to acquire more expensive tastes, 
he is not entitled to more resources than others merely because his ambitions are 
more costly to attain” (Clayton and Williams 1999: 449). We should reject equality 
of welfare since it panders to expensive tastes.
As decisive as this objection seems, a fairly simple response is available: 
instead of arguing for straight equality of welfare, we could move to equality o f 
opportunity for welfare. On this account, if Louis chooses a lifestyle that yields 
lower welfare, but his opportunity for welfare is the same, no extra funds will be 
forthcoming. Cohen and Ameson argue for this adjustment, as discussed below.
The second major objection to equality of welfare addresses the problem of 
handicaps.9 According to Dworkin, handicaps or disabilities give the ideal of 
equality of welfare its most immediate intuitive appeal: “When the question arises 
how wealth should be distributed among children, for example, those who are 
seriously physically or mentally handicapped do seem to have, in all fairness, a claim 
to more than others. The ideal of equality of welfare may seem a plausible 
explanation of why this is so. Because they are handicapped, the blind need more 
resources to achieve equal welfare” (189). However, this thought is misleading. If
9 Reflecting the terminology of the day, Dworkin uses the term ‘handicap’ throughout his analyses, 
and many other political theorists who have commented upon or enlarged his work preserve that term. 
However, ‘handicap’ is now regarded by many as an outmoded term, and I shall use the term 
‘disability,’ except, of course, when ‘handicap’ appears in direct quotations. Although this is not the 
place for an analysis of the implicit assumptions about people with disabilities that appear in the luck 
egalitarian literature, it seems worth pointing out that, at one point, Dworkin explicitly contrasts ‘the 
handicapped’ with ‘the healthy’ (1981a: 241), which is a very problematic -  and revealing -  
distinction.
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welfarists encounter individuals such as Tiny Tim, who is disabled, poor, but happy, 
and Scrooge, who is able-bodied, rich, but miserable, they are committed to saying 
that some of Tim’s resources should be transferred to Scrooge to boost his welfare 
(241), which seems unappealing. (By way of preview, Cohen argues that the 
Tim/Scrooge example also defeats equality of opportunity for welfare since Tim, 
given his cheery disposition, has more opportunity for welfare than Scrooge (1989). 
This is one reason why Cohen argues equality of opportunity for welfare is not the 
best version of luck egalitarianism.) Moreover, Dworkin suggests, even if Tiny Tim 
had the same amount of money as everyone else, and because of his cheery 
disposition, has above-average welfare, “many” people will hold that he should get 
extra resources, if needed, to buy special equipment to offset the disadvantage caused 
by his disability (242).10 The upshot, for Dworkin, is that equality of welfare entirely 
fails to offer a satisfying account of the ideal of equality, and even where it seems 
likeliest to explain our intuitions, it fails to do so upon close examination.
With the ground well-prepared by his criticisms of welfarist equality, 
Dworkin articulates the ideal of equality of resources in part two of his essay.11 This 
proceeds through the elaboration of two devices: an auction and a hypothetical 
insurance market. The auction takes place amongst a group of shipwreck survivors 
who wash up on a desert island. They decide to divide the resources of the island 
equally between them by giving each “immigrant” an equal number of clamshells 
with which to bid for their favourite resources (285). This models the initial equality 
of economic power that Dworkin argues is a precondition to a fair distribution of 
resources. The auction involves bundles of all the island’s resources that can be 
possessed privately by individuals. The internal composition of the bundles is itself 
a product of people’s choices about what they would like to possess. It is especially 
important to people that the bundles have attractive combinations the goods we put
10 A further criticism of welfare egalitarianism that Dworkin articulates concerns the unfortunate 
individual whose handicap is so extreme that even if all available resources are channelled to her, she 
still does not attain a noticeable improvement in welfare. Dworkin says not only is this implication 
unfair to other members of society, it is not a conclusion that egalitarians would endorse, even in 
principle. He argues that equality of resources provides a more satisfactory guide to handling this 
problem. Although Cohen does not reveal his own position on whether all resources should go to the 
victim, he rejects Dworkin’s claim that egalitarians would counsel against such a transfer (1989).
This debate will not be pursued further here, but it reappears in chapter six under discussions about the 
merits and drawbacks of egalitarian, prioritarian, and sufficiency views. See Miriam Cohen- 
Christofidis (2004) for a related discussion.
11 Brighouse (1996) and Scheffler (2003a) point out that he doesn’t so much argue for it as simply 
explain and describe it.
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towards leisure and productive activities. The overall characteristics of the island 
itself, and its people, are not themselves the subject of justice, but rather its 
parameters. To take an extreme example, if the island contains only plovers’ eggs 
and you detest plovers’ eggs, you cannot complain on grounds of justice when you 
get your fair share. As Dworkin observes, “the contingent facts of raw material and 
the distribution of tastes are not grounds on which someone might challenge a 
distribution as unequal. They are rather background facts that determine what 
equality of resources, in these circumstances, is...” (289). This stipulation seems 
natural in the case of the hypothetical island auction, but when carried into a real 
market economy its implications have proved controversial, as we will see.
The auction proceeds until it meets what Dworkin calls the ‘envy test’: “No 
division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any 
immigrant would prefer someone else’s bundles of resources to his bundle” (285). 
This method ensures that everyone has what he or she really wants, at a cost that is 
“fixed by asking how important, in fact, that resource is for others” (289). But 
imagine a year goes by. One person has amassed wealth through dedicated drudgery 
on her tomato farm while another has sunbathed, permitting her resources to dwindle 
to nothing. The sunbather may envy the farmer but this shows not that they are 
unequal now, but rather that the envy test should not be applied at any one point in 
time. Instead, it is about whether or not we envy one another’s total bundle of 
resources over the course of a whole life. One chooses a life of wealth and drudgery, 
and another a life of leisure and frugality (304-06). Dworkin writes that we want 
“equality of resources devoted to whole lives.. .[Our theory] argues only that 
resources available to [a person] at any moment must be a function of resources 
available or consumed by him at others, so that the explanation of why someone has 
less money now may be that he has consumed expensive leisure earlier” (310-11). 
Every islander eventually ends up with the items and lifestyle they each want at a 
price that reflects their value to others. As Jean Hampton notes, although people’s 
“different tastes will convince them that some of them have done better than others,” 
the “important point is that all of them will have had the same chance as the others, 
with the same initial resources, to secure the satisfaction of their desires as best they 
can and thus to be responsible for how they have done so” (1997: 156).
The island auction scenario presumes that the immigrants are largely identical 
in terms of their talents and abilities; they differ mainly in their tastes. The wealth
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inequality between the gardener and the leisure-lover does not bother us since we 
presume that they are equally able to work and make money if they choose. If we 
are informed, however, that someone is poor not because he chose to sunbathe all 
year but because he is disabled, we will feel that the inequality is unfair. We need a 
different device to deal with inequalities that arise from unchosen differences in 
people’s natural abilities and talents. Dworkin believes a market is an integral 
feature of any modem theory of justice, but he is aware that the market will be 
unkind to those who are disabled, sick, or possess few and limited talents:
[P]eople are not equal in raw skill or intelligence or other native 
capacities; on the contrary, they differ greatly, through no choice of 
their own, in the various capacities that the market tends to reward.
So some people who are perfectly willing, even anxious, to make 
exactly the choices about work and consumption and savings that 
other people make end up with fewer resources, and no plausible 
theory of equality can accept this as fair (1985: 207).
How should we correct for differential abilities and talents in a market economy that 
exploits them to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others?
To address these problems, Dworkin proposes a hypothetical insurance 
market as a “supplement” to the auction (1981b: 301). There are two such markets: 
one is geared to deal with disabilities and health-related differences, the other with 
differences in native talents and skills. Although these insurance markets are 
hypothetical, as Justine Burley explains, the idea is that in a “society governed by 
equality of resources, what an individual is compensated for, and by how much, is 
modelled on the results of the appropriate hypothetical insurance scheme” (2004: 
xiv). Let us focus first on the scheme for disabilities. Straight equality of resources, 
which assigns equal bundles to all, fails to recognise that someone with a “serious 
handicap faces his life with what we concede to be fewer resources” (Dworkin 
1981b: 302). In order to ensure that people with disabilities get a fair amount, 
Dworkin proposes that we imagine all individuals facing the same risk of developing 
a physical or mental disability at some point in their lives. We suppose that 
insurance is available, and ask how much insurance coverage against disabilities the 
“average member of the community” would purchase. Equipped with these averages 
for different disabilities, we then pay out that amount to people who actually develop 
disabilities over the course of their lives. The funds for the compensation come from
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“taxation or [another] compulsory process” (298). We now have a system that 
retains the initial appeal of allowing people to choose their bundles of resources 
according to their own values and priorities, while at the same time mitigating the 
differences in wealth that unchosen disabilities produce. As Andrew Williams notes, 
“unlike egalitarians who regard market institutions as threats to justice, to be 
tolerated for reasons of efficiency, Dworkin insists that the justice of a distribution of 
privately owned resources depends on whether it could have emerged from a 
hypothetical market process which is sensitive to individuals’ values, but corrects 
forms of unfairness present in real markets” (2002b: 380).
Interestingly, Dworkin argues that the hypothetical insurance market for 
disabilities should be extended to obsessions, which are strong preferences or tastes 
that people wish they did not have and which interfere with their life goals. Most 
tastes and preferences are not like this -  and, of course, what is a disadvantageous 
craving to some is a cherished personality quirk to others. But where such unwanted 
cravings do exist, they are better understood as analogous to a handicap: “those who 
see their sexual desires or their taste for opera as unwanted disadvantages will class 
these features of their body or mind or personality firmly as [an unlucky 
circumstance]. These are, for them, handicaps, and are therefore suitable for the 
regime proposed for handicaps generally” (303). This introduces some flexibility 
into the strong distinction between tastes and circumstances that equality of resources 
generally attempts to impose. Tastes are chosen, so costs associated with them fall to 
the agent; obsessions are not so their costs should be neutralised by society. But isn’t 
picking up the tab for the costs of people’s ‘obsessions’ tantamount to pandering to 
expensive tastes, which Dworkin firmly rejects? According to Dworkin, obsessions 
are akin to handicaps, not tastes, because people dis-identify and renounce 
obsessions, but they identify with and endorse their tastes as part of their personality. 
Cohen, Ameson, and others argue that Dworkin’s appeal to ‘identification’ is 
dubious; we consider those issues below.
The hypothetical insurance market for talents is similar to that proposed for 
disabilities. Dworkin notes that talents are not exactly like disabilities. Whereas 
severe mental and physical disabilities pose barriers to individuals’ realising their 
ambitions, individuals’ talents help to inform the ambitions they select. As Dworkin 
notes, they have a “reciprocal influence” on each other (313). Nevertheless 
unchosen differences in talent create objectionable inequalities in a market society in
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a similar way to unchosen disabilities, so it is not unreasonable to think that a 
hypothetical insurance market is also a good way to address these. The hypothetical 
insurance market proposed for talents is very complex, but the basic elements are as 
follows: individuals know their “tastes, ambitions, talents, and attitudes toward risk” 
and they know the projected income structure for their society (317). But they do not 
know the relation between the two; they are ignorant as to what their own personal 
economic rents will be. People buy insurance that compensates them for the 
difference in income between the amount they are actually afforded to make by 
virtue of their (God-given) talents, and the amount they hypothetically would have 
chosen to make, based on the information they have about themselves and their 
society (317). Although it is more complicated than the basic auction, agents 
determine an optimal balance of work and leisure according to their own values, and 
are made responsible for these choices through their hypothetical insurance 
purchases.
Whether buying insurance related to talents or handicaps, individuals’ 
hypothetical insurance choices model public policies of health care provision and 
income tax. As Kymlicka explains, in the real world, the tax system will duplicate 
the results of people’s hypothetical choices. “Income tax would be a way of 
collecting the premiums that people hypothetically agree to pay, and the various 
welfare, medicare, and unemployment schemes would be ways of paying out the 
coverage to those who turned out to suffer from the natural disadvantages covered by 
the insurance” (2002: 77). In real life, if and when a person suffers something she 
would have insured herself against, the state will pay her compensation at the rate 
that the insurance would have paid out.
Some Dworkinian terms help tie the whole theory together. With its two 
devices, Dworkin’s equality of resources ultimately produces a distribution that he 
calls ‘ambition-sensitive’ but ‘endowment-insensitive’ (311). People’s prospects 
should not be allowed to differ just because of chance differences in their 
endowments or circumstances, but differences traceable to ambitions and choices are 
acceptable. Another way Dworkin puts this is to affirm that equality of resources 
“assigns [someone’s] tastes and ambitions to his person, and his physical and mental 
powers to his circumstances” (302), rendering inequalities traceable to the second 
category only as eligible for compensation. It should be noted that this taxonomy 
omits ‘talents.’ Dworkin has noted that talents are not purely accidental, but in effect
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he assigns talents to the category of unchosen ‘endowment’ since he is prepared to 
compensate for inequalities arising from them.
The concepts of option luck and brute luck are also important. According to 
Dworkin, the first is “a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out,” 
while the latter is “a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate 
gambles” (1981b: 293). Insurance provides a link between the two kinds of luck 
because the “decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble” 
(293). Thus, it is consistent with equality of resources that two accident victims 
blinded in an accident should have different outcomes if one of them chose not to 
buy insurance against this catastrophe. Assuming that both had an equal opportunity 
to insure against the catastrophe and that each had the same and correct information 
about the probabilities of it occurring, we have to conclude that the choice of one not 
to insure simply signals that sight was not as important to him as the thing upon 
which he spent his resources. Although this might seem harsh, it is, in Dworkin’s 
analysis, just. Equality of resources assumes that agents are equally endowed with 
reason and knowledge about the probability of certain outcomes, and are therefore in 
an equal position to choose whether to take gambles or not. They express their 
willingness to accept the risks of gambles -  or the size of the risk -  with their 
insurance-purchasing decisions (296-97). Ultimately, Dworkin believes that his 
conception of egalitarianism demonstrates that the value of equality can be 
successfully combined with the liberal emphasis on individual choice and personal 
responsibility.
Amartya Sen and Equality of Capability
In harmony with Dworkin, Sen takes the view that straight welfarist versions 
of egalitarianism are unsatisfactory. His famous example concerns the “cripple” who 
is nevertheless high in welfare because “he has a jolly disposition” or because “his 
heart leaps up whenever he sees a rainbow in the sky” (1982: 367). Despite his 
disability, the cripple is liable to be overlooked by welfarist equality since his 
welfare is high. Indeed, resources could be subtracted from his stock since he 
evidently has less need for them than someone with a sour disposition. More 
generally, according to Sen, welfarist equality fails to interrogate the background 
conditions that have led to a person’s current state. Compare someone who is bred 
for a luxurious life replete with great material wealth and endless opportunities, with
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someone who grows up on the edge of material adequacy, often lacking adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, education, and so on. The latter may not develop desires and 
preferences for the things he needs to have a flourishing life. A subjective 
egalitarianism like welfarism, which relies on people’s mental evaluations of their 
situations, cannot register the deprivations this person suffers if he has adapted 
himself to his reduced circumstances. Adaptive preferences loom large in Sen’s 
considerations of the currency of equality perhaps because much of his scholarship is 
in the field of development economics.
Although there are problems with welfarist egalitarianism, Sen argues that 
resourcist alternatives are not perfect either. An equality of resources approach 
directs our attention to people’s holdings of goods or things, which Sen terms 
‘fetishistic’: “Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather 
than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods” (1982:
366).12 The amounts of goods people hold might bear little relation to what they can 
do and be with them. The diversity of people’s needs -  “varying with health, 
longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, temperament and even 
body size” (366) -  means that the same amount of goods in the hands of two 
different individuals might have startlingly different impacts on their wellbeing. Call 
this the problem of ‘variable resource-conversion ability.’ Provided with identical 
baskets of food, for instance, a pregnant woman would derive less wellbeing and 
capability from hers than a non-pregnant woman. Sen argues that resource equality 
overlooks this problem.
Resources are obviously important to how people’s lives go, but they do not 
constitute the right “space” for interpersonal comparison. According to Sen, primary 
goods or resources only matter to us indirectly, for the role they play in the real 
freedom or capability to pursue one’s valued ends. The right space of comparison is 
“basic capability equality” (368). The capability approach distinguishes between 
functionings and capabilities. Functionings refer to the actual doings and beings that 
a person executes or enjoys, while capability refers to the overall set of available 
combinations of functionings. Sen also distinguishes between elementary 
functionings, such as being nourished and having good health, and complex 
functionings, such as happiness, self-respect, and taking part in the life of the
12 In later works (e.g. 1990; 1985), Sen includes within the scope of his critique Dworkin’s equality of 
resources ideal as well.
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community (1992: 39-40). Thus, Sen holds that we should judge a person’s position 
in a social arrangement using two perspectives: “(1) the actual achievement, and (2) 
the freedom to achieve. Achievement is concerned with what we manage to 
accomplish, and freedom with the real opportunity to accomplish what we value.
The two need not be congruent” (1992: 31). In essence, Sen argues from the point of 
view of equality, interpersonal comparisons should register both what goods do to 
human beings and what people are able to do and be with them. He suggests that his 
proposal can be seen as a “natural extension of Rawls’ view,” but that it shifts 
attention from “goods to what goods do to human beings” (368). Ultimately, Sen 
asserts, capability equality focuses on what really matters to us: our real freedom to 
achieve the ends we have reason to value.
Someone might wonder, however, if this approach represents such a big 
departure from a resourcist approach after all. Sen emphasises that “the conversion 
o f ... primary goods and resources into freedom to select a particular life and to 
achieve may vary from person to person,” and thus, “equality in holdings of primary 
goods or resources can go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms 
enjoyed by different persons” (Sen 1990: 115). This objection seems to embarrass 
straight equality of resources which assigns identical bundles to everyone. But 
Dworkin recognises the inadequacy of this scheme, and responds to the problem 
through allowing individuals to insure against disability and other factors which 
interfere with their achieving their aims. How is what Sen proposes different from 
equality of resources?
The answer to this is not straightforward. Addressing the question from the 
perspective of the currency debates, some writers maintain that capability equality 
distinguishes itself from resource equality because it takes into account the effects of 
prevailing social attitudes and practices on people’s prospects (e.g. Robeyns 2003a; 
Williams 2002a). For example, in some societies, men and boys are favoured over 
women and girls at mealtimes, leading to malnutrition for females. As a 
straightforward resource disadvantage, both approaches would register this 
difference. However, women are sometimes prevented from flourishing because of 
social norms discouraging them from pursuing certain occupations or doing certain 
things available to men. Some argue that the capability approach is sensitive to
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inequalities traceable to these cultural and social factors whereas equality of 
resources is not.13
Dworkin’s view is that, as it has been expressed to date, Sen’s capability 
approach suffers from an ambiguity (2000: chapter 7). Some of Sen’s passages 
imply that he is interested in equalising people’s ‘complex’ functioning such as 
happiness; if this is right, he essentially argues for a form of equality of welfare. On 
the other hand, Dworkin argues, it is possible to derive an interpretation of capability 
equality that is virtually identical to resource equality. And since Sen is expressly 
interested in moving away from welfarist approaches, this seems a reasonable 
interpretation. Specifically with regard to the putative inability of resource equality 
to respond to certain gender inequalities, Dworkin argues that his overall egalitarian 
view supports the same sort of programmes to empower women in societies with 
traditional gender practices as the capability approach (2002). I look at this debate in 
detail in chapter three.
In any event, whatever the differences between the two approaches turn out to 
be, these discussions tend to be conducted from within a shared frame of reference 
that takes for granted certain assumptions underpinning liberal egalitarianism, such 
as the notion that the ‘equality of what?’ question captures what is really at stake in 
egalitarian politics. From a perspective wider than the currency debate, the 
differences between Sen’s approach and those articulated by Dworkin and the other 
luck egalitarians to be discussed here proliferate. For starters, Sen does not appear to 
be quite as wrapped up in the intricacies of the ‘expensive tastes’ debate as other 
theorists. Dworkin and Cohen have batted the problem of ‘expensive tastes’ back 
and forth in a series of articles of ever-increasing complexity,14 while Sen “maintains 
a peculiar aloofness” from this debate (Browne and Stears 2005: 357). Moreover, 
Sen’s emphasis on the importance of agents’ freedom seems to set him apart.15 
While this issue is too complex to explore here, this view chimes with Sen’s own
13 In the case of individuals with disabilities so severe that it will be very costly to equalise them, 
Williams (2002a) suggests that Sen’s programme would be more radical, as in more redistributive, 
than Dworkin’s since he recommends “redressing such inequalities only to the extent required to 
mimic the operation of a fair hypothetical insurance market” (Williams 2002a: 28). Although he is 
not considering the similarities and differences between Dworkin’s and Sen’s theories, Kymlicka’s 
(2002: 78) analysis of equality of resources’s commitment to the severely disabled supports 
Williams’s interpretation.
14 For Dworkin’s side, see (1981a; 1981b; 2000; 2004). For Cohen’s side, see (1993; 1989; 2004).
15 See, for example, Agarwal, Humphries, and Robeyns (2003) and other contributors to the special 
edition of Feminist Economics (2003, Vol 9 No 2/3) on Sen’s work.
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perception of the difference between his approach and Rawls’s and Dworkin’s 
resourcism. While they focus on the means to freedom, Sen argues that he focuses 
on freedom itself (1990: 115). Finally, Sen’s explicit and pointed attention to gender 
also sets him apart from luck egalitarians. That women are disadvantaged compared 
to men in all societies (though in diverse ways and with diverse consequences), has 
not escaped the notice of luck egalitarians.16 Yet of the putative luck egalitarians, 
Sen alone insistently presents gender differences, and specifically bodily differences 
between women and men, as a vital factor to consider when we try to select the most
• 17satisfactory account of human advantage (see, for example, Sen 1995; 1990). 
“Messy” topics like pregnancy and neonatal care -  and what these things do to the 
capacity of agents to pursue lives they have reason to value in societies which 
routinely make no special provisions for them -  do not appear, by contrast, in 
Dworkin’s discourse of resource equality. Sen’s feminism sets him apart from other 
theorists who have pursued the ‘equality of what’ question, and it likely helps to 
account for the capability approach’s popularity within feminist circles,18 in contrast 
to the other versions.
This is not to deny the relevance of Sen’s work to luck egalitarianism. From 
the perspective of the currency debate, capability equality certainly figures as an 
important contribution, alongside primary goods, welfare, resources, opportunity for 
welfare and access to advantage. Like the other writers considered here, Sen has 
situated his work on distributive justice in the “post-Rawlsian” liberal egalitarian 
tradition. Additionally, both the essence of the existing egalitarian literature and the 
shape of future contributions to it were neatly captured by Sen’s question, ‘equality 
of what?’. Perhaps most importantly, Sen’s contributions are an important reference 
point in the subsequent development of the luck egalitarian tradition by writers such 
as Dworkin, Cohen, and Ameson, who are commonly regarded as central figures in
16 See for example, Dworkin (2002) wherein he acknowledges sexist pressures on women to assume 
sole responsibility for the care of children to be unjust; Cohen (1997: 4) wherein he says he 
“endorses” the substance of the feminist slogan “the personal is political”; and Ameson (1997) 
wherein he suggests that social norms around sex roles lead to unfairness. Egalitarian philosophers 
(e.g. Matravers 2002: 566) sometimes credit Sen (1985) with introducing the problem of the ‘tamed 
housewife’ specifically to egalitarian debates. However, as far as I am aware, Thomas Hill (1973) 
first introduced the figure -  he called her the Deferential Wife -  to contemporary moral philosophy 
more broadly.
17 Sen suggests, for example, that other theories of equality typically “assume away” the biological 
differences between women and men, which “induce[s] some systematic errors in understanding the 
correspondence between the space of primary goods and that of freedoms to achieve” (1995: 264).
18 See, for example, Anderson (1999); Burtner (2000); Nussbaum (2000a; 1999); Robeyns (Robeyns 
2003a; 2003b); and the special issue of Feminist Economics mentioned in the previous note.
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the tradition. Sen’s contributions are constitutive of the luck egalitarian tradition in 
their own right and also because they have prompted others to clarify and harden 
aspects of their competing approaches. However, for the reasons set out in the 
preceding paragraph, I shall not include Sen as a “core” luck egalitarian in the rest of 
the thesis.
Welfarist Challenges to Equality of Resources
In this section and the next, we consider the work of two theorists who are 
not convinced that Dworkin has discredited welfare egalitarianism as an appealing 
conception of equality, and have, as a result, engaged very closely with his claims. 
Although Cohen and Ameson reject straight equality of welfare because it panders to 
expensive tastes, and therefore ignores personal responsibility. “Individuals can 
arrive at different welfare levels due to choices they make for which they alone 
should be held responsible,” yet equality of welfare insists on overriding the effects 
of these choices by re-establishing equal welfare (Ameson 1989: 83). However, they 
believe modified versions of the ideal are appealing.
Cohen and Ameson attempt to problematise the “cut” that Dworkin makes 
between a person and his resources. As noted, Dworkin distinguishes the person 
(including his tastes, preferences and ambitions, in other words, his personality), and 
his resources (comprised of his social circumstances and native talents and abilities). 
On Dworkin’s view, shares should not be unequal because of resource differences, 
but are allowed to vary according to people’s personalities, expressed through their 
tastes and ambitions. Cohen and Ameson argue that Dworkin’s cut is inconsistent 
with his own stated commitment to ambition-sensitivity and endowment- 
insensitivity. Cohen’s counter-example features Paul, whose passion is photography, 
and Fred, whose favourite hobby is fishing. The activities are not equally available 
to Paul and Fred because, in their economy, photography just happens to be more 
expensive to pursue. Cohen states that the “egalitarian thing to do is to subsidize 
Paul’s photography” (1989: 923) since he is worse off in a way that is beyond his 
control; his disadvantage is rooted in their society’s market economy. Ameson’s 
similar counter-example features a government which has agreed to pay benefits to 
two native tribes who are equally badly off. The tribes are identical except that one 
group’s important religious ceremonies involve alcohol while the other group’s 
ceremonies require peyote. If the market price of peyote should suddenly rise while
31
alcohol remains cheap, members of the first group seem entitled to claim an increase 
in their benefit payments to help cover the new costs.19
Dworkin would reject subsidising Paul and the tribe. Recall that, for his 
theory, the contingent facts of a society, including its available resources and the 
desires of its population, which factor into its price system, are not grounds on which 
someone might challenge a distribution as unequal. Cohen, however, argues that 
egalitarianism should try to insulate people’s fates from the arbitrary effects of the 
market, meaning that his account “mandates less market pricing” (923). When the 
expensiveness of a taste is attributable to the contingent effects of the market or the 
distribution of natural resources, it is inconsistent with a choice-sensitive 
egalitarianism to burden an individual with its cost.
A second way that equality of resources, as developed by Dworkin, is 
unfaithful to choice-sensitivity is in the area of unchosen tastes. Cohen agrees with 
Dworkin that Louis’s deliberately cultivated taste for champagne should not be 
compensated because Louis is responsible for his condition. But what about Louis 
II, who was schooled by his parents into a taste for champagne, unaware of what it 
would cost him later in life?20 According to Cohen, “Dworkin says: sorry, Louis, we 
egalitarians do not finance expensive tastes; whereas I say: sorry, Louis, we 
egalitarians do not finance expensive tastes which people choose to develop” (1989: 
923). The counter-example suggests a shift from straight equality of welfare to 
equality of opportunity for welfare: the latter dismisses Louis I’s claims on the 
grounds that he chose the taste, but compensates Louis II since he blamelessly found 
himself with the taste.
According to Cohen, the upshot is, we should ask whether an individual 
could have done or could now do anything about his disadvantage: “Whatever 
number of dimensions the space of disadvantage may have, egalitarianism, on my 
reading, cuts though each of its dimensions, judging certain inequalities of advantage 
as acceptable and others as not, its touchstone being a set of questions about the
19 A parallel example from David Miller (1990) also features intoxicating commodities. Criticising 
Dworkin’s theory, Miller writes, “We have already said that, given my bundle of goods, if I choose to 
cultivate a taste for champagne and so have less welfare overall, that is my responsibility. But the 
problem now is one of a general shift from, say, beer-drinking to wine-drinking, which will enhance 
the value of all bundles of goods containing vineyards and depress the value o f all bundles of goods 
containing hop-plantations. It will be difficult for an egalitarian to agree that I should lose out because 
of changes in other people’s tastes (supposing I own a hop-plantation)” (1990: 89; italics in original).
20 It is Matt Matravers (2002) not Cohen, who uses the Louis I and II motif which I adopt here.
responsibility or lack of it of the disadvantaged agent” (921). In other words, it 
should be immaterial for egalitarians if an agent suffers a resource or welfare deficit. 
What matters is if he is responsible for those deficits because his voluntary choices 
and actions produced them. Paul and Louis II have involuntary expensive tastes, and 
if Dworkin really wants to be consistent on the role of choice in determining 
distributive shares, he should accept that these examples demonstrate that some 
expensive tastes ought to be compensated.
However, Dworkin anticipates that a partisan of welfare equality, by 
appealing to the role of choice and deliberateness, can claim to escape the expensive 
taste objection, effecting a move from straight equality of welfare to equality of 
opportunity for welfare. But consider the situation of Jude, a man who has fewer 
resources than everyone else but is satisfied with his life until he reads Hemingway 
and acquires a taste to travel to Spain to see the bullfights. Should he be given the 
funds he requires to satisfy his longing? Dworkin suggests that egalitarians should 
say yes, in light of the fact that he had less than his fair share of resources to begin 
with, and “as things fall out,” will still have less than anyone else after the transfer 
(1981a: 239). But, Dworkin argues, if welfare egalitarians grant this request, they 
will be inconsistent. On one hand, they have refused to subsidise Louis’s 
deliberately cultivated expensive taste, but now they appear to wish to subsidise 
Jude’s expensive taste. “The reason Louis is undeserving of an increase is simply 
that the taste he has cultivated is expensive. Jude’s new taste may be just as 
expensive. The difference is that Louis asks that more than an equal share of social 
resources be put at the disposal of his life while Jude asks only that something closer 
to an equal share be put at the disposal of his” (Dworkin 1981a: 239).21
Cohen’s response is as follows. He concedes that even equality of 
opportunity for welfare falls before the case of Jude: a “believer in equality of 
opportunity for welfare has to keep Jude poor, since he did not have to become a 
bullfight-lover” (1989: 925). However, he believes his own theory, equality of 
access to advantage, survives. It would award Jude the “funds he needs to travel to 
Spain” but would also require Jude to “accept some deduction from the normal
21 Dworkin omits stating a crucial assumption necessary to make the examples tell against equality of 
opportunity of welfare. In his account, it is unclear if  Jude deliberately cultivated his new taste for 
bullfighting, or if it snuck up on him. If it is the latter, then equality of opportunity welfarists can 
subsidise Jude with no inconsistency. However, Williams’s account of Dworkin’s dilemma explicitly 
supplies the key missing assumption that Jude consciously cultivated the new desire, which Williams 
evidently takes to be implicit in Dworkin’s (2002: 379).
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resource stipend because of his fortunate high ability to get welfare out of resources” 
(925). He suggests, in other words, that it would award more to Jude than equality of 
opportunity for welfare would, but less than equality of resources. Not too hot, not 
too cold; just right. This is an uncharacteristically vague response by Cohen. He 
suggests that his particular response to Jude is derived from the general principle of 
equality of access to advantage (925), but does not explain how. There is no way to 
get a sense of the amount of resources Jude would be assigned, relative to others, 
under his scheme -  just the travel money? Slightly less than what others have? It is 
hard to see how equality of access to advantage would define a non-arbitrary level of 
subsidy to Jude.22
Cohen does not address directly what Matthew Clayton and Andrew 
Williams (1999: 449) deem to be a more serious implication raised by the Louis/Jude 
dilemma, although it is alluded to in his remark about Jude’s good fortune in 
converting resources to welfare. If there is any move by egalitarians towards 
“keeping Jude poor,” as Cohen says -  and the idea is that equality of opportunity for 
welfare does so, and equality of access to advantage would keep him poorer than 
Dworkin’s scheme -  this raises the issue of welfare egalitarians’ response to adaptive 
preferences. It is consistent with equality of opportunity for welfare to grant Jude’s 
request if his originally cheap tastes are traceable to his deprived childhood. He 
simply found himself in this unfortunate circumstance, and therefore cannot be held 
consequentially responsible for the welfare loss that accompanies the shift from his 
cheap or adaptive preferences to his new, more enlightened ones. However, where 
adaptive preferences are absent -  his cheap tastes are genuine -  welfare 
egalitarianism is committed to withholding resources. “To do so is unobjectionable, 
welfarists claim, since it would be unjust to ignore her good fortune in being able to 
convert resources into utility more effectively than others” (Clayton and Williams 
1999: 450).
Interestingly, although they are not explicit about this, Clayton and Williams 
convey the sense that it is perverse for egalitarians to regard being endowed with 
cheap tastes as a type of good fortune. Yet, this is clearly the intuition behind 
Cohen’s remark. And I submit that it is not foreign to other egalitarians -  me, for
22 This is an ironic outcome, since one of the main appeals of luck egalitarian approaches to equality is 
said to be their non-arbitrariness (see Ameson (2002) for assertions to this effect, but Wolff (1998) for 
doubts). This issue will be touched on in chapter six.
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one. Recently, my friend and I were busy congratulating ourselves on the fact that, 
because neither one of has ever known true riches (by western standards), we find 
ourselves thrilled to bits for a week with something as humble as a box of new 
stationary. Clayton and Williams do not offer any arguments as to why the more 
natural or acceptable response from egalitarians is to think that having cheap tastes 
is bad fortune.
This omission highlights the need for egalitarian theories that rely heavily on 
individual choice to provide an account of healthy preference-formation. In equality 
of resources, citizens have, by hypothesis, authentic preferences. In much of the 
essay, there is a tendency not to examine the origin of preferences and ambitions. 
Rather, it discusses and compares adults whose ambitions are in place at the moment 
we encounter them, such as Adrian who wants to be a farmer and Bruce who wants 
to play tennis (305). Cohen criticises this omission in Dworkin, suggesting at one 
point that people do not straightforwardly choose their ambitions, as Dworkin 
implies. But he does not provide an account of healthy preference formation. 
Ameson defines ‘ideally considered preferences’ (1989: 83), but he too does not 
discuss what social conditions would facilitate individuals’ forming these authentic 
preferences. Luck egalitarians’ principled commitments to autonomy and authentic 
preferences are not a substitute for providing a substantial account of how autonomy 
is defined and, especially, how it is acquired and protected. I discuss the nature of 
preference formation and adaptive tastes, and satisfactory egalitarian responses to 
them, in chapters two and three.
As noted above, Dworkin argues that equality of resources compensates those 
who suffer from obsessions. He justifies what might at first appear to be a 
concession to expensive tastes by arguing that people renounce their obsessions, 
whereas they embrace and identify with their tastes. It seems that few egalitarians 
have been persuaded by this, and I find myself in agreement with them (see, for 
example, Ameson 1989: 81; Cohen 1989: 925-927; Matravers 2002).23 The appeal 
of equality of resources when it encounters the disabled person who requires a 
wheelchair to get around is that it says we must supply that person with the 
additional resources to compensate for the deficiency in her native endowments so 
that she then has the same amount of resources as everyone else to pursue her life
23 Matravers’s analysis (2002) is exceptionally helpful in tracing the intricacies of the expensive taste 
debates, and interpreting Dworkin’s complex position on the subject.
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plans. In the case of the person afflicted with an overactive libido, the thought 
appears to be that we will give him extra money to buy the chocolates and flowers he 
needs to woo the women he requires to satisfy his sex drive, so that he can then get 
on with the rest of his life and the plans to which he actually attributes value. This 
differs from welfare egalitarianism -  we are not asking about his mental state; we 
just want to know that the extra resources let him meet the extra burdens flowing 
from his ‘disability.’ But who cares? It still sounds a lot like having one’s cake and 
eating it too, and I submit that few egalitarians will sympathise with Dworkin’s 
apparent inclination to channel extra resources to the sex maniac. It does not seem 
fair for someone to complain that something is an unwanted craving and get the 
resources needed to satisfy it, while at another level it appears that he is simply 
enjoying the fruits of the addiction. As Matt Matravers puts it, “it is not clear that 
consequential responsibility disappears with the agent’s renouncing some aspect of 
his personality. A selfish person who behaves shoddily to another is not necessarily 
relieved of responsibility for this by saying how much he wishes he were not selfish, 
even if he is sincere” (2002: 568). Dworkin’s other illustrative example of an 
expensive-taste-cum-craving, a person with a taste for opera, is also unpersuasive. In 
offering compensation to the opera-obsession-plagued person, equality of resources 
supposes that what she regrets is the taste for opera itself. This seems to be a 
misreading of the situation. It seems more likely that what she actually regrets is the 
fact that her taste for opera is expensive (Cohen 1989: 925-27).
Even though equality of resources is unpersuasive on this issue, it has the 
advantage of providing at least some sort of limit to the types of inequalities that 
warrant compensation. The stricter adherence to the chance/choice distinction that 
Cohen counsels faces two problems. The first is the impossibility of distinguishing 
what portion of a person’s disadvantage is due to choice and what portion to chance. 
Cohen differs from Dworkin in that he more clearly represents tastes and ambitions 
as a mixture of choice and circumstance. Indeed, he famously suggests that making 
choice central to distributive justice “lands political philosophy in the morass of the 
free will problem” (1989: 934). Nevertheless, he appears committed to this 
trajectory. It seems hard to understand why Cohen is so fixed on choice if he 
believes that ascertaining the effects of choice in a person’s situation is extremely 
difficult or impossible. Maureen Ramsay argues that there
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seems to be little point in insisting that it is unjust for people to be 
disadvantaged in ways that they did not freely choose, while highlighting 
that what is chosen is indeterminate. If distinguishing choice is so 
‘awesomely difficult’ and ‘genuine choice may be a chimera,’ then it is 
not clear why Cohen believes that the issue is so indispensable to a 
defensible egalitarian theory... Cohen’s commitment to responsibility 
could be seen as contingent on a positive answer to the question of 
genuine choice. But, if there is one, he has not provided it and his 
emphasis on choice and responsibility goes against the grain of his own 
arguments which imply the likelihood of a negative answer to that 
question (2005a: 441-42).
The other problem concerns where to draw the limits on what is compensated 
under a welfarist version of egalitarianism. Cohen promotes a version of 
egalitarianism that compensates for disadvantage, regardless of what sort it is, 
provided it is unchosen. Consider an exchange between anti-egalitarian John Kekes 
(1997) and Rawlsian egalitarian Linda Barclay (1999). Kekes argues that 
egalitarians’ zeal to compensate people for all kinds of inequalities leads to absurdity. 
His example: egalitarianism must hold that men be compensated for the fact that, on 
average, they have shorter life spans than women, and women should be ushered into 
the sorts of stressful and dangerous jobs and roles that contribute to men’s shortened 
life expectancy. Barclay replies that Kekes (who, interestingly, refers mainly to 
Rawls but in my view would have been more on target if he had cited the luck 
egalitarians’ views) has failed to notice the Rawlsian emphasis on equalising primary 
social goods. She writes: “A man might not like the way his wife cooks his dinner 
either, but this fact would not generally be considered a matter of national priority, 
something to be addressed by the constitution, parliament, or the judiciary... Not all 
o f the things that people want or need can or should be addressed at the political 
lever (1999: 89, italics added). To move to a more general level, the point is, we 
should also view inequalities from the perspective of what citizens can reasonably be 
asked to compensate other citizens for. (This is an important theme within 
Anderson’s critique, as will be discussed in chapter six.) The chance/choice 
egalitarianisms canvassed here do not address this point.
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Alternative Currencies of Equality
Cohen and Ameson believe we should not eschew welfarism altogether since 
it still seems to tug on our sympathies as egalitarians. Dworkin is wrong to argue 
that involuntary resource deficits entirely occupy the space of egalitarian concern.
To show this, Cohen presents a character who has involuntary resource and 
involuntary welfare deficits: a man who does not have the use of his legs. “To get 
around, he needs an expensive wheelchair. Egalitarians will be disposed to 
recommend that he be given one. And they will be so disposed before they have 
asked about the welfare level to which the man’s paralysis reduces him” (1989: 917). 
So this character confirms Dworkin’s claim that what induces egalitarian action on 
his behalf is just his involuntary resource-deficit. But, Cohen announces, “I have not 
completed my description of the man’s misfortune. There is also something wrong 
with his arms. He is not less able to move them than most people are: I shall assume, 
to make my point more vivid, that he is especially good at moving them. But there 
is, nevertheless, something seriously wrong with them...: after he moves them, he 
suffers severe pain in his arm muscles” (918). Egalitarians will also be moved to 
compensate the man for this disadvantage; for example, by supplying expensive 
medicine which suppresses the pain that otherwise would follow arm movement. 
Cohen argues that this dispensation is a response to the man’s involuntary welfare 
deficit. “A would-be resource egalitarian who said, ‘Compensation is in order here 
because the man lacks the resource of being able to avoid pain’ would be invoking 
the idea of equality of opportunity for welfare even if he would be using resourcist 
language to explain it” (919). There are situations where, really, our response to 
people’s misfortune is a response to their welfare disadvantage, and that response 
goes all the way down, as it were, and is not grounded on resourcist intuitions (923- 
24).
Though Dworkin’s critique of welfare egalitarianism is powerful, according 
to Cohen, there appear to be good reasons to keep welfare alive as a metric of 
egalitarian concern. Or, as Ameson (1989) puts it in his own critique of Dworkin, 
the problems with welfare equality should not “stampede” us in the direction of 
equality of resources, since the latter too has problems.
Cohen calls his approach “equality of access to advantage.” While his view 
resembles Sen’s in significant ways, he also hopes to clear up an ambiguity which, in 
his view, dogs Sen’s contribution. ‘Access’ is a wider concept than opportunity; it
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describes when someone has both the opportunity and the capability or wherewithal 
to do something. Thus, a person “enjoys access to something which he does not have 
only if he has both the opportunity and the capacity to obtain it” (1989: 941). To 
adapt an example from Cohen, imagine two people who are both capable of 
swimming, but only one of whom has the opportunity to swim because there is a 
pool in her neighbourhood. Or, imagine that both have the opportunity, but one lacks 
the capability because of a physical disability. These scenes point to different spaces 
or types of inequality.
According to Cohen, Sen identifies two dimensions of assessment that 
warrant egalitarian concern when comparing individuals’ situations in the world, but 
he then puts both these dimensions under the single name “capability” (942). Sen’s 
major contribution is this: he “pleaded for a metric of well-being which measured 
something falling between primary goods and utility” (942). This metric should be 
called ‘midfare,’ not capability, in order to avoid confusion. Midfare is a metric of 
equality that captures what “goods do to (or for) human beings, in abstraction from 
the utility [the goods] confer on them” (943). According to Cohen:
It is ... false that the normatively relevant effect on a person of his bundle of 
primary goods depends entirely on his mental reaction to what they do for 
him. There is also what welfarists ignore: what they do for him, what he gets 
out of them, apart from his mental reaction to or personal evaluation of that 
service. Consequently, Sen was right that, in the enterprise of assessing a 
person’s well-being, we must consider his condition or state in abstraction 
from its utility for him. We must look at something which is ‘posterior’ to 
‘having goods’ and ‘prior’ to ‘having utility.’ We must look, for example, at 
his nutrition level, and not just, as Rawlsians do, at his food supply, or as 
welfarists do, at the utility he derives from eating food (943).
Cohen argues that this intermediate dimension of comparison -  midfare -  is the right 
egalitarian metric. However Sen’s view is too “athletic.” He focuses too much on 
the fact that people want goods in order to do something with them. That is 
important, Cohen agrees, but goods can do good for people even if they don’t 
actively do anything with them. Supplied with nutritious food, an infant and an adult 
each derives welfare from the food even though only the adult actively feeds himself. 
Plenty of advantages are advantages for people without their volition or choice 
coming into it. According to Cohen, midfare is a “heterogeneous collocation” of
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advantage whose heterogeneity arises because “goods do categorically various things 
for people” (18). Sen basically got it right -  he identified midfare as a crucial 
dimension for comparing advantage -  but he confused the issue by using that concept 
interchangeably with capability, which is a different thing, and is properly 
understood as a subcategory to midfare.
One of the most helpful explanations of Cohen’s argument is his description 
of midfare as an intermediate position between goods and utility. “Each terminus of 
the goods-midfare-utility sequence has seemed to some the right focus for 
assessment of a person’s situation from an egalitarian point of view. Rawlsians look 
at the beginning of the sequence and welfarists look at its end. Welfarists think that 
the Rawlsian measure is too objective, that it takes too little account of distinguishing 
facts about individuals. Rawlsians think that the welfare measure is too subjective, 
that it takes too much account of just such facts” (18-19). Because midfare is 
heterogeneous, it takes on board both concerns. It retains an objective measure of 
advantage, insofar as it captures what goods like food do to people regardless of their 
mental evaluation of that benefit. But it also retains the fact that advantage 
comparisons between people are a subjective affair since people’s physical and 
aspirational diversity means that they will have diverse rankings of the importance of 
different sorts of achievements.
Ameson argues for equality of opportunity for welfare, which obtains when 
“all persons face effectively equivalent arrays of options” and where the expected 
value of each person’s best set of options is the same as everyone else’s best set of 
options (85-86). (Notice that this resembles Dworkin’s envy test, in that it takes 
people’s own estimations of their ideal life as the standard.) The way we discover 
whether such a state of affairs obtains is by constructing a decision tree for each 
individual that gives a complete life history. “Given that one or another choice is 
made and one or another outcome realized, the agent would then face another array 
of choices, then another, and so on” (85). Everyone will have multiple life paths 
with differing amounts of value that each person attaches to each path. An 
individual’s first choice or preferred life path should be of equivalent value to every 
other individual’s first preference, and the second-best to every other’s second-best, 
and so on. The following is a good description of the norm: “when an age cohort 
reaches the onset of responsible adulthood, they enjoy equal opportunity for welfare 
when, for each of them, the best sequence of choices that it would be reasonable to
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expect the person to follow would yield the same expected welfare for all, the 
second-best sequence of choices would also yield the same expected welfare for all, 
and so on through the array of lifetime choice sequences each face” (1999: 488). 
When equality of opportunity for welfare obtains, then any inequalities we see 
between individuals must be the product of choices for which they can properly be 
held personally responsible.
Equality of opportunity for welfare immediately encounters the worries about 
adaptive preferences touched on earlier. The norm is entirely subjective: what counts 
is each individuals’ mental evaluations of the value of the various life plans before 
them at the age of maturity. But consider an individual whose family background is 
bad. His parents have managed to stay just on the right side of criminal neglect: his 
nutrition, schooling, and playtime activities are just barely adequate. The array of 
life plans that he confronts at the onset of adulthood will be much more limited than 
the array more advantaged members of his cohort face. But equality of opportunity 
for welfare cannot register this difference if, as we might expect since he has known 
nothing better, he rates his best sequence of choices as equal in welfare value to the 
best sequence of choices facing someone from the most privileged background. 
People accommodate themselves to the options they perceive as within their grasp, 
and will also come to attach value to those options. Egalitarians should not 
necessarily respect these judgments when such differences in background conditions 
are suspected. Ameson does not consider this problem with his norm in the two 
main articles that express the ideal (1989; 1999)
In recent years, Ameson has endorsed what he calls ‘responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism’ or RCP for short (2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2004). In general, 
egalitarianism and prioritarianism are closely related moral views which hold that we 
should try to make the situations of disadvantaged persons better. Egalitarianism 
focuses on the gap between those who are well-off and those who are badly-off. In a 
choice between a world where everyone is doing moderately well and a world where 
half are doing moderately well and half quite well, the principle of equality says we 
should prefer the first. This view leaves equality open to the levelling down 
objection since it would prefer to waste resources rather than permit an inequality. 
Priority is concerned not with the gap or relative position of agents but their absolute 
positions. It says that benefiting people matters more the worse off they are. 
Inequality is not to be avoided at all costs. If, for some reason benefits can only go
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to more advantaged individuals and this distribution does not worsen the absolute 
position of the worst off group, then priority approves this. Equality does not since it 
widens the gap.24 Ameson writes, “The root idea of prioritarianism is that one ought 
as a matter of justice to aid the unfortunate, and the more badly off someone is, the 
more urgent is the moral imperative to aid” (2000a: 343). At the level of policy, 
however, the views tend to converge. Both doctrines will recommend policies that 
transfer resources from the better off to the worse off. The gap between the groups 
will therefore start to close and individuals’ conditions begin to converge.
According to Ameson, prioritarianism holds that “institutions and practices 
should be set and actions chosen to maximize moral value, with the stipulation that 
the moral value of obtaining a benefit for a person is greater, the greater the well­
being gain that the person would get from it, and greater, the lower the person’s 
lifetime expectation of well-being prior to receipt of the benefit” (2000a: 343).
Given two individuals A and B who are equally badly off, we will help the one who 
can be helped most by the benefit. This preserves Ameson’s concern (also evident in 
his promotion of equality of opportunity for welfare) to keep a welfarist dimension in 
egalitarianism, by making the standard utilitarian assumption that the worse-off a 
person is, the more utility he or she stands to gain from aid. He adds to this a 
principle of responsibility-catering, which responds to the degree of responsibility a 
person bears for her condition. Suppose that you and I are equally badly off, and a 
benefit from the state will increase our well-being by the same amount. But suppose 
that the benefit can only go to one of us. You are badly off because you were struck 
by lighting, while I am badly off because I freely gambled away all my money at the 
races. RCP says that the benefit should go to you in light of the fact that you are not 
responsible for being in a bad way, whereas I am. Overall, Ameson’s view gives a 
“version of weighted well being in which the moral value of well-being increments 
that we might obtain are adjusted twice -  once to give priority to the worse off, and 
again to reflect the degree of responsibility of each individual for her present 
condition” (2000: 96-97). (I discuss Ameson’s work in chapter six).
24 For an influential discussion of equality and priority, see Derek Parfitt (1998).
25 However, it should be noted that egalitarians would want to set a ceiling on sky-high incomes, and 
would think this is independently important, whereas prioritarians give no special consideration to 
this. Following the principle of Pareto optimality, prioritarians hold that when it is possible to move 
to a distribution that improves some people’s prospects without diminishing the prospects of anyone 
else, we should do so. I am grateful to Anne Phillips for this point.
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On my reading of his work, Ameson has preserved one key aspect of his 
earlier view and becomes somewhat ambiguous about another. The element 
preserved is a principle of responsibility. In his earlier account, he said that “people 
share equal opportunity for welfare just in case there is some time at which their 
opportunities are equal and if any inequalities in their opportunities at later times are 
due to their voluntary choice or differentially negligent behavior for which they are 
rightly deemed personally responsible” (86). We have seen that in RCP, awards to 
needy individuals are to be tailored according to how responsible they are for their 
situation. In cases where the difference in welfare between them is not huge, RCP 
might even select a better off individual for attention before a worse off individual if 
the latter has been grossly negligent and the former has not.
The more ambiguous element, in making the shift from equality of 
opportunity for welfare to RCP, is how much and in what way individuals’ 
subjective evaluations matter. In his older view, Ameson argued that it was 
individuals’ own evaluations of the life options before them that mattered in 
determining whether they are equal or not. It is not as clear in RCP how individuals’ 
mental evaluations factor in. Ameson holds that there is an external standard for 
determining how badly off individuals are relative to one another. In RCP, we 
compare people according to “the quality of life that individuals reach by these 
means [tools and means and opportunities], in other words their level of well-being, 
where this is identified neither with bare preference satisfaction nor enjoyment but 
with achievement of what is objectively worthwhile or choiceworthy in human life” 
(341). Even though Ameson invokes a standard of what is “objectively” worthwhile 
for a human life, presumably, individuals must be able to decide for themselves what 
they consider to be worthwhile achievements and goals in their own lives, even if 
those are now to be selected from within a narrower range.
For the rest of the thesis, I will usually assume that RCP represents Ameson’s 
preferred approach to distributive justice. As he notes, RCP is not, strictly speaking, 
an egalitarian doctrine (2000a). However, I think it is valid to treat Ameson as a 
representative of luck egalitarian views since he has stepped forward in several 
articles to defend egalitarianism, and specifically, luck egalitarianism, from its so- 
called “enemies” (Ameson 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2004).
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2 . K e y  S h a r e d  E l e m e n t s  in  L u c k  E g a l it a r ia n  T h e o r ie s
If we stand back a bit from the differences that have emerged amongst these 
egalitarian thinkers, the shared elements in their theories and approaches come to the 
fore. As variants of the broader doctrine of liberal egalitarianism, it is noticeable that 
they attempt to combine or balance classical liberalism’s commitment to liberty of 
choice and respecting the autonomy of the individual, on the one hand, and 
traditional egalitarianism’s commitment to making people equal. This combination 
therefore produces departures from what are perceived as the core or definitive 
values and norms of the two origin traditions. Luck egalitarians’ departures from 
classical liberal positions -  particularly the emphasis on individual liberties as being 
threatened by state interference -  prompt Gerald Gaus (Gaus 2000a) to label it 
‘revisionist liberalism.’ ‘Liberty reduced to equality’ is Gaus’s (not entirely 
approving) characterisation of Dworkin’s liberalism (2000a: 166). From the 
traditional egalitarian perspective, on the other hand, it looks as if luck egalitarians 
do too much pruning of the ideal of equality amongst citizens in order to 
accommodate the liberty of choice.26 Luck egalitarianism not only permits but 
actually requires people’s incomes to be unequal according to their choices. If, from 
the classical liberal perspective, luck egalitarianism can be summed up by the slogan, 
‘Liberty reduced to equality,’ the verdict from traditional egalitarians might be: 
‘Equal outcomes reduced to equal opportunities.’
The Chance/Choice Distinction
The luck egalitarian views canvassed here all assert that the chance/choice 
distinction is fundamental to egalitarian political morality, giving rise to its most 
basic commitment: to eliminate inequalities that are traceable to people’s unchosen
26 John Baker, for example, commenting on the recent egalitarian literature writes that these views are 
“philosophically forceful, but each seems to allow for greater inequalities of overall condition, 
however that is defined, than many egalitarians would hope for. For such [old] egalitarians, the core 
idea is ‘equality of outcome’ as opposed to either the forms of equal opportunity promoted by 
Ameson, Cohen and Dworkin, or the inequality of outcome expressed by the Difference Principle” 
(Baker 1992: 104). For observations along the lines that ‘old egalitarians’ favour equal outcomes in 
some form while ‘new egalitarians’ favour equal opportunities in some form, see also Phillips (1999: 
preface; 2004); Dworkin (2000: 1-7); Vallentyne (2002: 529); and Brown (2005b). Some posit that 
there is a valid distinction between old and new egalitarians, but call into question its sharpness.
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97circumstances; traceable, that is, to luck. The following statements are 
representative of those appeals. According to Dworkin, “the distinction between 
people’s choices and their circumstances is of central importance to justice.” He 
continues that “people are entitled to receive some form of compensation when they 
are handicapped or lack marketable talent, but not when and just because their tastes 
or ambitions are expensive to satisfy” (2003: 192). Ameson asserts that in “the ideal 
luck egalitarian society, there are no inequalities in people’s life prospects except 
those that arise through processes of voluntary choice or faulty conduct, for which 
the agents involved can reasonably be held responsible” (Ameson 2000a: 339). 
Cohen contends that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish 
the influence of brute luck on distribution. Bmte luck is an enemy of just equality, 
and, since effects of genuine choice contrasts with bmte luck, genuine choice 
excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities” (1989: 931). Their emphasis on 
extinguishing the effects of luck is what, in Anderson’s view, makes the term iuck 
egalitarianism’ so fitting. As we have seen, there are differences of opinion about 
how this fundamental egalitarian ambition should be interpreted and realised. 
Nevertheless, the general norm is clear enough, and clearly rests on an assumption 
that, in theory at least, it is possible to distinguish between inequalities that should be 
eliminated because of their origins in chance, and inequalities that are acceptable 
because of their origins in agents’ choices about how to live their lives. This core 
intuition is what distinguishes the approach, for example, from David Miller’s (1999) 
theory of justice which permits individuals’ distributive shares to vary according to 
some unchosen circumstances, such as personal talents.
A principle of individual responsibility arises out of this general luck 
egalitarian ambition. Provided an agent has been equipped with what is necessary to 
make rational decisions and choices (such as relevant facts, reasoning skills, and time 
to deliberate calmly and thoroughly about the potential effects of one’s choices and 
actions), then he should be the sole bearer of the consequences of his choices. Luck 
egalitarians also share the view that incorporating this responsibility principle into 
the heart of the egalitarian project is to be applauded. Dworkin, for example, 
suggests that it is a crowning achievement of contemporary egalitarians that they 
have achieved (or nearly achieved) a “unified account of equality and responsibility
27 Or, to put it another way, we could say that the aim is to ensure that only inequalities traceable to 
people’s choices remain. Accordingly, Smilansky (2003) calls the tradition ‘choice-egalitarianism.’
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that respects both” (2000: 7). Cohen, commenting on Dworkin’s theory, writes that 
he has “performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within 
it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice 
and responsibility” (1989: 933).28
Other egalitarians have worried about both aspects of this: both the centrality 
now accorded to the principle of responsibility in the egalitarian project, and whether 
its instalment is cause for celebration. Some wonder, for example, if agents should 
be required to be the sole bearers of the burdens of their choices even if they have 
been deliberately and rationally chosen by the agent (Mason 2000; Phillips 2004). 
Others suggest that the evident complexity of coming up with a reliable account of 
individual responsibility detains egalitarians unnecessarily when they could be 
focusing their efforts elsewhere (McKinnon 2003; Ramsay 2005a). These concerns 
constitute one of the most significant areas of critique and some will be addressed in 
chapter three.
A commonality in the positions defended by Dworkin, Cohen, and Ameson is 
that we should condemn and try to ameliorate inequalities that are traceable purely to 
bad bmte luck. As we have seen, disability and having meagre native talents are the 
archetypal examples of the sort of bad luck that generates objectionable inequality. 
This luck-centric characterisation of the source of objectionable inequality 
encounters at least three important, and interrelated, objections. The first is that it 
creates an over-large category of objectionable inequalities. Some egalitarians 
believe that not all inequalities that are the effects of differences in luck are morally 
bad, thereby warranting redistribution. This, for example, is Miller’s view. 
Differences in native powers are differences in our luck, but he argues that we are 
entitled to keep some of the benefits that flow from our powers, even if we had no 
control over what talents we are bom with (1999). The second is that it illegitimately 
presumes that certain differences in luck represent lamentable misfortunes, rather 
than merely ordinary human difference and variety. This is clear in its assumption 
that disabilities are generally to be regarded as misfortunes (Anderson 1999a; Young 
1990).
28 Similarly, John Roemer writes: ‘One, if not the, major accomplishment o f egalitarian theory since 
Rawls’s reinvention of the field thirty years ago, is the inclusion of considerations of responsibility’ 
(2002a: 470).
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The third is that the catch-all category of ‘luck’ is under-specified. It treats as 
morally equivalent inequalities that have morally different causes. The unhappiness 
caused by having a hooked nose is regarded as equivalent to the unhappiness caused 
by involuntary homelessness (Anderson 1999a). The inequality resulting from low 
native skills is treated as equivalent to the inequality resulting from racist 
employment discrimination. These examples point to different axes of objectionable 
inequality -  natural and social. Moreover, within the latter, there are inequalities 
directly caused by individual wrongdoers (e.g. bigots or neglectful parents) and there 
are inequalities whose cause is also social wrongdoing, but is more diffuse, not 
traceable to a single individual, or social practice or institution. The uncritical use of 
the category of luck to identify objectionable inequalities empties it of the concept of 
wrongdoing, and more generally, it deprives us of the opportunity to think carefully 
about the morally relevant differences between both different types of inequalities 
and their different origins.
It should be noted that someone who makes these criticisms is not committed 
to saying that luck-based inequalities are morally unobjectionable. This is the 
erroneous conclusion that Ameson appears to draw in an essay defending the core 
ideal of luck egalitarianism. He writes that the “difference between human misery 
caused by natural disaster such as a flood and human misery caused by social 
interactions does not for RCP mark the line between a space wherein social coercion 
[for the purposes of redistribution] is prohibited and a space wherein social coercion 
might be morally acceptable” (2000a: 346). He thereby implies that the opposite 
norm -  that natural disasters producing inequality do not warrant distribution -  can 
be attributed to Anderson. This is false, as will be demonstrated in chapter six. (By 
way of preview, Anderson would appeal to norms of basic capability and a minimum 
threshold of human functioning to ground redistribution to a flood victim, for 
example.) Someone can reasonably and consistently criticise the way luck 
egalitarians lump all natural and social misfortunes and evils into the general 
category of luck without thereby having to be insensitive to luck-caused inequality.
In general, the conceptual and moral difficulties encountered by an egalitarian 
approach that seeks to attribute the cause of all objectionable inequalities to a single 
factor, luck, indicates that egalitarians should prefer a more pluralistic approach to 
justice. I will argue this in subsequent chapters.
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Finally, luck egalitarianism constitutes a highly individualised approach to 
the problem of inequality. This is revealed by the previous set of objections, which 
note that individualised sources of inequality, such as agents’ discrete choices to 
choose this occupation or that hobby, are run together with social sources of 
inequality. This ill-equips the project to conceptualise and address some of the most 
pressing problems of contemporary social inequality, including gender and racial 
hierarchies (Anderson 1999a; Armstrong 2003; Hinton 2001; Levey 2005; Mason 
2000; Phillips 1999; 2004; Robeyns 2003a; Scheffler 2003a; 2003b; 2005; 
Schwartzman 2000; Williams 2002). This is clearly a major and wide-ranging 
critique. The following sections point out other aspects of this criticism, while 
chapters two through four investigate it in further depth.
Eliminating Luck’s Effects
In the luck egalitarian discourse, much effort goes into articulating and 
defining the norm of equal distribution that the theory recommends. By contrast, 
relatively little effort goes into saying anything about how that norm would be 
implemented and executed. This is not a point only about the implementation of luck 
egalitarian norms through public policies in real societies, although that too is a 
neglected area within the literature. The point, rather, is that the issue is neglected 
even at the theoretical level. One way this neglect reveals itself is in the ambiguities 
and slippages in the language concerning how to address inequalities deemed 
objectionable by the preferred norm.
Arguably, ‘redistribution’ is the most popular theoretical concept used in this 
regard by luck egalitarians. In many places, luck egalitarians refer to the 
redistribution or transfers that must take place between individuals to correct for the 
undeserved inequalities. However, other concepts appear regularly too, and tend to 
be used interchangeably with one another. Referring back to the expressions of the 
luck egalitarian ambition, for example, we see that Dworkin argues that “people are 
entitled to receive some form of compensation” for undeserved inequalities, while 
Cohen refers to the commitment to “extinguish” inequalities that are unchosen. This 
latter term is particularly capacious. It could mean giving Louis II a case of 
champagne itself, or the funds to buy his champagne, or the chance to enrol in a re­
education programme to school him out of his expensive taste.
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To this observation, someone might reasonably say: so what? What is the big 
deal if luck egalitarians tend to use ‘redistribute’ interchangeably with ‘compensate,’ 
‘subsidise,’ ‘eliminate’ and the others? Everyone knows what is intended, and the 
bottom line is the same: in some way to improve the prospects of a person who has 
been identified as deserving of aid. This response does not seem right, however, 
since there are important theoretical as well as moral differences in these different 
forms of remedy. ‘Redistribution,’ for example, is a fairly neutral term, relative to 
some of the others (although evidently not in the minds of many New Labour 
politicians (Levitas 1998). ‘Compensation,’ on the other hand, implies that the 
recipient has suffered a misfortune, and furthermore, implies that the misfortune will 
not be eliminated, but rather, the person will be given enough money so that she 
becomes indifferent to it. Some of these issues will be taken up in chapter four, but 
for now, the general point is simply that treating these concepts as interchangeable, 
as luck egalitarians tend to do, is unfortunate because each one does carry particular 
implications (Wolff 2002, 2003).
One reason these conceptual slippages and ambiguities in luck egalitarian 
discourse may occur is because, in a perfectly realised luck egalitarian world, the 
task of remedying inequalities would seldom arise anyway. In many ways, luck 
egalitarianism simply detours around the problems of how we correct unjust 
inequalities. This detour takes the form of a canonical moment of perfect equality -  
another feature common to the theories under consideration here. The idea is that we 
need not worry our heads about how to ‘extinguish’ or ‘subsidise’ unjust inequalities 
if the only inequalities that arise are deemed acceptable from the point of view of the 
ideal. This canonical moment is explicit in Dworkin’s theory (the auction and 
hypothetical insurance markets are both examples) and in Ameson’s equality of 
opportunity for welfare, and is implied by Cohen’s equality of access to advantage. 
Thus, as Ameson writes, “in the ideal luck egalitarian society, there are no 
inequalities in people’s life prospects” except those that arise through choice; 
consequently, there is no need for redistribution or eliminating of inequalities after 
that canonical moment.
The device of the canonical moment of equality encounters several 
objections. Clare Chambers (2005) notes that the canonical moment of equal 
opportunity (or MEO) is usually imagined to occur “at age 18, when applications for 
universities or jobs are submitted” (4). And, indeed, Ameson asserts that it is the
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moment of majority in his theory. She argues that this approach, which “reaches 
ever backwards into people’s histories, investigating their backgrounds, the 
advantages they have previously enjoyed, and even their genetic endowments, 
obscures the fact that chains of equality-of-opportunity-upsetting events reach into 
the future as well as the past” (4). The imaginary and arbitrarily located MEO 
imposes a problematic division between two halves of an individual’s life. 
Misfortunes in the first half, before the MEO, are rectified by luck egalitarians’ 
schemes, while misfortunes that befall the individual after the MEO are deemed 
acceptable. A similar objection is made by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (1999) to 
Ameson’s equality of opportunity for welfare. Suppose that two people make their 
most pmdent choice of life plan and that within each sequence of life choices, each 
faces the unavoidable risk that a volcano near her house will erupt. In the end, only 
one volcano empts, killing the nearby resident. The objection says that equality of 
opportunity for welfare does not care about this inequality since the two enjoyed 
perfect equality at the onset of adulthood. Ameson’s reply to the critique accepts the 
basic point. He argues that the theory can be amended to take into account 
unavoidable risks that fall out differently for agents. It does this by stipulating that 
“any windfall gains that some agents get and sheer misfortunes that others suffer are 
fully offset by compensation after the fact, so that it remains true that agents who 
behave with comparable pmdence will gain the same level of welfare (utility) over 
the course of their lives” (1999: 490). In the rest of the article, Ameson reaffirms 
that equality of opportunity for welfare must “offset by transfer and compensation 
after the fact” any bmte luck inequalities that arise between agents that could not 
have been handled through agents’ informed choices at the canonical moment (1999: 
493).
Ameson’s response -  transfer and compensation “after the fact” -  helpfully 
turns us toward the other objection to this aspect of luck egalitarianism. Will 
Kymlicka suggests that the tendency for compensation after objectionable 
inequalities have emerged is in keeping with the overall conservatism of luck 
egalitarianism. Rather than tackle the social institutions which reproduce 
inequalities, luck egalitarians merely advocate increased transfer payments to the 
unfortunate (Kymlicka 2002: 88-94). By focusing on the apparently radical aim of 
making distributive shares reflect only people’s choices, luck egalitarians have 
largely failed to challenge the social structures within which people make choices
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and to notice how those structures systematically make different menus of choice 
available to different types of people. In a socialist literature, this complaint will 
focus, for example, on how a capitalist division of labour represents a certain, 
limited, set of options for working-class people and their offspring. Feminist 
versions will note that gender structures shape and constrain women’s and men’s 
choices, helping to reproduce a gender order. Whether the interest is in class, 
gender, or other social structures, the point is that these questions about inequality 
prevention differ markedly from the luck egalitarian emphasis on compensation after 
the fact. And even if we accept that an individual’s inequality warrants 
compensation, and put the radical restructuring of social institutions on hold for 
another day, why is it usually the tacit assumption of luck egalitarians that financial 
compensation is the best form? (Wolff 2002; 2003). The general point to notice here 
is that there is a tension in luck egalitarianism between the assumption that 
undeserved inequalities will not even emerge under a perfectly realised norm, and the 
tendency to speak of ‘compensation’ for inequality after it has emerged. In chapters 
two through four, I demonstrate different ways in which luck egalitarianism is unable 
to challenge these deep, structural inequalities.
The Luck Egalitarian Style
As a specific normative project within the more general tradition of Anglo- 
American analytical political philosophy, luck egalitarian writings share stylistic 
methods and features that characterize that tradition. I focus on two features here. 
The first is the tendency to employ artificial scenarios and hypothetical examples -  
usually featuring one or two individuals -  rather than real world problems of 
inequality. Examples of this are abundant. Dworkin’s account contrasts Adrian the 
tomato gardener with Bruce the tennis player; Cohen contrasts Paul the photographer 
and Fred the fisherman; and Ameson, the two Indian tribes requiring peyote or 
alcohol for their religious ceremonies (perhaps not as artificial as the others). In 
terms of lone individuals, Dworkin’s Louis, the man with expensive ‘champagne’ 
tastes, is probably the most famous, but there are many others, including,
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memorably, Cohen’s wheelchair-bound man with the inexplicably robust but painful 
arms. Why are these strikingly artificial (even, implausible) scenarios so popular?
In the main luck egalitarian texts discussed in section one, explanations of the 
methodological style are scarce. Dworkin writes that he “uses examples mainly in 
the standard philosophical way -  as artificial cases invented to illustrate and test 
theoretical hypotheses” (2000: 3). Eric Rakowski, who defends a version of equality 
of resources similar to Dworkin’s, has remarked that beginning with “artificially 
similar cases is useful, for they capture an important truth. Although we come into 
the world at different times, and somebody was always there before us, we enter in 
the same way, without any more right to the bounty of nature than anyone else who 
sees daylight for the first time” (1991: 274). Between them, these suggest at least 
three rationales for the style. First, it simply reflects philosophical convention. 
Second, artificial scenarios permit us to clarify and compare important moral 
principles. Third, and more specifically related to egalitarian theory, artificial 
scenarios permit us to recognise unfairness.
Jonathan Wolff and others have queried the methodological style of luck 
egalitarianism (Wolff 1998; see also Anderson 1999a; McKinnon 2003), and some 
aspects of their criticisms will be considered in chapter four. For now, I want to 
make a different point: that the individualistic and artificial examples are problematic 
because they obscure what is wrong with the very phenomena they ostensibly 
challenge. As indicated in the discussion on luck, luck egalitarianism seems to 
involve a misdiagnosis of objectionable inequalities by virtue of the fact that it 
appeals to ‘bad luck’ for all such inequalities, whether they are caused by genetics, 
floods, or human wrongdoing. The language we use shapes our understanding of the 
social phenomena we criticise. Unfortunately, luck egalitarian language is ultimately 
unhelpful in getting to grips with some aspects of contemporary inequalities and why 
we feel they are unjust.
Consider, as a parallel, the account that feminist academic Carol Cohn (1987) 
gives of the changes in her thinking and personality as she immerses herself for a 
year in the world of American defense intellectuals. Defense intellectuals create the 
theory that informs and legitimates nuclear strategic practice. Cohn’s experiences
29 Their artificiality is not the only worry. As one reader put it, the examples tend to be about ‘Fred’ 
and ‘Paul’ rather than, say, Rashmi and Xambi, and about stuff like champagne and trips to Spain, 
which seem to point to pretty obvious cultural and class biases. Some of these issues are touched on 
in chapter four.
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are compelling. She describes herself going through four stages: listening to the 
language of defense; learning to speak the language; engaging in dialogue; and a 
final stage she calls ‘the terror’ wherein she wakes up to the changes that have 
occurred in her own thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war. What makes 
the article so compelling is that it is not what some might expect: a feminist scolding 
male warmongers for the sexualised, patriarchal imagery of nuclear weapons. 
Instead, she documents the pleasure she takes in learning the “technostrategic” 
language of nuclear war and in becoming a member in an “elite and privileged 
group” who use that language (1987: 717). She becomes skilled in technostrategic 
language and soon abandons an earlier vow to speak plain English to defense 
intellectuals. But learning the specialised language changes her, and changes her in 
ways that she ultimately finds alarming:
the better I got at engaging in this discourse, the more impossible it became 
for me to express my own ideas, my own values. I could adopt the 
language and gain a wealth of new concepts and reasoning strategies -  but 
at the same time as the language gave me access to things I had been unable 
to speak about before, it radically excluded others. I could not use the 
language to express my own concerns because it was physically impossible. 
This language does not allow certain questions to be asked or certain values 
to be expressed (1987: 708).
One of the most disturbing elisions, from Cohn’s point of view, is the fact that the 
terrible human suffering, mutilation, and death which nuclear warheads portend, is 
always obscured by technostrategic talk of ‘collateral damage.’
The language of luck egalitarianism is clearly very different from the 
language of nuclear defense, but it can function in similar ways and have similar 
effects on those who use it. Certainly, I could recognise what Cohn meant when she 
discussed the thrill and pleasure of becoming competent in a specialised language 
that is “abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms; language that is sexy and fun to use” 
(715). When a speaker at a conference on egalitarianism mentions plovers’ eggs, 
there is a similar frisson that comes with being possessed of a specialised, elite 
knowledge. But, as Cohn observes, alongside the pleasure there is also alarm. The 
language of luck egalitarianism, like the language Cohn learned, does not allow 
certain questions to be asked, without, as she says, the questioner appearing “a soft­
headed activist” (708). It does not allow certain values to be expressed. Wolff and
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Anderson make this point in relation to the value of respect, but the point can be 
generalised. The concepts of “oppression” and “domination” are rarely used in the 
language of luck egalitarianism (Young 1990); neither is the concept of “racism” 
(McCarthy 2001); and little is ever said of poverty, or homelessness, or hunger 
(Caputo 2005); (Levitas 1998). Interestingly, none of the luck egalitarians have a 
theory o f inequality -  a theory, that is, of the causes of inequality -  beyond the 
notion that bad luck causes inequality (Baker et al. 2004). Individualism and 
artificiality characterise much of the language of luck egalitarianism. As a result, it 
systematically elides, mystifies, and obstructs thinking about and articulating 
concepts and values that are vital to the project of egalitarianism. In some ways, we 
need look no further than one of the most popular, persistent figures in luck 
egalitarian discourse -  the guy whom we are supposed to be concerned about 
because he cannot afford champagne -  to see this.
The second stylistic characteristic common to the work of luck egalitarians is 
a certain coyness about who or what does the redistribution, and in what context 
redistribution occurs. Although luck egalitarians are rarely explicit about this, the 
tradition is widely regarded as assuming the context of a modem western liberal 
democracy with a market economy and a welfare state. (Gaus 2000a: 218-220; 
Kymlicka 2002: chapter 3; Young 1990). As such, luck egalitarian writings tacitly 
assume that the state and its officials are the agents who carry out the calculations 
and who redistribute things (unless another arrangement is specifically described, 
such as Dworkin’s insurance scheme, which is of course meant to model the welfare 
state). The texts conjure up images of the state and its authorities, or devices 
modelled after the state. Interestingly, however, explicit references to the ‘state’ are 
surprisingly rare within the literature. As Chris Armstrong notes, liberal egalitarians 
tacitly “presume a strong role for the state in achieving equality, [but display] little 
overt concern for the problems of state control (and this despite the otherwise 
vehement opposition to state socialism of much egalitarian theory)” (2001: 12).
The lack of specificity about the context of redistribution and the distributing 
agent may be designed to leave open the possibility of application in a global, as well 
as national, context.30 Or it may be designed to avoid provoking the libertarian and
30 This, anyway, was the trajectory of Rawls’s thought. A Theory o f Justice assumes a bounded 
society, whereas Law of Peoples adopts a global context. But if it is the case that luck egalitarians
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conservative complaint that modem liberalism -  unlike its classical counterpart -  
promotes an omnipotent, managerial welfare state.31 But perhaps the more plausible 
explanation is that luck egalitarians do not discuss the state much because, in their 
models, they literally become the state. This makes it harder for them to be reflexive 
about its character and role. Consider again Cohn’s analysis of defense specialists’ 
language. According to Cohn, the technostrategic language of defense specialists 
only articulates the perspectives of the users of nuclear weapons, never that of the 
victims:
I do not mean this on the level of individual consciousness; it is not 
that defense analysts somehow convince themselves that they would 
not be among the victims of nuclear war, should it occur. But I do 
mean it in terms of the structural position the speakers of the language 
occupy and the perspective they get from that position. Structurally, 
speaking technostrategic language removes them from the position of 
victim and puts them in the position of the planner, the user, the actor 
(1987: 706, italics in original).
The analogous point in the luck egalitarian literature is that the language promotes a 
tacit statism. The state is not mentioned because luck egalitarians have become the 
state. Always on the acting end, never on the receiving end, the overwhelming 
tendency within the luck egalitarian literature is to present a statist perspective, not 
the perspective of the person who receives. One of the most obvious and explicit 
examples of this is John Roemer’s “theory of responsibility for the egalitarian 
planner” (1993). In case this sounds too harsh, it is worth stressing that, like Cohn, I 
do not think luck egalitarians deliberately put themselves in the position of planner, 
user, actor. Rather, I view it as a function of the discourse itself as a whole. I 
consider this point further in chapter five.
Conclusion
Anderson’s Tuck egalitarian’ label has been rapidly and widely adopted, 
suggesting that her critique crystallised worries and preoccupations that were playing
believe we can extrapolate from their domestic egalitarian principles to problems of global distributive 
justice, the ones under consideration here make no mention of it.
31 See P.E. Gottfried (1999) for an extended attack on contemporary liberal theory and its concomitant 
‘managerial state.’
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in the minds of others. Some of those who bear the label, however, bristle at it 
(Dworkin 2003: 192; Ameson 1999; Cohen 2003). This might be partly due to the 
fact that Anderson’s article is highly critical, even “polemical” (Callinicos 2000), but 
is also, I take it, because they see the term as shifting attention from still unresolved 
issues regarding currency. No clear ‘winner’ has emerged in the competing accounts 
of equality of resources, welfare, opportunity for welfare, capability, and access to 
advantage, and until a satisfactory currency is identified, some egalitarians may 
regard other issues as less important. When Dworkin brought out Sovereign Virtue, 
for example, he included a new chapter on equality and capability, which considered 
Sen and Cohen’s arguments that capability (or advantage, to use Cohen’s term) 
represents a third alternative to the traditional welfare/resource dyad (2000: chapter 
7). Dworkin argues that this is not so; capability really turns out to be one or the 
other, depending on your reading.32
‘Luck egalitarianism’ puts the resource/welfare distinction and its cognates 
into the background in order to bring out other aspects of egalitarian debates, such as 
the centrality now accorded to the choice/luck distinction, the decisive shift away 
from a norm of equality of outcome, or the individualised nature of the discourse as a 
whole. For those who articulate these worries (and others), it seems right to shift to a 
new perspective. Rather than resources-versus-welfare being the all-important 
debate and orienting device, adopting ‘luck egalitarianism’ as a category permits us 
to focus on what seems more salient right now: the way that all these versions share 
the same general ethic. According to Anderson, that ethic says that “the fundamental 
aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved bad luck -  being bom with 
poor native endowments, bad parents, and disagreeable personalities, suffering from 
accidents and illness, and so forth” (1999a: 288). Catriona McKinnon writes that on 
the luck egalitarian view, “to be committed to equality is to be committed to 
assessing the extent to which the disadvantaged among us are responsible for their 
own suffering” (2003: 144). This is a rather bald way of putting it, but it is largely 
accurate.
The introduction of a new category means that its opposite (or opposites) is, 
implicitly or explicitly, under construction as well. So, what are the alternatives to 
luck egalitarianism? There is no simple answer to this question, but I explore some
32 But see Andrew Williams (2002) and Pierik and Robeyns (Forthcoming), who insist that it 
represents a genuine third category, and Dworkin’s response (2002) where he denies this.
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possibilities in the rest of the thesis. My point for now is the familiar one that we 
must pay attention not only to what ideas and commitments and principles we 
identify as belonging to a particular category, but also to what ideas, principles and 
goals are then left out and whether or not they coalesce into an alternative view. Part 
of what interests me in these debates is the possibility that theorists who adopt the 
‘luck egalitarian/other’ framework of analysis revisit and echo issues and concerns 
that have been and are elaborated in the more traditional opposition between liberal 
approaches to social justice and feminist critics. It seems likely that the ‘luck 
egalitarianism/other’ framework of analysis permits controversies over such issues as 
the public/private dichotomy; the conflict between freedom of choice and social 
equality; and the conflation of distributive justice with social justice in general -  
issues that feminists have explored at length -  to come to the fore. This is what 
chapter two begins to map out.
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Chapter Two
Fem inist Challenges to L iberal Conceptions of Justice 
and  Luck  Egalitarianism
In  cha pter  o n e , I argued that the various formulations of the luck egalitarian 
ideal of equality have much in common, and I outlined several significant criticisms 
to be developed throughout the thesis. The argument this chapter develops is that 
certain common feminist criticisms of liberalism are indispensable for understanding 
the limitations of luck egalitarianism. Because of the sustained engagement with 
liberal terms of political discourse, feminism is well positioned to challenge luck 
egalitarianism. As noted in the introduction, there is an asymmetry in the degree to 
which feminists have engaged with Rawlsian approaches, on one hand, and luck 
egalitarianism, on the other. The self-consciously feminist literature addressed 
specifically to luck egalitarianism is small, but growing. This chapter draws links 
between that specific literature and feminist criticisms of the broader liberal tradition. 
Four key feminist preoccupations vis-a-vis egalitarian liberal approaches to justice 
that are particularly germane to my project are: the constitution of the liberal notion 
of the self; the privileging of individual choice; the tendency to approach justice as a 
problem of distribution; and the importance accorded to economic inequalities as the 
main form of social injustice. As will be shown, feminists have no unified position 
on these and many other issues. Nevertheless, some commonalities emerge, and 
focusing on these sheds light on what is problematic in luck egalitarianism. My aim 
is to furnish readers with a grounding in these feminist criticisms and to point 
forward to ways that they re-emerge in the mainstream criticisms.
1. Choice a n d  the  L iber al  In d iv id u a l
A strong theme within the feminist literature on social justice is to urge that 
we need to be more critical and cautious than liberals tend to be about the role and 
status of individual preferences and choices. While, on the whole, it is anathema for 
liberalism to disrespect or override individuals’ choices, except when that is required 
to prevent harm to others, feminists have been sceptical of this non-interference norm, 
since they hold that it permits and reinforces gender inequality.
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The feminist concern with preferences and choices arises because of the 
importance that liberalism accords to the individual’s basic freedoms, to the right to 
choose -  in general, to the value of individual autonomy. Classical liberals such as 
John Stuart Mill argued that the core constituent commitments of liberalism are to 
respect individuals’ autonomy and to avoid paternalism. “[T]he only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right” (JS Mill (1991), 
quoted in Gaus 2000a: 24). Contemporary liberal theorists such as Rawls and 
Dworkin have also highlighted the importance of individual choice and autonomy. 
According to Rawls, for example, even if some people are less endowed than others 
with public and personal virtues such as impartiality and intelligence, everyone is 
entitled to the same equal rights and freedoms: “It is sometimes thought that the 
basic rights and liberties should vary with capacity, but justice as fairness denies this: 
provided the minimum for moral personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the 
guarantees of justice” (1999: 443). Dworkin argues for an ambition-sensitive, 
endowment-insensitive account of liberal justice. This approach assigns individuals’ 
choices an explicit and weighty role in determining just social arrangements. In 
general, respect for people’s preferences and choices plays a central role in liberal 
theories of justice.
Feminists have worried about the liberal commitment to respecting people’s 
choices. Given pervasive inequalities of power between women and men, there is 
every reason to think that the preferences of both sexes will reflect and reinforce 
gender hierarchy. In light of men’s oppression of women, women have formed 
preferences for less than what they are due injustice, and men have formed 
preferences for more than what they are due. Even while maintaining the centrality 
of individual autonomy to liberalism, Mill vividly noted this problem. He employs 
as a metaphor for women’s nature a tree manipulated by men to have luxuriant 
shoots, cultivated “in a vapour bath,” and stunted ones, “with ice purposely heaped 
all around them.” Consequently, what “is now called the nature of woman is an 
eminently artificial thing -  the result of forced repression in some directions, 
unnatural stimulation in others. It may be asserted without scruple, that no other
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class of dependents have had their character so entirely distorted from its natural 
propensities by their relation with their masters... (1982: 22-23). Feminist concerns 
for the way women’s ambitions and choices are systematically distorted by a 
patriarchal society have hardly abated since Mill’s time. Thus, in the contemporary 
feminist literature, the complaint has been largely the same as Mill’s. Summarising 
the thrust of several feminist theorists’ work, Ann Levey states, “Women’s choices 
are suspect, it seems, because women have been socialized to have compliant or 
subordinate preferences; women’s preferences are the preferences men desire them 
to have” (2005: 129-30). If liberal justice insists on taking people’s preferences at 
face value, and fails to interrogate them, it risks sanctioning and perpetuating severe 
injustice to women.
Liberals may respond that the problem with this argument is that it is 
grounded in problems of gender hierarchy in the real world. The liberal may say: we 
do not deny that in the real world, this kind of thing happens. But at the level of 
ideal theory, where persons are imagined to be free and equal and not distinguished 
from one another by unjust gender conditioning, this worry goes away. At the ideal 
level at which liberal theories of justice are pitched, agents are to be imagined as 
being equally empowered and in possession of genuine preferences and ambitions.
However, this response triggers further concerns amongst feminists. It is well 
known that a major challenge articulated by feminists concerns the nature of the 
individual agent or ‘self that liberal theory presupposes and employs. While this 
individual is offered as a representation of a neutral or generic human being, many 
feminists argue that it is inherently male-biased. Accounts vary, but the general idea 
is that the liberal self exhibits attributes and experiences traditionally associated with 
men, such as rationality, autonomy, independence, egoism, and self-interestedness, 
but that these are described as ‘neutral’ and ‘universal’ traits. Liberal theory passes 
an implicit or explicit value judgment that these are valuable and important traits and 
experiences, and constitute the essentially human. At the same time, the liberal self 
is imagined as basically devoid of the characteristics and experiences that are 
traditionally associated with women, such as emotion, connectedness, selflessness, 
and caring. Again, according to feminists, it is hard not to perceive a judgment in 
this that liberalism takes these things to be less valuable, and certainly less 
distinctively ‘human’ than the first, male-defined, norms. Summarising the thrust of 
the literature, Anne Phillips writes, “The individuals of liberal theory are presented
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as if they refer indiscriminately to women or men, but have written into them a 
masculine experience and masculine norm. Their abstraction cloaks a masculine 
body” (1991b: 151).33
Two responses by liberals can be discerned. The first concedes the point that 
the liberal agent has looked decidedly masculine. Beginning in the 1980s, many 
male political theorists began to use more gender-neutral language, replacing ‘men’ 
and ‘he’ with ‘humans’ and ‘he or she.’ This response produces texts that no longer 
overtly exclude women. However, Susan Moller Okin argues that even though 
contemporary theorists explicitly renounce the overt sexism of earlier times, their 
analyses at best achieve a false gender neutrality (1991: 11-13). The “merely 
terminological responses” to feminist criticism evident in the texts constitute only a 
thin veneer of gender neutrality which barely conceals the fact that, “[to] a large 
extent, contemporary theories of justice, like those of the past, are about men with 
wives at home” (1991: 13). According to Okin, one important reason that the gender 
neutralisation remains superficial is that mainstream theorists do not consider the 
family as relevant to questions of justice. This is either because it is presumed to be 
a basically just institution (viz. Rawls) or it is felt that norms of justice (such as 
individual rights) are anathema to the family, since it should be governed by 
principles of love and care (viz. Sandel) (1991: ch 2). Interestingly, Okin’s 
observation about the language change in male theorists’ texts dates from the 1980s, 
documenting a widespread trend. This trend appears to have passed luck egalitarians 
by. Writing in the early 1980s, Dworkin’s essays feature an all male cast of 
characters, as do Cohen’s and Ameson’s essays from 1989.
The other response says that feminists have wrongly supposed that the liberal 
self employed by theorists represents a complete account of human nature. The 
idealised individual is simply meant to model certain features of human beings, not 
to be a stand-in for what all humans are really like. In general, the feature of the 
human being that the self is meant to model is our capacity for impartial, moral 
reasoning. Robert Fullinwider insists that the “impoverished list of characteristics 
that apply to the parties in [Rawls’s] Original Position does not express a human 
ideal that real individuals should find attractive or try to live up to; it represents,
33 The feminist literature on this issue is vast. Some representative and important accounts include 
Dietz (1998); Held (1993); Okin (1991); Pateman (1989; 1988); Phillips (1991). For overviews of the 
literature, see Kymlicka (2002); Squires (1999); and Weiss (1995).
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rather, a parsimonious base from which real persons might look past the various 
webs of commitments that divide as well as unite them to see if there are fair terms 
upon which they can all live together in society” (1995: 498). Similarly, Martha 
Nussbaum argues that “the rationality of the parties in the original position is not 
meant to be, all by itself, a model of how persons are, or a theory of human nature. It 
is only together with the veil of ignorance that the account of the rationality of the 
parties supplies us with a model of something about persons: namely, an account of a 
moral point of view...” (2003: 492). Undoubtedly this is still an idealised 
conception of even that capacity, but it is not one that feminists, presumably, want to 
say does not apply to women.
This latter response is an important corrective to criticisms that confuse what 
is offered by liberals as a model of particular human traits with a prescription of how 
they want humans to be. Nevertheless, it encounters a further objection from 
feminists. Why should the capacity of human beings that is modeled be the capacity 
for impartial reason, and not some other capacity, such as caring for others, that we 
also presumably share? Feminists thus insist that the ideal self is still indicative of 
certain problematic aspects of liberal theory, such as the fact that it grows out of and 
reinforces the public/private dichotomy. Although it is presented as gender neutral, 
some feminists still detect male bias in that it valorises two things -  the public sphere 
and rationality -  from which women have traditionally been excluded. The question 
for feminists then becomes, how thorough-going is this exclusion? Is it simply 
historical so that the residue of sexism can be eliminated? Or is it inherent to the 
tradition? Regardless of exactly how the individual is imagined, can and should 
feminists employ this agent in their struggle for women’s equality?
From this point, the debate shifts from an exchange between liberals and 
feminists to one featuring different points of view within feminist theory itself (a not 
uncommon pattern within feminist theory as a whole (Squires 1999: introduction)). 
Although this oversimplifies, a great deal of the feminist theory on this issue can be 
assigned to one of two schools of thought. The first acknowledges that, while liberal 
thought has traditionally excluded women, gender bias is not inherent to the tradition 
so feminism can reconstruct and deploy the liberal individual in its emancipatory 
project. Understanding women’s exclusion as an unfortunate product of historical 
prejudice, this position notes that the reason the individual is constructed abstractly, 
stripped of contingent features such as class, sex, and race, is to express and
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underline the fact that, at the core, we are all free and equal, and deserving of equal 
treatment. If we are really all the same in a fundamental way, then official 
discrimination on the basis of contingent features such as sex or race is exposed as 
illegitimate. On this reading of the rationale for the liberal individual, the 
implication is that feminism cannot do without it. As Phillips observes, “For the last 
three hundred years, every oppressed group has found a lifeline in the abstractions of 
the individual and has appealed to these in making its claims to equality” (1991: 155). 
Echoing this, and pointing to the implications for women specifically, Nussbaum 
argues that the “idea that all human beings have a core of moral personhood that 
exerts claims on government no matter what the world has done to it is an idea that 
the women of the world badly need to vindicate their equality and to argue for 
change” (1999: 71). The problem is not with the individual itself, as a conceptual 
and moral device, but rather with its construction, which was premised on a 
traditional and unexamined public/private dichotomy that excluded women from the 
realm of politics. Ultimately, this position leads to a call for the genuine 
neutralisation of the individual, involving a reconsideration of (a) the characteristics 
considered distinctively human and (b) the reconstruction and interrelation of the 
public and private spheres. The male bias in liberal theory, unfortunately, is still 
evident today, but by “taking on board the insights of feminism” liberalism will be 
“changed in ways that make it more deeply consistent with its own most foundational 
ideas” (Nussbaum 1999: 57).34
The second school of thought has serious doubts that genuine neutralisation 
of the individual is possible or desirable. According to this view, which has perhaps 
been most influentially developed by Carole Pateman (1988; 1989) and Iris Marion 
Young (1990; 1998), the construction of the male-biased individual is no mere 
historical accident. Rather, the abstract individual has been constructed in ways that 
systematically exclude women (Pateman 1988) and, more generally, ‘difference’ -  
that is, characteristics and experiences not traditionally associated with white, 
bourgeois men (Young 1990). This feminist position understands the liberal 
individual as an inevitably exclusionary figure.
Pateman’s account focuses on the classical social contract theorists.
According to her, most interpretations of the original social contract understand it as
34 This position has been taken up with (with varying enthusiasm) by Dietz (1985; 1998); Nussbaum 
(1999; 2000), Okin (1989; 1991); Phillips (1991b; 1992); and Wendell (1987), amongst others.
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securing and expressing the equality and freedom of all modem citizens as they cast 
off their natural subjugation to their fathers. This conventional interpretation ignores 
or suppresses the sexual contract which is prior to, and constitutive of, the social 
contract. Pateman writes, “The original pact is a sexual as well as a social contract: 
it is sexual in the sense of patriarchal -  that is, the contract establishes men’s political 
right over women -  and also sexual in the sense of establishing orderly access by 
men to women’s bodies” (1988: 2). The suppression of this story and its 
implications for women’s citizenship continues into the present day. Summarising 
Pateman’s work, Squires notes how it becomes “possible for contemporary liberal 
theorists to forget (or overlook) the fact that the ‘liberal individual’ was explicitly 
argued to be the male head of household” (1999: 29). Young’s account focuses more 
broadly on how what she calls an “ideal of universal citizenship” excludes women 
and visible minority groups (1998). While the ideal is meant to be inclusive, it fails 
because of constitutive features that tend to encourage cultural homogeneity. In 
particular, the public/private dichotomy defines the “public as a realm of generality 
in which all particularities are left behind.” This forces formerly excluded groups 
such as “women, workers, Jews, blacks, Asians, Indian, Mexicans” to be “measured 
according to norms derived from and defined by privileged groups” (1998: 406).
This school of thought is fairly unanimous in terms of what it perceives as the 
rationale behind the liberal individual, and its (therefore limited) potential for 
overcoming women’s and other oppressed groups’ subordination. Alternative 
conceptions of citizenship are thus required. Pateman proposes abandoning the idea 
of a single common core identity for all, and instead accepting that people come in 
two basic forms: “To take embodied identity seriously demands the abandonment of 
the masculine unitary individual to open up space for two figures; one masculine, 
one feminine” (1988: 224). Young’s proposal is not dissimilar, though her concern 
goes beyond gender differences to take into account other axes of difference as well. 
She favours an ideal of “differentiated citizenship,” which includes a programme to 
provide institutional means for the representation of oppressed groups (1998).
These feminist debates continue, and further points of dispute could be 
outlined. For instance, in its affirmation of the virtues of reason and impartiality as 
important for women, does the first position inadvertently contribute to the devaluing
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of the traditionally feminine? And, going in the other direction, does the second 
position flirt dangerously with retrograde notions of gender complementarity and 
‘separate but equal’ (Dietz 1995; Okin 1989) or promote the idea that individuals are 
so completely constituted by their communities that they can never transcend their 
differences and cultural locations, rendering universal norms of justice fictional 
(Nussbaum 1999)? For my purposes, however, the particularly important strands 
within this are those that address the phenomenon of adaptive preferences.
2. A d a p t iv e  P r e f e r e n c e s , Ju s t ic e , a n d  E n d s
The contention, to recall, is that pervasive inequalities of power constitutive 
of gender hierarchy cause people to develop deformed preferences and desires, 
rendering them unable to make choices consistent with their own best interests. 
Liberalism seems unable to grapple with this because it promotes formal, rather than 
substantive, equality. It simply takes preferences at face value and does not extend 
itself to a critique of existing preferences.
Martha Nussbaum is an obvious theorist with which to begin the discussion 
because she has made the problem of women’s adaptive preferences a central 
concern of her work, but has also famously defended the liberal tradition, including 
its controversial individualism, against feminist critics. In a memorable example 
from her recent work, Nussbaum describes how women’s adaptive preferences may 
be reversed:
In the desert area outside Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh, I talked with 
women who were severely malnourished, and whose village had no 
reliable clean water supply. Before the arrival of a government 
consciousness-raising program, these women apparently had no feeling 
of anger or protest about their physical situation.... They did not 
consider their conditions unhealthful or unsanitary, and they did not 
consider themselves to be malnourished. Now their level of discontent 
has gone way up: they protest to the local government, asking for clean 
water, for electricity, for a health visitor (2000: 113).
35 For instance, even though Phillips and Nussbaum are basically on the same side with respect to 
liberalism’s promise for feminist politics, Phillips argues that “while Nussbaum challenges the 
dichotomy between reason and emotion” she leaves the hierarchy of the former over the latter in place 
(2001b: 261).
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In addition to adaptive preferences relating to basic needs, she argues that the 
widespread acceptance of forms of gender violence in western and non-western 
cultures instill in many women “the preference (if that’s what we should call it) to 
put up with abuse” from their male partners (1999: chapter 5; 2000: chapter 2). The 
adaptive preferences problem constitutes a central focus of her development of the 
capabilities approach to social justice. Nussbaum argues that there are ten central 
capabilities essential for human beings to have truly flourishing lives. She proposes 
them as a philosophical underpinning for constitutional principles that all 
governments should secure. It is a bare minimum of justice to ensure that all citizens 
can achieve a minimum level of functioning in each of the ten areas ((2000a: chapter 
two; see also 1992; 1999).36
Though Nussbaum is ultimately a partisan of the capabilities approach, she 
also defends certain rival liberal theories, insisting that not all simply take existing 
preferences as given. Nussbaum insists that the “idea that some preferences are 
deformed by ignorance, malice, injustice, and blind habit has deep roots in the liberal 
tradition of political philosophy...: in Adam Smith’s ideas about greed and anger, in 
Mill’s ideas about the sexes, in Kant’s ideas about the many ways in which people 
get accustomed to treating one another as means rather than ends, in John Rawls’s 
ideas about the ways in which unjust background conditions shape desire and 
choice” (2000a: 114). Thus, when feminists have condemned liberalism for 
insensitivity to adaptive preferences, their objection has been too sweeping. 
Nussbaum opts for a view that foregrounds liberals such as Rawls who “permit 
themselves a more extensive scrutiny of the history of group hierarchy and 
subordination” (69). For Nussbaum, the tension that some feminists perceive 
between liberal equal treatment norms and feminist understandings of unjust social 
power dissolves, provided we keep before us the “best” examples of liberal theory.
In general, the claim that liberal theories of justice do often embed a critique of 
existing preferences forms part of Nussbaum’s wider aim to show how liberalism 
and feminism are compatible projects.
Many parts of Nussbaum’s characterisation of liberal approaches to justice 
are persuasive. However, I find her conviction that, with careful selection of the
36 Nussbaum notes that while her version of the capabilities approach shares features with Amartya 
Sen’s and was developed, in part, through her work with him, it is also distinctively her own (2000a: 
introduction). Chapter six considers Nussbaum’s version of capability equality in greater detail.
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‘best’ theorists and concepts, the individual choice/background injustice tension 
melts away to be overly optimistic. There is a real tension there, and, if anything, 
Nussbaum’s account of the constitutive principles of liberalism magnifies it through 
its emphatic celebration of choice. She argues that the heart of liberal theory 
contains a twofold intuition: “all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, 
no matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth 
is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a 
life in accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends” (1999: 57). She says this 
belief then gives rise to the two most fundamental norms shaping liberalism’s 
treatment of individuals: “it must respect and promote the liberty of choice, and it 
must respect and promote the equal worth of persons as choosers” (57). As Phillips 
puts it, “Nussbaum finds herself in a position where she is simultaneously hooked on 
the idea of choice and critical of most people’s choices” (2001b: 262).
Phillips agrees with Nussbaum’s general points that liberalism and feminism 
are closer allies than some feminists have supposed, and that to understand 
liberalism’s potential for women’s equality, feminists should better distinguish 
between different versions (2001b: 250). However, she finds several elements of 
Nussbaum’s attempt at synthesis implausible, arguing that “in combining a 
classically liberal emphasis on choice with a feminist understanding of unjust social 
power, she is driven into a curiously illiberal liberalism” (250). Phillips suggests that 
Nussbaum gets carried away in her celebration of the liberal individual, and tries to 
deflate this a bit. For example, she argues that if Nussbaum is right in her 
characterisation of liberalism being good for women because it emphasizes that each 
person is separate, equal, and should be treated as an end in herself (Nussbaum 1999: 
chapter 2), then it is hard to understand why liberalism took so long to extend those 
norms to women. “The conundrum becomes less puzzling,” Phillips suggests, “if we 
recognize that liberalism is driven by its critique of authoritarian and (later) 
interventionist government rather than any grand thesis about each individual being 
of equal worth” (252).37
37 Phillips challenges Nussbaum’s liberal individualism on three other grounds as well. First, 
following Pateman (1988; 1989), Phillips argues that the model o f the individual included a norm of 
patriarchal right to dispose of property, which included wife and children. The subsequent “extension 
of this freedom to women (rather like the male models of employement, which in the man’s case had 
depended on a wife) means it begins to crack at the seams” (2001: 254). Second, pointing to the 
poststructural turn within feminist theory, Phillips notes that the notion of autonomy has become very 
contested. Some feminists prefer an account of the self that sees it as “called into being through the
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However, Phillips’s deepest concerns with Nussbaum’s liberal-feminist 
theory seem to relate to her endorsement of the capabilities approach. As indicated, 
Nussbaum’s capability approach holds that, rather than focusing on money, resources, 
or welfare, governments should aim to ensure that all citizens are capable of 
achieving certain central capabilities. Phillips argues that Nussbaum basically 
recommends a norm of sufficiency, rather than equality (258):
In Sex and Social Justice, Martha Nussbaum redefines the liberal 
tradition so as to make it more thoroughly ‘materialist,’ more centered 
on substantive conditions for individuality and choice. The emphasis, 
however, is still on freedom of choice, and while this can generate 
strong positions on equalizing either opportunities or capabilities, it 
does not provide for further criticism of the inequalities that may then 
ensure... As applied to the relationship between the sexes, this points in 
a rather troubling direction, suggesting we would have to swallow 
objections about ultimate inequalities between women and men so long 
as the original capabilities were firmly in place (259).
Phillips argues that Nussbaum has performed a valuable service in making liberalism 
less of a “dirty word” (264) to feminists. However, she remains unconvinced that 
Nussbaum’s distributive justice programme is the right way to “address the problem 
to which Nussbaum directs us -  the social formation of preferences and the danger of 
presuming that what people put up with is what they want or need” (265).
For anyone familiar with Phillips’s recent work, it will be clear that her last 
criticism is connected to her own explorations of the direction taken recently by 
egalitarians. Phillips takes issue with what she sees as the “retreat from economic 
equality” (1999: 51; see also Phillips 2004) in the last twenty years. She believes the 
focus on capabilities is part of this retreat -  “the capabilities approach speaks to a 
perception that equality ... is no longer on the agenda, and glosses over what might 
otherwise be seen as a retreat by making freedom of choice the central concern” 
(2001b: 259) -  but her challenge to current egalitarian thinking is broader than that.
very activities we might have thought of as expressions of the se lf’ (255). Third, she highlights the 
criticisms of liberal feminism emerging from multiculturalist perspectives about the ethnocentricism 
implicated in the concept of autonomy and suggests that Nussbaum perhaps “too readily adopt[s] a 
view of non-western or immigratnt cultures as defined by patriarchal interests” (263).
38 It is interesting that Phillips connects Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to luck egalitarianism, 
suggesting both constitute a retreat from norms of equality of outcome. This alignment is most 
effectively generated (perhaps can only be generated) by adopting an equal outcomes norm -  a norm
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Thus, in one recent essay, luck egalitarianism is the specific focus of her criticism 
(2004). Phillips understands luck egalitarianism as essentially promoting a form of 
opportunity equality. She grants that it is a robust version of the doctrine -  
“ratcheted up to include some pretty substantial material conditions” (2004: 2) -  but 
equality of opportunity nonetheless. According to her, making equality of 
opportunity more substantial then permits an “even firmer dismissal of equal 
outcomes, for if we really did manage to ensure that all individuals had the same 
opportunities -  and failing that, managed to compensate the unfortunates whose 
opportunities can never be so good -  we should be reasonably confident that any 
remaining inequalities had come about through the exercise of individual choice” 
(2004: 2).
Phillips proposes a norm of equality of outcome in three areas: political 
representation; the social division of labour; and at the micro-level of individuals, 
considered one by one (although this last is not as straightforward as the first two) 
(2004: 6). The vision that emerges from her argument is of a society with legislative 
bodies that mirror the social characteristics of the population at large, and with a 
social division of labour that sees all kinds of people in all kinds of jobs: no female 
and ethnic ‘ghettos’ in the service industry, for example. Phillips suggests that 
making the vision a reality will require breaking down the conceptual dichotomy that 
opposes overt discrimination to structural constraints as obstacles to equality in 
politics and the economy. Proponents of opportunity equality obviously oppose the
' I Q
former, but have less successfully challenged the latter. Phillips asks what 
purchase, if any, the ideal of equality of outcome has when we compare individuals, 
rather than groups. Immediately, it looks as if this idea is not going to get off the 
ground since it is absurd to recommend that everyone should aim for the same 
destination. Rather than try to make this argument stand up, Phillips shifts ground 
instead: the issue is not whether “we can extend outcome arguments to apply also to 
the distribution of resources and activities between individuals, but whether current 
thinking misrepresents the effects of social relations and institutions as if these were 
generated by individual choice” (15). She suggests that luck egalitarians exhibit an
that is currently unpopular, as Phillips is well aware. It is perhaps more common to view luck 
egalitarianism and Nussbaum’s capability approach as divergent (Williams 2002; Robeyns 2003a). I 
discuss some issues around how to characterise Nussbaum’s theory (as well as Elizabeth Anderson’s 
similar one) in chapter six.
39 This is a point of agreement between Nussbaum (1999: 69) and Phillips (2001b: 250,258).
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“unhealthy obsession” with individuals and their choices. Asking whether “opera 
singer Maria is entitled to a higher income than surfer Bruce, or champagne drinker 
Charlie to a larger drinks budget than teetotaler Jane, obscures... structural 
inequalities that cannot be understood in such individualist terms” (1999: 58). Even 
at the most difficult level of interpersonal comparisons, Phillips recommends 
retaining an ideal of outcome equality as an antidote to the overly individualistic 
discourse of luck egalitarians (2004: 9).
Phillips is, of course, correct in noticing that equality of outcome is seen as 
passe. Even egalitarians who, in my view, promote something very close to equality 
of outcome tend to use a different term, such as equality of condition (e.g. Baker et al 
2004). Such a forthright defence of outcome equality is bound to attract objections 
from anti-egalitarians, since it will likely raise for them the spectre of an egalitarian 
dystopia: a world of deadening conformity. If Phillips really wants equal outcomes 
in the social division of labour, then we had better prepare ourselves for a workforce 
of identikit people. In his short story “Harrison Bergeron,” Kurt Vonnegut describes 
how the “United States Handicapper General” in the year 2081, had finally made 
everyone equal in every possible way. This society kitted out people who possessed 
above-average intelligence or beauty or talent of any kind with “sashweights and 
bags of birdshot” and masks “so that no one, seeing a free and graceful gesture or a 
pretty face, would feel like something the cat drug in” (1961, reprinted in Pojman 
and Westmoreland (1997: 315). These anti-egalitarian visions come in more and less 
theatrical forms,40 but one shared concern is that outcome equality suppresses 
individual diversity and prevents different people from excelling in different areas.
The problem with this objection is that it misunderstands the true meaning of 
an ideal of equality of outcome. It is opposed not to human diversity and excellence 
in different endeavours, but rather to social hierarchy and segregation. Equality of 
outcome challenges a society that, due to a complex combination of prejudices and 
normative assumptions, social structures, and individual decisions and actions within 
those structures and norms, still tends to slot certain types of people into certain types 
of occupations. As Phillips notes, for centuries feminists have supposed that equal 
outcomes are an important benchmark of justice, and this commitment is at least
40 See Kekes (1997) for a more philosophical, but still dystopic, treatment, and Barclay (1999) for a 
response to Kekes. For a feminist twist, see Elshtain (1992). Elshtain is not, of course, against the 
equality of women. However, she does worry about feminisms that in her view encourage women to 
ape men’s traditional roles and adopt their values and priorities.
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partly explained by their suspicion of ‘separate but equal’ rationales which have been 
used to deny women access to particular spheres and powers (2004: 6).
Some may have noticed a different difficulty with Phillips’s argument, 
however: it implies that in order to achieve equal outcomes, we might sometimes 
have to override people’s autonomous choices about careers. As Brian Barry argues, 
“Equal outcomes can be secured only by departing from equal opportunities so as to 
impose equal success rates for all groups. A culturally diverse society cannot be 
conceived as one in which everyone is trying equally hard to achieve the same goals” 
(2000: 108).41 But Phillips insists that equality of opportunity, even when stretched 
to take into account unjust background differences, is still too minimal and that we 
must look at people’s choices themselves. It is not enough to simply remove the 
“more material constraints on choice” for “if something in our circumstances makes 
us less ambitious or more willing to put up with what others might regard as failure, 
this seems as compelling a constraint on our opportunities as being taught in a class 
of thirty instead of a class of fifteen” (2006: 24). In other words, we must query 
people’s choices directly. While Phillips is critical of Nussbaum for her ambivalence 
about choice, she seems to get into a similar situation herself: endorsing choice in the 
abstract but querying people’s actual choices.
This also casts a new light on the divergence Phillips perceives between their 
visions of social justice. Despite their shared concern for women’s adaptive 
preferences, Phillips represents their approaches to justice as very divergent, with 
Nussbaum opting for a minimalist approach guaranteeing women and men only a 
basic threshold of capability, above which many inequalities might obtain, while her 
own approach holds out for strict equality between the sexes. But Phillips hesitates 
to accept the validity of some women’s occupational choices, in light of social 
conditioning encouraging them to view some choices as more appropriate and 
acceptable than others. Thus it is unclear that Phillips is so very far away from 
Nussbaum’s view that certain ends, or capabilities, are inherently valuable and that
41 See also Miller (1999). He poses a similar objection to Iris Young’s work. Young, he argues, 
assumes that occupational segregation is prima facie evidence of social injustice. Although real life 
often suggests this view is correct, in principle we can imagine occupational segregation occurring 
absent any unfairness, discrimination or injustice (Miller 1999: 16, 273n). We are tempted to find real 
cases of occupational segregation bad because we suspect -  and, sadly, we are often right -  that sexual 
or racial discrimination is behind it. However, consider a case wherein members of two religious 
groups gravitate to different occupations because of their religious beliefs. We might find this weird 
or unfortunate, he writes, but we should not take it as a case of injustice.
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we should thus try to ensure that all human beings enjoy them. Phillips does not 
present anything like a substantive list of important human goods which feminists 
should invoke in their arguments for gender equality. Indeed, few theorists of social 
justice have, which is partly what makes Nussbaum’s approach so novel. 
Nevertheless, some sort of implicit but substantive conception of human flourishing 
appears to motivate Phillips’s argument for equal outcomes.
Ann Levey (2005) presents an analysis of current liberal egalitarian 
thinking that has some parallels with Phillips. For example, both suggest that 
the current social division of labour is in need of serious reform: “As feminists, 
we might want to insist that some percentage of spaces in nursing be reserved 
for men and some spaces in engineering be reserved for women, even if that 
means some women who want to be nurses will not be able to” (2005: 141). 
However, Levey appears to go further than Phillips in acknowledging that the 
policy implications of such a vision include a commitment to ignoring or 
overriding people’s choices. According to Levey, as a feminist, you cannot 
find the grounds within “neutral liberalism” (a doctrine attributed to, among 
others, Rawls and Dworkin) on which to criticise all of the choices voluntarily 
made by women that some feminists feel ought to be criticised -  i.e. economic 
choices that perpetuate gender hierarchy. She draws the following conclusion:
“if we take seriously that gendered preferences are problematic, and if I am 
right that such preferences are often fully voluntary and autonomous, we need 
to take seriously that at least sometimes we will advocate policies that go 
against the express preferences and values of existing women” (2005: 141).
Kimberly Yuracko (2003) goes even further than Levey. Whereas 
Levey’s analysis is limited to the implications for individual choice in the face 
of persistent gender inequality in occupations, Yuracko argues that feminism 
ought to adopt a perfectionist programme in a broad sense, so that it is able to 
criticise women’s choices in a variety of areas traditionally considered harmful 
by feminists. Yuracko argues that feminists usually do not criticise women’s 
choices to be “sex workers, sex kittens and full-time housewives” (2003: 9) 
directly, but instead criticise the conditions under which women make those 
choices. For example, economic coercion is often cited by feminists as a 
reason to doubt the voluntariness of some women’s ‘choices’ to become 
prostitutes. However, she argues that if we scratch the surface of these neutral-
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sounding arguments, we discover that feminists are really appealing to 
perfectionist reasons in condemning choices some women make. This is the 
starting point to another debate which I do not intend to pursue here, though we 
shall return to it in chapter three. For now, my point is that while the liberal 
side might say that Phillips is insufficiently neutral with respect to the good -  
her criticism of occupational segregation can only be sustained on the thought 
that it is bad if women continue to choose raising children over running 
corporations -  some on the feminist side will say that she attempts to be too 
neutral and should admit her disapproval of some women’s choices.
A possibly less controversial aspect to the debate around preferences 
concerns feminist strategies for tackling them. As part of her argument for 
equal outcomes, Phillips insists that the distinction between overt 
discrimination and structural constraints needs to be broken down. According 
to her, socially constructed differences between people, which are themselves 
“expressions of inequality,” probably have as much to do with preventing 
representational equality in government today as does overt discrimination 
(2004: 7-8). For women, the expectation that they will be the primary carers 
represents the main structural constraint (7). For racial and ethnic minorities, it 
is “seemingly ‘objective’ differences in educational and employment histories 
or length of time spent in mainstream politics” that pose the structural barrier. 
Similarly with the distribution of occupations: isn’t it likely that there are 
structural obstacles blocking the way to some occupations for some groups?
Where Phillips calls for the distinction between overt discrimination 
and structural constraints to be broken down, Iris Marion Young (1990) takes 
this a step further by calling attention to the fact that structural barriers to 
advancement for oppressed groups can be both external (such as workplace 
norms) and internal (such as feelings of self-loathing). Her argument to this 
effect has several strands but we will consider just one here. Following 
Anthony Giddens, Young argues that we should make a distinction between 
discursive and practical racism. Discursive racism consists in the overt and 
public expressions of hatred, disgust, and fear of persons from ‘other’ races and 
cultures. Even when discursive racism has mostly receded from a society, 
practical racism, which exists at a subconscious level, endures. It is evident in 
the racist or stereotyping remarks of persons in private, when their guard is
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down and they feel they are among friends. It is evident in ordinary, daily 
routines and interactions, such as when well-meaning whites who consciously 
oppose racism nevertheless find themselves acting fearfully or nervously 
around blacks. Young suggests that this less obvious form of discrimination is 
often present in daily social interactions, in policymaking, and in mass 
entertainment media (1990: 134-6). Members of stigmatised groups notice this, 
and sometimes internalise the negative impressions that they see others have of 
them. This is an aspect of her more general criticism of mainstream theories of 
distributive justice which says that because they view justice mainly as 
achieving a certain pattern of distributive shares amongst citizens, these 
theories tend to neglect the social institutions that produce and reproduce those 
patterns over time.
Jean Hampton (1997) has approached this deficiency in the liberal 
egalitarian literature through a distinction between political and social power. 
She suggests that the main tenets of liberalism tune liberal theorists to two key 
forms of harm to the individual: the oppressive consequences of formal 
political power exercised by the state, and the harm that one private citizen can 
inflict on another. This means that liberal theory commonly overlooks a third 
form of harm based in the social and cultural practices of a society but where 
no individual is necessarily doing anything wrong. She writes, “if the liberal 
state is committed to maximizing ‘autonomous self-government,’ concerning 
itself only with the individual acts of harm, it will fail to be responsive to 
restrictions on freedom and equality that are socially generated, with the result 
that subordination, loss of freedom, and abuse (generated by social rather than 
political forces) will actually flourish, to the great harm of many individuals 
within that society” (Hampton 1997: 192, italics mine). Hampton suggests that 
while liberals determinedly oppose unjust discrimination such as racism and 
sexism, their core tenets, which focus on harms perpetrated by individual 
agents against other agents, and which are ever-wary of state-imposed 
restrictions on individual freedoms, combine to mean that they are unlikely to 
hold that state power ought to be harnessed to oppose socially-generated harms. 
Where no individual wrong-doer is apparent, and where the state runs the risk 
of appearing to be non-neutral with regards to its citizens’ conceptions of the 
good, this makes it difficult for liberals to justify measures to combat socially-
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based, rather than politically-based, oppression. This resonates with my point 
in chapter one that the category of ‘bad luck’ is over-general, obscuring the 
moral differences between cosmic misfortunes, deliberate wrongdoing by 
individuals, and unintentional social action as causes of inequality.
3. T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  D is t r ib u t io n  in  S o c ia l  Ju s t ic e
A prominent theme within the feminist literature is the claim that the concept 
of distribution dominates and organises liberal approaches to social justice.
Feminists criticise this tendency on a number of different points, several of which are 
examined in this section. Perhaps the most influential of such critiques is Young’s 
(1990) Justice and the Politics o f Difference. For Young, part of what it means to 
say that the concept of distribution dominates mainstream theories of justice is that 
they tend “to conceive social justice and distribution as coextensive concepts” (1990: 
16). She establishes this by reviewing the work of a number of important theorists, 
including Rawls, Ackerman, William Galston, and David Miller (she notes that 
Walzer’s theory is “interestingly ambiguous” on this score) (16-18). She concludes 
that “most theorists take it as given... that justice is about distributions. The 
paradigm assumes a single model for all analyses of justice: all situations in which 
justice is at issue are analogous to the situation of persons dividing a stock of goods 
and comparing the size of the portions individuals have” (1990: 18). Apart from 
Ackerman, Young does not consider any of the theorists commonly regarded as luck 
egalitarians. However, it is reasonable to think that she would approve the extension 
of her analyses to these writers as well, given that their theories conform to the 
description of the model she provides. Indeed, her description rings especially true, 
for example, of Dworkin’s auction. Interestingly, Gerald Gaus, arguing from a rather 
different perspective to Young, reaches a similar conclusion. He suggests that in 
Dworkin’s theory, “Liberalism is depicted as a theory about how a distributor of 
good things should distribute them” (2000a: 168).
One aspect of Young’s critique concerns what we might call the ‘imperialist’ 
tendencies of the notion of distribution. She claims that mainstream approaches 
over-extend the concept of distribution from material things, such as income or 
houses, which lend themselves to division amongst individuals, to non-material 
things, such as rights, opportunities, power, and self-respect, which resist the logic of
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distribution. Observing this tendency in the above group of theorists, Young notes 
that they see this as contributing to the “beauty and simplicity” of liberal justice, 
which is able to formulate virtually any issue “in terms of the distribution of some 
material or non-material goods among various agents” (24). According to Young, 
however, the over-extension of distribution distorts the meaning and value of some 
of the things to which it is applied. “Rights are not fruitfully conceived as 
possessions,” she argues. “Rights are relationships, not things; they are 
institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another” 
(25). Similarly, self-respect “is not an entity or measurable aggregate, it cannot be 
parceled out of some stash, and above all it cannot be detached from persons as a 
separate attribute adhering to an otherwise unchanged substance” (27). According to 
Young, we should be careful to limit the concept of distribution to material things, 
and talk about non-material issues using a different vocabulary organised around the 
concepts of oppression and domination.
The mainstream response to this objection has been pretty unfavourable, with 
Brian Barry’s (2000) among the most trenchant. Barry pours scorn on the idea that 
rights, for example, do not lend themselves to the logic of distribution: “All of social, 
political and economic life is relational in some sense or other. But that does not 
mean that there is anything mistaken in saying that people ‘have rights’. Indeed, 
Young is unable to avoid falling into that way of talking herself’ (2000: 272).
Barry’s response seems correct: although rights cannot be divided, there is no 
difficulty in thinking about them as things that are distributed to (or, in some cases, 
withheld from) individuals, and it seems true that we experience rights as things that 
we do or do not have. Thus, with respect to some intangibles such as rights, it is 
Young’s critique, rather than the concept of distribution, that seems to be getting 
carried away. However, in other areas, her basic point -  that distribution cannot 
adequately express the meaning of a good -  seems correct. The good of self-respect 
is more contested. That even Barry concedes part of this -  he holds that self-respect 
is not eligible for distribution although the social bases of self-respect should be 
(271) -  is indicative of the controversy. This will be discussed later in this section, 
in relation to cultural inequalities, as well as in chapter four.
A second aspect to Young’s ‘distributivist’ objection to mainstream theories 
is that the focus on distribution hampers thinking about and including within the 
scope o f social justice the institutional structures and processes that precede
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distributions. Young asserts that the “general criticism I am making of the 
predominant focus on the distribution of wealth, income, and positions is that such a 
focus ignores and tends to obscure the institutional context within which those 
distributions take place, and which is often at least partly the cause of patterns of 
distribution of jobs or wealth” (21-22). Many feminists and socialists agree with this 
point, although they might vary their focus as to which institutions and structures 
egalitarian liberals take for granted. Even feminists who employ the concept of 
distribution (and this includes Young (see especially her discussion in Young 2006:
9In)) to analyse gender injustice maintain at the same time that this can obscure 
deeper issues. If we only ask what proportion of top corporate jobs goes to women, 
we may forget to query the exorbitant salaries CEOs command and the deeply flawed 
systems that ensure they do (Ramsay 2005b).
At any rate, Young focuses on three major social institutions and processes 
which she argues are overlooked and presupposed by mainstream theorists: decision­
making power and its organization, particularly within welfare state institutions; the 
social division of labour; and culture (3, 22, 75). (I place culture to one side for the 
moment because it fits better with the debates on redistribution and recognition 
forms of injustice, taken up below.) Focusing on decision-making power in welfare 
state institutions, Young argues that mainstream theories tacitly accept the post-war 
capitalist welfare state institutions as their main framework for approaching 
questions of justice. I argued that this was true specifically for luck egalitarian 
accounts in chapter one. The problem with these institutions is that they are 
depoliticised. According to Young, welfare capitalism represents certain advances in 
terms of safeguarding individuals’ wellbeing (67-70). The modem bureaucracies 
that constitute welfare state societies replace personality-based systems of benefits 
administered by capricious local powerholders, with rule-governed, impartial social 
service professionals (76). However, the flip side of uniform mles and procedures 
for all persons is a rigid inflexibility that prevents service providers from exercising 
discretion (although, inevitably, personal factors will always invade these 
interactions) and makes clients feel anonymised and powerless. In addition, these 
developments promote a consumerist, rather than participation-oriented, conception 
of citizenship: “Restricting conflict and policy discussion to distributive issues, the 
welfare capitalist society defines the citizen primarily as client-consumer.... Such a 
client-consumer orientation toward citizenship privatizes the citizen, rendering goals
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of popular control or participation difficult or meaningless” (71-72). Again, while 
Young is not addressing luck egalitarians specifically, this criticism anticipates 
objections by Anderson, Samuel Scheffler, and David Miller, as I discuss in chapter 
five.
One social institution Young mentions only in passing (1990: 21) but which 
other feminists regard as fundamental to the limitations of liberal justice is the family. 
Recall Okin’s argument that contemporary theorists persist in excluding women’s 
gender-based inequality from their theories despite superficial language changes 
because they almost universally take the family for granted and fail to consider it as 
falling within the scope of justice (1991: 8). “The judgment that the family is 
‘nonpolitical’ is implicit in the fact that it is simply not discussed in most works of 
political theory today.... In the most influential of all twentieth-century theories of 
justice, that of John Rawls, family life is not only assumed, but is assumed to be just 
-  and yet the prevalent gendered division of labor within the family is neglected, 
along with the associated distribution of power, responsibility, and privilege” (9).42 
The family is itself a distributive institution, directly determining what different 
family members get, and indirectly influencing distributions outside the domestic 
sphere. The pool of candidates eligible for that rewarding career has already been 
shaped by the institution of the family through the prevailing sexual division of 
labour which assigns most of the unpaid domestic work and dependent care to 
women. Although Okin and Young focus on different institutions, their accounts are 
underpinned by an important common criticism: the distributivist approach 
forecloses discussions about the justice of particular institutional structures that 
determine distributions because the theories take them as given.43
How have mainstream theorists responded to this criticism? Rawls has taken 
at least parts of it on board. He seems to have accepted that A Theory o f Justice 
inadvertently wrote in substantive assumptions about the kind of society it applied to, 
and sought to correct for this -  by explicitly acknowledging it -  in his later Political
42 While this is a strong indictment of Rawls, readers familiar with Okin’s work will know that, in the 
end, she argues that Rawls’s theory of justice is virtually the only one that, suitably adapted, can 
address issues of gender inequality.
43 Young’s chapter on welfare state capitalism does not draw the necessary links between general 
criticism and specific theorists that could help us assess her arguments (though she cites certain 
passages in Rawls’s Theory as examples (1990: 22). In a recent re-statement of her influential work, 
Young corrects the earlier generality and addresses the criticisms specifically to Rawls’s views (2006). 
She also supplies a new critique of the division of labour within the family and the structural division 
between care work in the domestic sphere and paid work in the public sphere.
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Liberalism (1993). The adequacy of his response is a matter of dispute.44 However,
I do not intend to pursue those issues here as that would engage us in too specific a 
discussion of Rawlsian justice whereas my aim is to construct a more general 
account of the debates that sheds light on luck egalitarianism. For his part, Miller 
(1999) interprets Young’s criticism as saying that the distributive paradigm of justice 
emphasises outcomes rather than the hierarchical processes that give rise to outcomes. 
He argues that, “At first sight it might seem that this charge simply misses the point, 
because the reason for focusing on distributive outcomes is not simply to label them 
just or unjust, but to indict the institutions and practices that create unjust outcomes.
If the capitalist organization of industry produces distributions of income, working 
conditions, and so forth that fail the test of justice, then that gives us good reason to 
attempt to find a better alternative” (Miller 1999: 15). Miller apparently does hold 
that the capitalist organisation of industry and labour produces income distributions 
that fail the test of justice and he argues for a maximum income ratio of 8:1 (1997: 
94). This is a dramatically more egalitarian ratio than those that actually obtain in 
the US and the UK (1999: 69-73), and possibly a more egalitarian ratio than some 
versions of luck egalitarianism would yield since it sets no principled upper limit on 
the amount that someone could legitimately earn. But Miller is not, as noted in the 
first chapter, best read as a luck egalitarian, so his apparent readiness to query some 
institutions as well as outcomes is not then evidence about the luck egalitarian 
literature.
Though Young does not address her critique to Dworkin’s theory, it might 
have proved even more forceful and illuminating had she done so. It is clear that 
equality of resources accords a central role to -  is, in fact, dominated by -  a market 
in private property. As Dworkin observes, “an equal division of resources 
presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device but 
also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution” (1981b: 284). As discussed 
in chapter one, agents make their hypothetical occupation and catastrophe insurance 
choices after they have been supplied with information about their society. Lisa 
Schwartzmann (2000) argues that “because the insurance scheme models current 
ambitions in order to come up with a premium rate structure, Dworkin must import
44 See Nussbaum (2003) for an overview of the Rawls-feminist debate on the family. Nussbaum 
suggests that feminist “criticisms pertaining to the family raise the most difficult and troubling issues, 
for they seem to threaten the very project of political liberalism” (515).
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from our own society complex cultural assumptions about matters such as family 
structure, occupational choice, and desires for wealth” (2000: 234). In a point that 
resonates with Young’s focus on the substantive assumptions about the welfare state 
that constitute mainstream theories of justice, Kymlicka asserts that “Dworkin often 
writes as if the most obvious or likely result of implementing his conception of 
justice would be to increase the level of transfer payments between occupants of 
existing social roles. But, as Rawls notes, liberal egalitarians should also be 
concerned with the way these existing roles are defined” (Kymlicka 2002: 90) and 
Dworkin’s theory takes “the existing level of inequality in market income as a given, 
and ask[s] how best to tax some of the unequal income of the advantaged and 
transfer it to the disadvantaged” (2002: 82). While these remarks do not constitute a 
full analysis in themselves, they are enough to suggest that on the face of it, 
Dworkin’s model presupposes certain distributive institutions constitutive of our own 
society. This issue will be taken up in chapter three, particularly with regard to the 
question of the sexual division of labour.
Feminists should employ the concept of distribution in their analyses (it is 
hard to see how it could be avoided in any case), but at the same time, they should 
guard against supposing that that is the extent of social justice. As Young argues, 
social justice and distribution are not co-extensive concepts. We should not let our 
interest in fair distributions distract us from other important concerns. These include 
questions about the nature of the social institutions that distribute benefits and 
burdens; possibilities for change and reform of those institutions; and whether the 
sorts of occupations and roles currently accorded a high value in our society are 
really of much social value after all.
An important strand within Young’s work, and one that she has developed 
specifically in relation to luck egalitarianism, concerns what she calls the ‘social 
ontology’ of the distributive paradigm. She argues that mainstream theories of 
justice typically have operated with “a social ontology that has no room for a concept 
of social groups” (1990: 3). Young argues that this is strange, particularly if theorists 
are interested in inequality, since comparisons of social groups are indispensable to 
understanding patterns of inequality. As Young notes, “[pjeople commonly claim 
that women lack equality with men, Blacks with whites, old people with younger 
people, children of working-class parents with children of middle-class parents, and 
so on. Governments, research institutions, and other organizations apparently
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legitimate such group-conscious judgments about equality by disaggregating general 
welfare measures according to gender, ethnicity, race, religion, caste, age, occupation 
or region” (Young 2001: 1). If an individual’s freedoms or rights are violated, there 
is no need to ask about her social group background as it is already evident that an 
injustice has been done. By contrast, a presumption of injustice does not arise if an 
individual has less income than another since we know that individuals differ in a 
million ways including income levels that do not raise issues of injustice. When it 
comes to inequalities, a group-based analysis reveals patterns of objectionable 
inequalities that might be masked at a more fine-grained level. Even though 
Dworkin criticises Rawls’s theory for not being sufficiently fine-tuned to intra-group 
differences, and even though his theory of distributive justice employs highly 
individualised interpersonal comparisons, he cannot avoid referring to objectionable 
social group inequalities. To take one example, he writes that “in the real world 
people do not start their lives on equal terms; some begin with marked advantages of 
family wealth or of formal and informal education. Others suffer because their race 
is despised” (1985: 207).45 The recognition of these “real world” social group 
inequalities does not seem to carry over into Dworkin’s theory of equality. A 
common difference, then, between feminist and the mainstream liberal egalitarian 
analyses of inequality is in their propensity to retain in theoretical discussions a 
group-based analysis. Indeed, it is hard to think of a feminist analysis of inequality 
that does not implicitly, and usually explicitly, employ a social ontology of groups.
It would be a mistake to conclude that this difference then corresponds in any 
straightforward way to philosophical or political positions on group-based remedies, 
however. Take affirmative action policies, for example, which constitute one of the 
most well-known forms of group-based policy. One finds feminists, anti-racists, and 
mainstream liberals on either side of this issue. Nussbaum suggests that liberals 
“will continue to differ about the topic of differential treatment, especially in the area 
of affirmative action” (1999: 69; for overviews, see Kymlicka 2002: chapter 3), and 
the same is true for feminists and those fighting racism.
45 It is perhaps not insignificant that in the passage from Dworkin I am quoting, the next line 
continues, “Luck plays a further and sometimes devastating part in deciding who gains or keeps jobs 
everyone wants” (1985: 207). This claim about the “the jobs everyone wants” sits somewhat uneasily 
with Dworkin’s emphasis nearly everywhere else that it is precisely because people want and pursue 
such different things in life, including occupation (beachcombing, law, tomato-farming...), that we 
should be unmoved by the wealth differences that result.
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With a social ontology of groups largely absent, the distributive paradigm 
produces a discourse of justice that is almost invariably about the distribution of 
something to individuals in order to effect change in their relative standing as 
individuals. Young believes this represents a significant limitation, for sometimes 
what is needed for social justice is a change in the relations between social groups. 
No mere re-allocation of goods amongst private individuals can achieve this more 
radical social change. This insight has perhaps been most persuasively developed by 
Nancy Fraser in her development of a dualistic framework of social justice (1995; 
1996; 1997a). In many ways, the starting place for Fraser’s analysis is the mere fact 
of social group differentiation in modem, multicultural societies, so unlike Young, 
she does not dwell on the thought that this group-based perspective is a potential 
source of controversy. Fraser’s approach to social justice develops an important and 
influential contrast between redistribution and recognition as two essential forms of 
justice. We begin with her model in the final section of this chapter, where I show 
that a key feminist criticism of the broadly liberal approach to justice is its neglect of 
cultural obstacles to equal citizenship.
4. C u l t u r e , R e c o g n it io n , a n d  Re s p e c t
Fraser situates her approach to theorising social justice in what she terms ‘a 
post-socialist’ age: political events in the real world, including the collapse of 
communism, meant that a new foundation for progressive politics had to be found. 
Fraser argues that this new foundation could be perceived in the new social 
movements, including women, minorities, gays and lesbians, and the disabled, that 
were mobilising in advanced capitalist democracies. Well-meaning social reformers, 
including liberals and socialists, in the post-war era, which included liberals and 
socialists, understood the barriers to full citizenship to be mainly economic ones. 
Certainly, entrenched economic hierarchies, such as low social mobility for children 
of the working class, and pink ghettos for women in the paid labour force, need to be 
tackled in the name of equal citizenship. But the other half of the story, becoming 
increasingly salient as societies become more diverse, is that entrenched cultural 
hierarchies are also crucial barriers to equal citizenship. The very welfare state 
institutions that promote greater economic equality in some cases turn out to 
contribute to the maintenance of entrenched cultural hierarchies (1995: 85). In
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characterising these events, Fraser offers both a description or interpretation of them, 
and a prescription for how to conduct politics in the new era. In terms of description, 
she argues that the ‘“struggle for recognition’ is fast becoming the paradigmatic form 
of political conflict in the late twentieth century.... Cultural domination supplants 
exploitation as the fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces 
socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political 
struggle” (1995: 68). In terms of prescription, she argues that the two struggles for 
justice should be regarded as equally important and primary, and that we should try 
to theorise ways in which to pursue them simultaneously (69).
It should be noted that Fraser’s analysis differs from Young’s in that Fraser 
does not frame the problem as there being an overemphasis in the mainstream 
literature on distribution. Young’s analysis suggests that distribution should be 
folded within a broader approach focusing on oppression and domination. That you 
and I each get our fair shares still matters, but this issue recedes behind deeper 
questions concerning our participation and inclusion in decision-making and in the 
power structures that determine distributions. Fraser’s point is slightly different.
Fair shares for individuals -  the politics of redistribution -  remain at the forefront of 
her attention. Particularly in her earlier work, the emphasis is on giving equal weight 
and concern to the twin injustices of ‘maldistribution’ and ‘misrecognition.’ In later 
work, she comes to attach more importance to citizen participation as an aspect of 
fully equal citizenship, thus drawing their approaches closer together (see especially 
Fraser (2001) and Young (2000)).
However, underpinning this difference of emphasis is a shared concern to 
raise the profile of the problem of cultural hierarchies, wherein some social groups 
are accorded more recognition and respect than others. They (as well as other 
feminists) argue that this forms a significant barrier to equal citizenship for members 
of despised cultural groups, and that it should be distinguished from economic 
unfairness. There is little disagreement on the bare issue that different social groups 
enjoy different levels of respect and recognition within society. It is easy to find 
claims to this effect in the feminist literature; somewhat less so in the broadly liberal 
literature. As an example from the former group, Fraser writes, “Gays and lesbians 
suffer from heterosexism: the authoritative construction of norms that privilege 
heterosexuality. Along with this goes homophobia: the cultural devaluation of 
homosexuality. Their sexuality thus disparaged, homosexuals are subject to shaming,
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harassment, discrimination, and violence, while being denied legal rights and equal 
protections -  all fundamentally denials of recognition” (1995: 77). As an example of 
the latter group, Dworkin writes that, “[i]n all the dimensions in which our society is 
stratified -  income, wealth, power, prestige, and authority -  blacks are greatly 
underrepresented in the top levels, and the resulting de facto racial stratification is an 
enduring shame, waste, and danger” (2000: 400). Enumerating the dimensions of 
racial inequality, that is, Dworkin identifies ‘prestige’ as one, and I take it that this 
can be understood as a synonym for respect and/or recognition. Thus, in general, it 
appears that there is no quarrel on the basic claim that the unequal respect accorded 
to social groups counts as an important inequality in contemporary citizenship status, 
which varies along axes of race, ethnicity, gender, and other social group differences. 
However, at least three controversies then emerge from this empirical agreement: 
first, whether according different amounts of respect and recognition to different 
social groups is always objectionable; second, to what extent the coercive power of 
the state should be employed to combat objectionable inequalities of respect and 
recognition accorded to different groups; third, rival theses about whether respect 
and recognition inequalities are independent from material inequalities amongst 
groups -  and depending on one’s preferred view here, what that thesis then implies 
about effective political action.
Starting with the first issue, there seems to be general agreement that when 
different social groups are accorded different degrees of respect and recognition due 
to irrational prejudices, ignorance, and superstition, it is morally wrong. This is clear 
in Dworkin’s use of the word ‘shame’ to describe racial stratification, including 
differences of prestige. Similarly, Fraser’s claim that homosexuals are subject to 
‘shaming’ in virtue of their despised sexuality conveys her moral disapproval of such 
inequalities of respect. However, the feminist literature is likely to stretch this 
further, with some feminists suggesting that nearly any time we encounter a social 
group that is the target of general social disapproval, loathing, and stigmatisation, we 
ought to find it objectionable. Thus, Young argues that “Groups cannot be socially 
equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly 
affirmed and recognized” (1990: 174; cf. 119, 163, 168). This is too totalising, 
however. It is objectionable when people despise social groups out of an irrational 
prejudice, but it is correct to withhold respect from a social group that denies all 
humans have equal moral worth. As Fullinwider demands of Young, “Why...
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should I respect the Southern Baptist who believes I am damned for not practicing 
his brand of religion?.... Why should Young respect fellow citizens in virtue of rather 
than in spite of their misogyny? In any society of any size there are bound to exist 
groups loathsome and contemptible from our particular points of view. An ideal that 
calls for each of us to respect all others in virtue of their differences is otherworldly” 
(1995: 512).46 The emerging consensus is that it is always morally objectionable to 
deny respect to a person, but not always morally required to express respect for his or 
her group.
In more recent work, there is evidence of feminists reining in some of the 
more extravagant calls for reciprocal respect and recognition amongst social groups 
evident in earlier writings. For example, in a modification of her earlier argument, 
Fraser rejects the claim that “everyone always needs their distinctiveness 
recognized” (2001: 31).47 While attributing this stance to Charles Taylor (1994) and 
Axel Honneth (1995), Fraser argues that her own approach to social justice views 
“claims for the recognition of difference pragmatically and contextually -  as 
remedial responses to specific pre-existing injustices” (2001: 31). She argues that 
this approach can explain, where others cannot, why “those occupying advantaged 
positions in the status order, such as men and heterosexuals, usually shun recognition 
of their (gender and sexual) distinctiveness, claiming not specificity but universality. 
Nor why, on those occasions when they do seek such recognition, their claims are 
usually spurious” (2001: 31). While differences of opinion are bound to remain 
around when it is morally objectionable to deny respect to a particular group, there is
46 A front page story in The Onion, a satirical on-line newspaper, recently lampooned calls that groups 
must be respected, whatever their nature. The story featured a demonstration organised by the 
NAASP -  the National Association for the Advancement o f Shirtless People -  against stores and 
restaurants with ‘No shirts, No shoes, No service’ policies, and their calls for the public at large to 
respect them for their difference, their shirtlessness. While The Onion's story characteristically 
focuses on the absurd, and Fullinwider’s more serious examples are, or could be, taken from real life, 
they speak to the same general point.
47 Fraser’s work has evolved over the years, and has been the focus of considerable analysis. See, for 
example, Christopher Zum’s (2003) analysis highlighting what he perceives as the major changes in 
her position, as well as an examination of her claims about Honneth’s own brand of identity politics. 
Suffice it to say here that, in her earlier work, Fraser presents an analysis that is broadly favourable to 
identity politics, or what she calls the politics of recognition, and its calls for minority and despised 
groups to be accorded equal respect and recognition with majority groups. In her more recent work, 
she has withdrawn this broad endorsement and argues for a position that accords respect to groups on 
a case-by-case basis, and whose normative aim is the freedom and equality of individuals who are 
members of groups, rather than groups themselves. “Aimed not at valorizing group identity, but 
rather at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition in the status model [a term that 
distinguishes Fraser’s approved model of recognition politics, distinguishing it from the older, 
‘identity’ model] seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact 
with others as a peer” (Fraser 2001: 25).
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increasing agreement that distinctions must be made between valid and invalid 
claims of social stigma and exclusion.
The second controversy engages the question of to what extent, and in what 
manner, the coercive power of the state should be employed to combat objectionable 
inequalities of respect and recognition when these are discovered. It would be 
hazardous to suggest that there is anything like unanimity between the mainstream 
liberal egalitarian positions and feminist ones, yet if we extract somewhat 
bowdlerized positions from each tradition, basic principled disagreements emerge.
In general, the broadly liberal approach suggests that group-based respect 
inequalities license state-sponsored remedial action to the point where members of 
the group enjoy genuine equality of opportunity. For example, Miller imputes to 
Young the position that it is an injustice if blacks internalise a negative self-image of 
themselves because the media regularly portray blacks as “criminals, hookers, maids, 
scheming dealers, or jiving connivers” (Young 1990: 20). Miller replies:
This state of affairs immediately raises two concerns about social 
justice. First, is it possible for employers and others to give genuinely 
equal opportunities to blacks if they are constantly being bombarded 
with such negative images? Second, is it possible for blacks to think of 
themselves as equal citizens along with others if the public media 
routinely portray them in this way? ... If the focus is simply on the way 
in which media representations might tend to encourage blacks or other 
groups to adopt certain roles (and so be self-fulfilling), I am less sure 
that this is a violation of justice. Certainly, following John Stuart Mill, 
we want people to choose their plan of life for themselves, and exercise 
faculties other than the ape-like one of imitation, but it is not an 
injustice if this fails to happen (1999: 17).
Miller’s reply invokes, as the primary standard for moral evaluation of respect and 
recognition inequalities, a principle of genuine equal opportunity. The implication is 
that if the answer to his first question is ‘no,’ then state action is warranted to correct 
this. Miller appears to understand the point of disagreement between him and Young 
to be that Young would insist on more than this. Whereas they can both agree on the 
principle of equal opportunity, Young sees a further injustice in the fact that 
stereotypical cultural representations spark imitative or self-fulfilling behaviour in 
blacks. Thus, it would seem that he interprets her position as requiring state action
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even if inequalities were down to such imitative behaviour and not to a failure of 
equal opportunities for blacks.
I think Miller has to be right about this discrepancy. As discussed earlier, 
feminists are not satisfied by appeals to a principle of equal opportunity in the face of 
persistent and predictable inequalities of outcome between men and women and 
people of different races and ethnicities. Inequalities that Miller construes as the 
effects of a failure of imagination on the part of particular agents might well be 
regarded by feminists as the effects of reasonable acquiescence or accommodation to 
act in accordance with overwhelming social expectations and norms about 
appropriate roles for particular types of people. This is why theorists such as Young, 
Fraser, Phillips, Nussbaum, Hampton, and Levey argue that feminists must take a 
stronger line about judging cultural representations unjust. As Nussbaum argues in a 
discussion concerning women’s ‘consent’ to unwanted sexual advances in a culture 
that pervasively eroticises women’s submission, it is not enough to point to the 
“resourcefulness” of women who manage to resist pressures to conform and say that 
everything is therefore okay (1999: 144). Feminists typically go further than 
mainstream theorists in their judgments about what is required by the state to rectify 
objectionable group-based respect inequalities. This stronger position has two 
aspects. First, it involves a greater willingness to politicise and criticise the spheres 
of culture and civil society -  including, prominently, media organisations and their 
output -  which derives in large measure from feminists’ ambivalence about the 
public/private dichotomy supported by liberal thought. Second, it involves a greater 
willingness to blur the line between the norms of equal opportunity and equal 
outcome, thus rejecting the former as the sole standard forjudging when inequalities 
are morally bad (Phillips 2004).
To recap, on the question of what should be done about respect inequalities 
between social groups, the broadly liberal approach holds that, as a matter of 
principle, ultimately no group should have privileged status in society, so we should 
work to achieve genuine neutrality between groups. Some feminists (and 
multiculturalists) argue that taking special measures designed to enhance the status of 
a despised group helps to dismantle the false neutrality of the liberal state, and 
exposes its implicit biases in favour of white, heterosexual Christian males. This 
relates back to the question of the liberal individual and the extent to which ‘he’ can 
be made genuinely neutral.
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In addition, differences emerge over the politics of extending equal respect to 
all groups. Barry argues that difference theorists, such as Young and Fraser, should 
take part of the blame when marginalised and oppressed groups fail to win or even 
lose equal rights with other citizens, citing as evidence American feminists’ failure to 
pass the Equal Rights Amendment and British gay activists’ failure to make the age 
of consent the same for homosexual and heterosexual relations. Barry argues that in 
both these cases, the battle was first joined as a matter of “elementary equity” (2000: 
276; 278). It became more contested, however, when activists changed tack and 
campaigned for “public affirmation of the equal worth of a homosexual lifestyle” 
(276), or in the case of the ERA, unconventional gender roles (278). The upshot, 
according to Barry, is that “Young and Fraser and those who think like them put at 
risk the survival of the liberal rights that have already been won and even more their 
extension so as to complete the movements towards legal equality” (277). In Barry’s 
view, the politicising of cultural identities, which he takes as aiming at a public 
affirmation of the equal value of all identities and practices, is illiberal in itself since 
it will inevitably employ the coercive power of the state to achieve its aims. It also 
may provoke a culturally conservative backlash that may succeed in denying equal 
rights.
Barry is correct that Young, and to a lesser degree the ‘old’ Fraser, downplay 
the importance of equal rights in the liberation of disadvantaged groups. Although 
Young suggests that the politics of difference requires a “dual system of rights: a 
general system of rights which are the same for all, and a more specific system of 
group-conscious policies and rights” (174), overall, her analysis suggests that the 
more important and radical struggle is cultural revolution. Fraser, particularly in her 
later work, is more cautious about promoting cultural revolution, but she too displays 
a tendency to downplay the way fully equal rights may contribute to eroding 
entrenched cultural hierarchies. This tendency in their analyses becomes more 
pronounced when contrasted to Nussbaum, who is more of a fan of “rights talk” 
when it comes to emancipating women (1999: chapters 2 and 5, for example). 
However, blaming Young and Fraser and “those who think like them” for failures in 
rights struggles is problematic. Part of this claim is empirical, of course, and it is 
unlikely that a clear causal arrow could be drawn here. Part of it echoes the lament 
voiced by many about leftwing academics, particularly those whose postmodern, 
cultural relativist leanings become too pronounced, playing into the hands of
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ASconservative forces (Barry 2001: 9-17). While I would agree with Barry that 
academics should be aware of the political purposes to which their views can be put, 
it is implausible to hold them responsible for events in the wider world of politics 
just because their views somehow touch on those events.
Barry’s objection -  implicitly asserting a hierarchy between those who fight 
for “elementary equity” issues and those who waste their time on cultural affirmation 
-  provides a useful segue into the last issue I want briefly to raise: how to 
conceptualise respect and recognition inequalities in relation to distributive and 
economic inequalities, and what sort of priority to assign to each? Some feminists 
argue that the distributive paradigm downplays respect and recognition inequalities 
as a category of injustice. In her redistribution/recognition model, for example,
Fraser argues that partisans of socio-economic injustice tend to conceptualise cultural 
or recognition injustice as epiphenomenal to material inequality, and vice versa 
(1995; 2001). Thus, even though distributive theorists may address respect 
inequalities in some way, the “primary thrust of their thought leads in the direction of 
distributive economic justice” (1995: 7In).
This perception is not unfounded. Distributive theorists -  understood broadly 
to include those writing from socialist as well as liberal traditions -  have tended to 
treat non-recognition inequalities as the paradigmatic form of injustice. Barry, as we 
have seen, suggests that legal inequalities are morally, politically, and causally prior 
to other sorts of inequality. Accusing Fraser’s economic/cultural dichotomy of 
“squeezing out” a category of legal inequalities, he argues that “[w]hat Fraser 
relegates to parentheses -  the establishment of complete legal equality for 
homosexuals -  is the only thing that is within the scope of legitimate political 
intervention. Fortunately, evidence from even the imperfect moves towards legal 
equality that have already occurred already indicates that it is enough to eliminate 
over time the stigmatization of homosexuality” (Barry 2001: 275-6, italics added).49
Within the luck egalitarian literature in particular, there is a pronounced 
tendency to treat economic inequality as the primary and paradigmatic form of 
inequality. I argue this in detail in chapter four. For now, suffice it to say that 
bringing issues of culture explicitly within the scope of social justice remains
48 For a recent example of this complaint, see Stanley Fish (2005).
49 Although she is more sympathetic to Fraser’s argument than Barry, Phillips (2003) suggests that 
Fraser’s model also overlooks a category for specifically political inequalities.
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stronger in the feminist literature. Though this now rarely takes the form of claiming 
that all groups deserve equal recognition and respect, the emphasis on cultural 
hierarchies remains strong, reflecting long-established views on the way prevailing 
gender norms and expectations about gender roles contribute to the objectionable 
inequalities theorised by liberal egalitarians. Luck egalitarians, in particular, focus 
heavily on the distinction between individual choice and circumstance as 
contributing factors to inequality. While in theory this distinction allows for 
unchosen cultural differences -  such as the fact that my culture or religion is widely 
disparaged but not yours -  to be theorised as contributing to objectionable 
inequalities, such differences are rarely mentioned. The focus on inequalities rooted 
in individuals’ variously cheap or expensive occupational, leisure, and consumption 
preferences underlines further the emphasis placed on material, economic 
inequalities. Feminists, by contrast, employ approaches to social justice that broaden 
this discourse: first, by drawing discussions away from the focus on individual 
choice and toward social arrangements that condition and constrain choice; second, 
by drawing discussions away from a focus on goods that can be distributed, in 
metaphorical bundles, to individual persons, and supplementing this with an account 
of the relations of power between social groups unequal in multiple dimensions, 
including the degree of respect accorded to them.
More specifically, feminists have raised issues regarding the adaptive nature 
of preferences, the potential gender bias implied in conventional understandings of 
equality of opportunity, and the problematic assumption that the state can act as a 
neutral agent of redistribution. Some of these themes re-emerge in the more specific 




G ender  Equality , Choice , and the Sexual D ivision  of Labour
A c c o r d in g  to  its proponents, the novelty and appeal of luck egalitarianism 
lies in its ability to combine the political values of equality and personal 
responsibility (Cohen 1989: 399; Dworkin 2000: 7; Roemer 2002a: 470). In the 
recent critical literature, by contrast, the notions of choice and responsibility have 
emerged as one of the most discussed and apparently most problematic aspects. That 
feminists should raise objections about the weight accorded to choice in determining 
whether particular observed inequalities are objectionable is not surprising. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, concern for women’s adaptive preferences has 
long made feminists adopt a more sceptical and cautious attitude towards choice. 
Similar objections are now increasingly voiced within the broader assessments of 
luck egalitarianism, and in this chapter, I focus on two of these.
1. A u th en tic  Choice a n d  the S e x u a l  D ivision  of Ca r in g  La b o u r
Andrew Mason explores the implications of luck egalitarianism50 when it 
confronts a range of cases involving members of society who need care. He is 
particularly interested in what the view implies for agents who choose to care for 
dependent relatives and forego paid work. Part of his discussion addresses the 
general luck egalitarian view and how it responds to individuals in need of care. 
There are two general types of cases: blamelessly and culpably needy persons.51 
Both types of cases inspire criticism of luck egalitarianism to the effect that it 
substitutes a traditional egalitarian commitment to respond to urgent human need, 
whatever its cause, for a scheme that sorts people into the ‘deserving’ and
50 Mason uses the term ‘equal access view’ rather than ‘luck egalitarianism’ throughout. The equal 
access view permits “inequalities of outcome which are the product of holding people appropriately 
responsible for their behaviour” and depends on being able to identify “those aspects of a person’s 
condition for which she can be legitimately held responsible” where responsibility means bearing the 
costs of choices personally (2000: 229).
51 ‘Blamelessness’ and ‘culpability’ might be slightly misleading terms in that luck egalitarians 
typically emphasise that holding individuals responsible for their choices should not be confused with 
being moralistic or blaming them. Cohen, for example, writes: “Notice that I do not say that a person 
who deliberately cultivates an expensive taste deserves criticism. I say no such severe thing because 
there are all kinds of reasons why a person might want to develop an expensive taste, and it is each 
person’s business whether he does so or not. But it is also nobody else’s business to pick up the tab 
for him if he does” (1989: 923; see also Dworkin 2003: 192). However, it should be noted that in at 
least one of Ameson’s hypothetical examples (2000a: 348), blame and praise appear to creep in 
through the use of terms such as “reckless” and “gross negligence” to describe parties’ behaviour.
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‘undeserving poor’ (Anderson 1999a; MacKinnon 2003; Wolff 1998). Mason argues 
that it has more resources than critics sometimes attribute to it for dealing with what 
appear to be the negative implications of the view for individuals who are in need of 
care.
In the case of victims who are blamelessly in need of care, Mason argues that 
the general luck egalitarian view would require the community to share the costs 
equally. Consider the case of the elderly person who needs care yet cannot afford it. 
We are to imagine that neither he nor anyone else is responsible for his situation. 
Mason argues that, in this case, luck egalitarianism holds that everyone in society has 
an equal share of responsibility for the unfortunate person. Although this is not 
entirely clear, Mason appears to suggest that the state will provide for the needs of 
the victim, perhaps through collecting a small tax from everyone. However, if some 
members of society decide to discharge personally their responsibility for 
blamelessly needy elders, say by cutting back on their hours of paid work to make 
time to visit the local seniors’ centre, Mason tentatively suggests that luck 
egalitarianism reasonably can require those individuals to bear any associated costs 
personally. When people discharge their share of the responsibility personally, “it is 
not obvious that the equal access view would be mistaken in maintaining that they 
should bear the extra costs of this decision” (233). Mason does not explain his 
tentativeness, but it appears to be related to his larger worry that, in practice, women 
not men tend to provide such care, so the reality is that it will mainly be women who 
bear the extra costs of these decisions. Does this imply that luck egalitarianism in 
practice tacitly accepts the systematic exploitation of women? This is part of the 
larger criticism he develops.
In the case of victims who are culpably in need of care, Mason argues that the 
core of the view is committed to ignoring or abandoning those individuals to their 
fates. An example of this, noted in chapter one, concerns Dworkin’s argument that a 
person blinded in an accident who chose not to insure against such catastrophes is 
not entitled to medical care. In general, the view says that “forcing others to provide 
the means to care for those who could have insured against infirmity but didn’t” 
amounts to “exploitation of the prudent” (Mason 2000: 233). However, Mason 
argues that luck egalitarians could insist that we have an “imperfect general moral 
duty, independent of justice” to provide care for these people. Furthermore, the view 
could also invoke special duties of care, also independent of justice, that individuals
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owe their relatives. Appealing to these special principles, luck egalitarianism thus 
could ensure that imprudent individuals would not after all be abandoned.
The second case -  particularly the suggestion that luck egalitarianism should 
invoke individuals’ special moral duty to provide care for their imprudent relatives -  
raises a new worry. In practice, women will tend to discharge these duties because 
of the traditional sexual division of labour: “male relatives have not, as part of their 
upbringing or experience, acquired the skills to do so” (233). Does this mean that 
luck egalitarianism effectively places a heavier burden of the costs of care for needy 
people on women? Mason notes that Anderson argues that this is indeed the 
implication of luck egalitarianism. Summarising her argument, he writes that luck 
egalitarianism “treats those (in practice, mainly women) who care for dependants as 
making a lifestyle choice even when they do so from the deep moral conviction that 
they owe duties of care to family members. She argues that in effect the equal access 
view assumes that self-sufficiency is the norm for human beings, and is committed to 
a kind of atomistic egoism” (231).
Mason responds that the implications are not as negative as Anderson 
suggests. He argues that all versions of luck egalitarianism are committed to 
substantive equality of opportunity between women and men, and acknowledge that 
meeting this commitment requires reforming traditional social institutions. “In 
relation to childcare commitments in particular,” he suggests, “the equal access view 
will require institutions and practices to be designed in such a way that they permit 
men and women to share the costs of their decisions to have children” (231). 
Consequently, he argues that luck egalitarians in general are prepared to enforce 
potentially “radical” and “far-reaching” reforms affecting the “workplace and 
domestic life,” such as imposing flexible work arrangements or requiring the salaried 
parent to pay the unpaid, stay-at-home parent. While luck egalitarianism requires 
social institutions to permit parents to share the costs of having and raising children 
if they so choose, it does not insist that they should share those costs equally. One
52 Because he is interested in exploring the implications of a generalised luck egalitarian view, Mason 
does not address what additional principles -  if any -  particular luck egalitarians invoke for the 
undeserving destitute and desperate. Dworkin suggests that, for paternalistic reasons, a society 
governed by equality of resources might make a minimum level o f insurance compulsory (1981b: 
295).
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parent may want children more than the other and so be willing to accept a greater 
proportion of the cost.53
Mason puts a bit of a gloss on luck egalitarianism with respect to its family­
friendliness. At least with regard to the three theorists my analysis addresses, I am 
not aware of discussions that refer specifically to how social institutions should be 
reformed, in light of traditional gender bias towards men, to ensure genuine equality 
of opportunity for both sexes. Tellingly, the “radical” and “far-reaching” measures 
that Mason argues would be supported by luck egalitarianism are supplied by him; 
the texts of the luck egalitarians we have discussed do not mention these. Dworkin, 
Cohen, and Ameson do not suggest that their theories require for their success that 
the traditional gender-structured family be in place. On the other hand, what they do 
say about persons in a society governed by equality of resources, access to advantage, 
and opportunity for welfare respectively, does not rule out the traditional family.
The individuals discussed are all fully-formed adults. During infancy, a period of 
total helplessness, who devotes intensive care and attention to ensure they survive 
and thrive? How do they acquire powers of rational, prudential decision-making? 
These questions receive no answers. In recent work, Dworkin has specifically 
addressed barriers to equal opportunity for women, and these comments will be 
discussed below. However, the point for now is that Mason has to infer gender- 
specific implications about work and family arrangements from texts that tend, on 
the whole, to be gender-blind. He has to supply examples of what the general luck 
egalitarian view implies, which is indicative of the fact that relations of care tend to 
be ignored within the framework.
Additionally, Mason’s response does not address the deeper point Anderson 
makes about luck egalitarianism assuming that self-sufficiency is the norm for 
human beings. This is a reasonable interpretation of luck egalitarianism because the 
examples employed by theorists implicitly represent individuals as self-sufficient. 
They introduce characters who choose various forms of remunerative work, or 
choose not to work and enjoy their leisure instead. But how does luck egalitarianism 
greet workers who are unpaid? Although human societies, as currently organised,
53 Susan Moller Okin (1991) has argued that in order to bring about gender justice, government should 
insist that heterosexual, two-parent families should split childcare and housework equally, or in lieu of 
that, automatically direct half the salary of the working parent to a bank account for the stay-at-home 
parent. Ameson (1997) rejects Okin’s ‘equal split’ proposal on a number of grounds, including the 
reason cited by Mason that one parent may willingly and without injustice assume more of the costs 
since he or she wants children more than the other partner.
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depend on an army of unpaid workers, mainly women, to ensure their reproduction, 
luck egalitarianism does not address them. Anderson suggests that it might greet 
them this way: it will say “women are not on average less talented than men, but 
[they] choose to develop and exercise talents that command little or no market wage” 
(297-8) so it is “not clear whether luck egalitarians have any basis for remedying the 
injustices that attend their dependence on male wage earners” (298). She argues that 
luck egalitarians conflate ‘responsible work’ with market wage-earning, and nothing 
in the core texts negates that. Her point is a specific case of the broader feminist 
argument, discussed in chapter two, that the individual employed by liberalism is 
male-biased. In assuming self-sufficiency and independence, luck egalitarianism 
reflects what tends to be men’s experiences, not women’s, and like other forms of 
liberalism, encourages the view that this is what all lives are like, and those that are 
not are deviant.
Mason’s response touts the preparedness of the equal access view to impose 
new workplace structures or new family financial arrangements in the interests of 
ensuring substantive equality of opportunity between men and women. And it could 
be said in reply to the above objection that these measures are required because luck 
egalitarians recognise that the implicit male-breadwinner, female-dependent- 
caregiver model is outdated. I accept this possible rejoinder. It is clear that luck 
egalitarians such as Dworkin, Cohen, and Ameson favour substantive equality of 
opportunity between the sexes. But I have yet to see this issue directly addressed in 
the architecture of their theories of equality. Whether making mainstream theories 
sensitive to gender requires mere modifications to them, or fundamental root and 
branch reconstruction is an issue sometimes addressed in relation to Rawls’s theory; 
luck egalitarian theories, by contrast, have not received the same attention, 
suggesting that this represents an important direction for further research beyond the 
implications my analysis reveals.
In addition to exploring the implications of a generalised luck egalitarian 
view, Mason also examines how particular versions respond to individuals who 
provide care. One such theory is Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism.54 Mason asks 
us to imagine the situation of married women who decide to forego or abandon a 
career in order to concentrate on raising their children. They have enjoyed genuine
54 He also criticises John Roemer’s (1996) theory, but I do not intend to consider this aspect of his 
discussion.
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equality of opportunity with their peers, and their current domestic situation is 
favourable. There is money to hire a nanny, and their husbands are willing and able 
to look after their children. But they are “unwilling to take advantage of that 
opportunity: they may believe that they, as mothers, have a responsibility to look 
after their children personally, or they may simply want to devote themselves to the 
care of their own children or both. Let us call this... ‘the case of the career- 
sacrificing mother’” (230-31). Such women are, Mason suggests, acting in 
conformity with prevailing gender norms. Women and men are socialised to want 
and expect different things from life. Gender socialisation is a complex and 
pervasive process. Nevertheless, we still regard individuals who undergo gender 
socialisation (that is, all of us) as autonomous agents. A career-sacrificing mother 
can be “fully and vividly aware of the way in which her desires and dispositions have 
been influenced by processes of socialisation... [yet] still reflectively [endorse] those 
needs and desires as her own” (242).
Mason argues that Dworkin’s theory would require the career-sacrificing 
mother to bear the costs of her choice, and would not compensate her for any 
disadvantages arising from her career-sacrifice. This conclusion flows from equality 
of resources because it holds that, provided an agent’s choices meet certain criteria 
for genuine or authentic choice, the egalitarian thing to do is to hold the agent fully 
responsible for its costs. According to Mason’s reconstruction, Dworkin deems a 
“person’s desire... authentic (or fully authentic) if and only if she endorses it in 
circumstances where she has an adequate opportunity to reflect upon it, others have 
an adequate opportunity to subject it to criticism, and no manipulation or 
brainwashing has been part of the process which led her to endorse it” (2000: 240). 
The fact that an agent’s desire is a product of socialisation would not then disqualify 
it from counting as authentic, for as Mason argues, “there are many kinds [of 
socialisation] that do not fall under the description of brainwashing or manipulation,” 
including the actions of “parents, grandparents and other adults, siblings and their 
friends” who all “play a role in the construction of gender, often unintentionally” 
(2000: 240).
Mason devises his example so that it is clear that the career-sacrificing 
woman should be understood as an autonomous agent in Dworkin’s sense. 
Additionally, assuming the implications established in the more general discussion 
(for example, that the equal access view requires social institutions to permit parents
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to divide care equally), then any disadvantage can only be attributed to her authentic 
choices. Equality of resources’s criteria for authentic choice combined with its norm 
that distribution be choice-sensitive therefore implies that a woman who 
autonomously chooses to sacrifice her career to raise her children has no legitimate 
claim for compensation.
For Mason, this is a troubling implication: “it would not seem just to require 
her to bear the full costs of her decision to look after her children personally, for that 
would fail to give proper weight to the profound effects of sexist norms and 
images... The fact that her preferences and desires are fully authentic, in Dworkin’s 
sense, does not seem sufficient to justify the conclusion that she may legitimately be 
required to bear the full costs of acting in accordance with them” (242). Women are 
socialised to assume responsibility for dependent care, so is it really fair to require 
them to assume all the associated costs? Reluctance to do so does not have to 
depend on any beliefs about the false consciousness of those who assume 
traditionally ‘feminine’ identities; women reflectively endorse their choices to do 
work coded as feminine and do not regard themselves as oppressed (Levey 2005). 
The issue is whether the rest of us, from the point of view of equality, should require 
them to bear the costs if we feel that sexist norms have encouraged the choices.
Mason suggests two reasons why equality of resources is unmoved by the 
career-sacrificing woman. The first is that it has not found the right balance between 
individual and collective responsibility. In refusing her claims, equality of resources 
“fails to give proper weight to the profound effects of sexist norms and images” that 
circulate in society (242). “Fails to give proper weight” is vague, but can be 
interpreted as a complaint that in this case equality of resources assigns too much 
responsibility to the individual and not enough to society. This is an important 
diagnosis since in Sovereign Virtue Dworkin represents his theory as particularly 
compelling in its ability to find that correct balance. He contrasts an “old 
egalitarianism” which emphasises collective responsibility while ignoring or 
downplaying citizens’ personal responsibility with conservatism “new and old” that 
makes the opposite mistake. “The choice between these two mistakes is an 
unnecessary as well as an unattractive one,” Dworkin insists. “If the argument that 
follows is sound, we can achieve a unified account of equality and responsibility that 
respects both” (2000: 7).
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A failure to give proper weight to the effects of socialisation may stem in part 
from the causes that Dworkin identifies as contributing to inequality. This refers not 
just to the causal factors relevant in Mason’s example, but more generally. In a 
passage typical of his work, Dworkin asserts that equality of resources says we must 
show equal
respect and concern for those whose luck has been bad and who have not had 
a fair opportunity to protect against that bad luck. People without jobs are in 
no way worse people, or even intrinsically less talented people, than income 
millionaires; often they have only been in the wrong place, with the wrong 
training, at the wrong time, or in the company of too many others who also 
want and need scarce jobs (2002: 117).
This passage conveys an implicit account of how people come to be economically 
unequal, suggesting that variations in people’s luck throughout life is a, if not the, 
major factor in these different outcomes. The passage conveys a curiously sanitised 
image of social life, and in particular, a sanitised account of unemployment. Because 
it is at an abstract level, it also sounds historically and socially naive. According to 
Martha Nussbaum, roughly 50 per cent of women worked for pay in America in the 
1990s (1999: 134). Presumably, a substantial proportion of those who were not in 
the paid labour force were caring for children and other dependents fulltime in the 
home. Even someone from another planet would not think that these facts of 
women’s unemployment should be mapped onto an explanatory grid which says that 
they were all simply in the “wrong place” at the “wrong time.” This is not to suggest 
that this is Dworkin’s interpretation of women’s unemployment. The point is, rather, 
that the phrase reveals how Dworkin’s analysis displays a tendency to ‘individualise’ 
phenomena that should be understood in terms of the broader social patterns that 
structure the work lives of women and men.
Without at least some of the facts of social structural inequality constantly 
before our eyes, there is less preventing us from focussing too much on what 
individuals have or have not done to deserve their shares. Luck egalitarian discourse 
seems to furnish us with at best a half-finished account of the causal factors 
producing inequality, due to its exaggerated emphasis on individual choice. This 
makes an appropriate division of responsibility between individual and society much 
harder. Moreover, an additional worry is that the focus on individual choices in 
abstraction from the social background informing those choices contributes to a
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failure to recognise power relationships between individuals. Anne Phillips argues 
that the fact that some men accrue great success and wealth is due not only to their 
individual ambitions but also to the fact that they can delegate virtually all domestic 
and dependent-care work to their wives. “Opportunities seized upon by the energetic 
and ambitious only exist because there are others who have no chance of doing the 
same, and it would be logically impossible for everyone to make the same choices” 
(Phillips 1999: 58). This point suggests the extent to which luck egalitarians appear 
to assume that inequality, including structural inequality, will always exist, and 
therefore the pertinent question is simply how to manage it, rather than eliminate or 
reduce it (Baker et al 2004; Kymlicka 2002).
Mason argues that a second reason equality of resources gives the wrong 
answer to the career-sacrificing woman is that it fails to oppose, as inherently unjust, 
a norm of female primary parenting. This claim turns us towards a rather different 
issue within egalitarianism which I postpone until the third section of the paper: 
namely, should egalitarians be prepared to adopt substantive positions about the 
worth of certain human goods? Section two remains with questions around how 
egalitarianism divides responsibility between the individual and the social, and 
whether resourcist equality has more resources to deal with this than some critics 
suppose.
2. E q u a l it y  o f  R e s o u r c e s  a n d  G e n d e r  S o c ia l is a t io n
Mason highlights what appears to be a significant disagreement between his 
conception of egalitarianism and Dworkin’s; namely, a willingness to criticise 
patterns of gender socialisation that reproduce the traditional sexual division of 
labour and to promote the replacement of these sexist norms with more egalitarian 
ones. However, since the publication of Mason’s analysis, additional work has been 
written, including an essay by Dworkin himself, which may close the gap between 
their views. In this essay, Dworkin discusses how his theory addresses gender 
socialisation. He suggests that
whatever difference now exists between the genders in their desires to 
combine a career with child care is very likely, at least in considerable 
part, the upshot of social expectations that are themselves the 
consequence of long-standing and unjust patterns of discrimination and
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stereotyping. As chapter 3 [of Sovereign Virtue] explains, equality of 
resources presupposes a society free from such injustices and would 
therefore argue for... remedial measures, including special child-care 
support for women at work... (2002: 137).
This passage seems promising as a response to Mason’s worry that equality of 
resources unfairly denies assistance to women because it does not fully weigh the 
effects of socialisation in their apparently autonomous choices. Dworkin alludes to 
historical discrimination against, and stereotyping of, women, and suggests that such 
historical discrimination and stereotyping finds expression today in men’s and 
women’s desires even though such systematic sexism is officially illegitimate and 
discredited. He acknowledges, in short, that men and women are still conditioned to 
want different things in life.
Dworkin does not indicate precisely which parts of his long chapter three are 
relevant to the matter, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the following passage 
would be indicated55:
Just as some people are at a disadvantage because the tastes of others do 
not allow their services to command a premium in the market, so other 
people suffer because they belong to a race, or have other physical or 
other qualities, that a sizeable number of their fellow citizens dislike or 
for some other reason wish to avoid. True, though equality of resources 
is neutral about the tastes that impose the disadvantage in the first case, 
it condemns the attitudes that create disadvantage in the second. But 
that difference means only that we have more reason to try to reduce the 
inequality that springs from prejudice than to try to reduce that from 
other sources. Compensation schemes based on hypothetical insurance 
markets, useful though they may be in ameliorating other forms of 
handicap, are plainly inappropriate in combatting the effects of 
prejudice. We must find some other way, compatible with the other 
goals and constraints of equality of resources, to place victims in a
551 take my cue here from Jude Browne and Marc Stears’s (2005) analysis, which is discussed below. 
They argue that it is likely Dworkin means this passage, although they note that he “clearly 
exaggerates the clarity of his own chapter [since there] is no explicit discussion of discrimination and 
stereotyping” in it (2005: 365).
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position as close as possible to that which they would occupy if 
prejudice did not exist (2000: 162).56 
This passage identifies an important refinement of equality of resources. As noted in 
chapter one, Dworkin insists that, in general, other people’s preferences do not 
provide grounds for an individual to complain of inequality. Contra to egalitarians 
such as Cohen, Ameson, and Miller, Dworkin maintains that if other people’s 
preferences for wine make my preference for it expensive because it is in short 
supply, that is my tough luck and I am not entitled to compensation. (Dworkin’s 
critics believe that this is tantamount to holding people responsible for something 
over which they have no control, which seems inconsistent with his emphasis that 
distributions be choice-sensitive.) However, as this passage indicates, equality of 
resources, equipped with this refinement, compensates agents when other people’s 
prejudicial preferences limit their opportunities, notwithstanding the general 
prohibition on compensating people for inequalities traceable to other people’s 
preferences.
Dworkin’s recent discussions address how historical sexist and racist 
discrimination and prejudice find expression in people’s contemporary preferences 
about work and family. In some ways, it seems a short step from this recognition to 
a position in harmony with Mason’s demand that responsibility for the costs incurred 
by the career-sacrificing woman should not be borne by her alone, in light of the fact 
that she is acting in harmony with prevailing gender norms. However, employing 
these comments by Dworkin as a reply to Mason’s worry faces the difficulty that 
they are in fact addressed to a different objection to his theory. Dworkin’s points 
speak to the idea that an egalitarian society should try to neutralise the effects that 
other people’s prejudicial preferences have on an individual’s fate, whereas Mason’s 
argument edges us toward the thought that an egalitarian society should try to 
neutralise the effects that an individual’s own preferences have on her fate, when 
those preferences appear to be constrained by an unjust norm. As we proceed 
through the objection that prompted Dworkin’s recent remarks, and an attempt to 
flesh out Dworkin’s claims, we should bear in mind this difference. However, at the
56 Elsewhere, Dworkin argues that allowing “someone’s fate to depend on other people’s external 
preferences, including prejudice against people of his race or class, is indeed unfair” (2000: 49 In, 
italics in original). It is notable that he identifies racism, and racism and classism, respectively in 
these passages, omitting sexism, which usually completes this unfortunate trio.
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end of the section I will return to this problem and show how the two issues are 
interlinked.
Dworkin’s points illuminate an objection to resource equality articulated by 
Andrew Williams (2002a). Williams presents an example that is designed to call 
into question resource equality’s sensitivity to inequalities that are traceable to other 
people’s preferences. It revolves around a hypothetical example featuring 
asymmetrical work-life balance opportunities in a society where preferences about 
work-life balance are distinctively gendered. He asks us to imagine that there are 
three types of people in this society: ‘ideal workers’ who want to dedicate themselves 
to their career; ‘ideal homemakers’ who want to dedicate themselves to the domestic 
tasks of raising children and keeping house; and ‘co-parents’ who “prefer not to 
specialize in either employment or domestic activity, but share family responsibilities 
roughly equally” (2002a: 31). He also asks us to imagine (not such a difficult stretch 
of the imagination) that most men want to be ideal workers, while most women want 
to be co-parents. Williams then introduces siblings, Ann and Bob, who are identical 
but for their sex, including having the same amount of resources, and the same 
ambition to be co-parents. In other words, both want to form a relationship with a 
partner (of the opposite sex) who also prefers co-parenting. But given the actual 
distribution of work-life preferences in their society, Ann will find it much harder 
than Bob to achieve her ambitions. “With fewer potential partners who prefer to 
share the domestic costs of child care, she will be more likely to make larger career 
sacrifices than Bob when she becomes a parent or may have to forgo children if she 
decides instead to become an ideal worker” (31).
Part of Williams’s aim is to establish that capability equality represents a 
genuine alternative to resource egalitarianism, without thereby collapsing into 
welfarism. The example of Ann and Bob highlights the fact that, while their 
resources are identical, Ann is able to “be and do” less than Bob because of their 
social situation. Sen and his supporters argue that capability equality, but not 
resource equality, attends to agents’ abilities to convert their resources into valuable 
functionings, making it on balance a superior (and less fetishistic) approach to 
egalitarianism.
Dworkin’s rebuttal has three parts. First, he emphasises the point already 
discussed. To the extent that Williams’s example implicitly relies on the supposition 
of prejudicial attitudes towards women, it is otiose since equality of resources
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presupposes a society free of such prejudicial attitudes. Substantive equality of 
opportunity for women is also called for to the extent that such attitudes continue to 
hamper women’s progress. Second, he suggests that the example relies on an 
unacknowledged and possibly sexist assumption that it is objectively more valuable 
to have the capability to engage in paid work than it is to have the capability to raise 
children. Thus, we must bracket these unacknowledged assumptions to allow the 
“example to do the work Williams wishes it to do” (2002a: 137). Third, what 
remains then, according to Dworkin, is an example that is not “different in structure” 
from the more familiar examples pressed by egalitarians who favour retaining some 
form of welfarism in the currency of equality. So his response to it would be the 
same as for those other examples: to compensate people in these cases would 
effectively be pandering to expensive tastes with which they identify and affirm as 
constitutive of their personalities.
Jude Browne and Marc Stears (2005) argue that Dworkin’s reply to Williams 
(which features the two passages I quoted earlier) is promising with respect to 
resource equality’s ability to address particular gender inequalities. Equality of 
resources, naturally, is opposed to prejudice and discrimination (denying people 
opportunities because of the ‘luck’ that makes them female or black). Interpreting 
Dworkin’s recent comments, Browne and Stears argue that equality of resources 
goes further than this; it is also aware that beyond intentional, contemporary actions 
such as employment discrimination, historical instances of discrimination and 
prejudice -  now corrected at the official level -  nevertheless continue to exert an 
effect on people’s lives. These forms of discrimination and prejudice, while 
unintentional, are also unjust, and ways should be found to combat their effects on 
people’s lives. “Dworkin appears to be committed to saying that the preferences of 
other men and women for a particular work-life balance have been directly shaped by 
the legacy of generations of conscious and intentional disadvantage for women in the 
labour market or as a result of their exclusion from decision-making” (2005: 366).
Browne and Stears believe this indicates a promising distinction between 
prejudicial and non-prejudicial preferences embedded in Dworkin’s work that should 
have far-reaching consequences for its ability to address inequalities related to sexual 
and racial differences. Developing this distinction should help to refute criticisms 
regarding the abstraction of Dworkin’s theory and its corresponding inability to 
grapple with social inequalities. Unfortunately, however, Dworkin has not “seriously
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attempted] to show how the two sorts of preferences (the prejudicial and the non­
prejudicial) are to be distinguished” (2005: 366). Browne and Stears propose to 
develop a strategy to do so. They argue that two approaches immediately come to 
mind. The first, swiftly rejected, involves psychoanalysing an agent’s character, 
preferences, decision-making skills, and the background factors to all of these. This 
will not be acceptable, they suggest, because it encounters “all sorts of problems of 
psychologically judging people’s preferences, which Dworkin generally wishes to 
avoid”; it is a “short step away from making nuanced value judgements about what it 
is that people think, and from there it is a short step to perfectionism”; it is just “too 
difficult to delineate precisely [acceptable from unacceptable influences behind 
people’s preferences] in psychological terms” (367).
Eschewing a process that peers into people’s psyches as ultimately illiberal, 
Browne and Stears instead endorse a strategy that observes the conditions under 
which people’s preferences are formed. They argue that there are two dimensions of 
concern here. First, we should look to see if there are “currently existing ‘structural 
faults’” that violate principles of equality of opportunity and therefore influence 
people’s preferences. If so, these faults should be fixed. An example is readily 
available in current asymmetrical maternity and paternity leave provision. Such 
policies are “often not the result of any direct desire on the part of the state to 
encourage women to stay at home... but rather remain as the legacy of earlier 
generations’ attitudes” (373n). Second, we should “investigate historical institutions, 
policies, and practices, which were themselves constructed from previous 
generations’ more explicit prejudice and which may leave an unacceptable 
preference-shaping legacy as a result” (368). Dworkin’s discussions of affirmative 
action (2000: chapters 11 and 12) are helpful in this regard since they put a “central 
emphasis on systematic and historical disadvantage” in order to distinguish between 
racial prejudice and simple preference (366). As with structural faults, steps should 
be taken to neutralise the effects that these historical prejudicial factors have on 
people’s preferences today.
Browne and Stears go into some detail about the process they visualise. They 
suggest that “scholars” would engage in a “close examination of the historical 
evolution of institutional and social patterns and would concern [themselves] 
primarily with revealing the relationships which may obtain between prevailing sets 
of preferences and behaviours and the policies and institutions crafted in eras
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characterized by prejudicial systems of exclusion in clear violation of a principle of 
equality of concern and respect” (368). Interestingly, a process that in some ways 
approximates the one Browne and Stears propose, engaging the veiy issues of gender 
inequality they are interested in, is available in the well-known Sears sex 
discrimination case. The Sears case was brought by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the US in 1979, 
eventually going to trial in 1984. The EEOC claimed that Sears was discriminating 
against women in hiring for high-paying commission sales jobs. Thus, the question 
facing the judge was whether women’s under-representation in these jobs could be 
explained by intentional or unintentional sexist prejudice on the part of managers or 
by the fact that men and women have different preferences and desires regarding jobs 
within the company.
While a courtroom is perhaps not the venue in which Browne and Stears 
imagine their process would be initiated, it seems plausible that the process engaged 
in by the judge who heard the case, and the lawyers and expert witnesses -  in this 
case, feminist historians -  for each side would resemble in its fundamentals the 
process they describe. Sears’s hiring and promotion policies; the wider US 
employment environment, institutions, and laws both contemporary and historical; 
and the patterns of behaviour of managers and employees within those institutions 
were all closely examined and cross-examined during the trial. Rosalind Rosenberg, 
historian and expert witness for Sears, citing the historical record of women’s 
employment patterns in the US, argued that women “simply ‘were less likely to 
prefer or have relevant experience in commission sales positions’” (quoted in 
Milkman 1986: 376). Alice Kessler-Harris, the historian testifying as an expert 
witness for the EEOC, countered this by arguing that “what appear to be women’s 
choices, and what are characterized as women’s ‘interests’ are, in fact, heavily 
influenced by the opportunities for work made available to them.... Where 
opportunity has existed, women have never failed to take the jobs offered.... Failure 
to find women in so-called non-traditional jobs can thus only be interpreted as a 
consequence of employers’ unexamined attitudes or preferences, which phenomenon 
is the essence of discrimination” (quoted in Milkman 1986: 376). These scholars, in 
other words, presented rival interpretations of the historical record regarding facts 
about women’s preferences, employment, and gender discrimination. In the event, 
the judge accepted the testimony of Rosenberg as superior to Kessler-Harris’s, and
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ruled that Sears had not discriminated against women. The EEOC lost the case on 
appeal (Kessler-Harris 2001).
A process such as the one Browne and Stears describe seems indispensable 
for helping us to judge when historical racist, sexist, and other discriminatory and 
damaging practices are still having effects on people’s preferences and therefore their 
opportunities. However, it seems that they may overestimate how conclusive such a 
process would be with regard to uncovering whether gender inequalities should be 
attributed to women’s different choices or to employers’ and others’ intentional and 
unintentional prejudice. This was partly my reason for making a link between the 
abstract process they describe and the Sears case. When all the related court actions 
are taken into account, the Sears case lasted nearly ten years. The other point is that 
both Milkman and Joan W. Scott (1988), who also wrote an essay analysing the 
implications of the Sears case, argue that this sort of process is very unfriendly to 
“the nuanced, careful arguments in which historians delight” (Milkman 1986: 376). 
Scott, in particular, is critical of the way the Sears case structured the issue as a 
classic equality-versus-difference dilemma which tends to work to women’s 
disadvantage whichever way it goes: “When equality and difference are paired 
dichotomously, they structure an impossible choice. If one opts for equality, one is 
forced to accept the notion that difference [for example, in job preferences] is 
antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable” 
(Scott 1988: 43-44). According to Scott, equality-versus-difference “puts feminists 
in an impossible position, for as long as we argue within the terms of a discourse set 
up by this opposition we grant the current conservative premise that because women 
cannot be identical to men in all respects, we cannot expect to be equal to them” 
(Scott 1988: 46).
In addition, Browne and Stears’s proposal seems to be offered as if it were 
some grand discovery that existing structural faults and the legacy of systematic 
sexism and other forms of discrimination need to be taken into account in 
determining which inequalities should count as objectionable. They write that 
structural faults should “already be the acceptable subject of reform within a 
resourcist perspective, although they often remain hidden in contemporary political 
analyses” (368). This characterisation of the literature is offered without any evident 
irony. Detecting structural faults is difficult when supposedly abstract egalitarian 
theories presuppose and take for granted certain substantive features of our own
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societies such as conventional sexual and social divisions of labour (Okin 1991; 
Young 1990). With regard to the second identified set of impediments to equality -  
the legacy of historical prejudice -  feminists and anti-racists have long argued that it 
is a key problem within the liberal justice framework that it does not allow for such 
an analysis. Given the kinds of concerns summarised in chapter two, it seems odd 
simply to presume that luck egalitarianism has the resources to address these issues.
We now return to the difficulty I noted earlier about the fact that Dworkin’s 
recent remarks about unjust gender socialisation engage a different objection to the 
one with which we started. Dworkin’s points speak to the idea that an egalitarian 
society should try to neutralise the effects that other people’s prejudicial preferences 
have on an individual’s fate, whereas Mason’s argument edges us toward the thought 
that an egalitarian society should try to neutralise the effects that an individual’s own 
preferences have on her fate, when those preferences appear to be constrained by an 
unjust norm. But these are really two sides of the same coin. Dworkin calls 
attention to the residual effects of historical institutional racism and sexism. Even 
though prejudicial doctrines and systems are officially discredited, their effects linger 
in the attitudes of some people and find expression in their preferences. But the 
residual effects of official racism and sexism do not only find expression in the 
preferences of out-group members; that is, people who are not members of the 
stigmatised, despised group. They also find expression in the preferences of in­
group members. Some members of despised groups internalise the negative attitudes 
expressed by others about their group (Young 1990: ch 5). This observation 
provides the link between the two objections under consideration here. It seems 
arbitrary for egalitarianism to condemn and neutralise only the racist and sexist 
preferences of other people when they limit my opportunities, and not condemn and 
try to neutralise my own racist and sexist preferences limiting my own opportunities, 
when the rationale for being concerned about them in the first place is that they are 
unjust residues of official discrimination. If the reason we care about other people’s 
prejudicial preferences is because they are fateful with regard to individuals’ 
opportunities, then this is also a reason for caring when people’s own preferences 
express and sustain gender and racial inequalities.
The obvious difficulty with this is that it returns us precisely to the terrain 
Dworkin, Browne and Stears, and egalitarians liberals generally have so far avoided: 
providing an antecedent account of healthy preference formation. As Browne and
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Stears have noted, liberals believe that appealing to the unjust conditions under 
which gendered choices are made, rather than calling into question the content of 
choices themselves, provides an acceptably neutral way of justifying coercive state 
action to combat intuitively troubling gender inequalities. We cannot, as liberals 
generally say, be in the business of questioning the content of people’s choices 
themselves. The standards used for assessing the conditions of choice must therefore 
be neutral with respect to people’s conceptions of the good or, to use Rawls’s term, 
their ‘comprehensive doctrines.’ They must not, for example, appeal to notions that 
some domestic arrangements are inherently more worthy than others. In the context 
of recent assessments of luck egalitarianism, this commitment appears to be coming 
under increasing pressure. This is evident in the second main strand of Mason’s 
criticism of the equal access view.
3. C r it ic isin g  C h o ic e s
Mason argues that equality of resources gives the wrong answer to the career- 
sacrificing woman because it fails to oppose, as inherently unjust, a norm of female 
primary parenting. This requires a bit of unpicking. Mason considers an objection to 
his argument that says that ignoring the career-sacrificing mother’s demands can be 
regarded as unfair only if there is a tacit assumption that the gendered parenting 
norm is itself unjust. The objector, he imagines, would say that Mason is not simply 
pointing to socialisation that generates inequality for women by producing a desire in 
them for disadvantageous economic arrangements, but is also arguing against the 
norm itself: “The norm that mothers rather than fathers should take primary 
responsibility for childcare is unjust... [I]t is partly the injustice of this norm (not 
merely the process of gender socialisation that is shaped by it and fosters behaviour 
that is in accordance with it) which explains why it would be unjust to require the 
career-sacrificing mother to bear the costs of her decision....” (2 4 3 -4 4 , italics in 
original). Mason appears to concede this point. He writes:
According to the approach I am defending, full equality of access is 
incompatible with the presence of certain sexist norms shaping men and 
women’s behaviour (and hence with the forms of socialisation which 
are shaped by these norms and involved in the transmission of them).
Using a term which has become fashionable, we might say that full
108
equality of access requires a social ethos that precludes the widespread, 
even if informal, operation of a norm which holds women primarily 
responsible for caring for their children and dependent relatives in 
general (2000: 245, italics in original).
The substantive implication of the second sentence is only partly disguised by its 
negative and tentative formulation. What Mason claims here is that ‘full equality of 
access requires a social ethos that includes an egalitarian co-parenting norm.’ He 
hedges this about with phrases such as “we might say” that what is needed is a 
“social ethos that precludes” a female primary parenting norm. But it seems clear 
enough that he considers that a theory of equality of access that truly intends to 
secure equality between women and men needs to be supplemented with an 
egalitarian social ethos, constituted by an arguably perfectionist appeal to egalitarian 
parenting over gender-unequal parenting practices. Indeed, his very application of 
the term ‘sexist’ to a female primary parenting norm is conclusive. He does not 
believe that egalitarians who are committed to equal access for women and men can 
or should be neutral with regard to the norms around the sexual division of labour, 
and in particular, parenting behaviour.
Mason does not represent this conclusion as particularly problematic for the 
equal access view to absorb. He suggests that his paper’s aims are “modest” and that 
it might be possible to formulate a “refined” version of the equal access view that 
will accommodate his conclusions (246). However, Mason’s conclusions appear to 
be more radical than he acknowledges, and appear to signal a decisive break with 
luck egalitarianism’s commitment to neutrality towards people’s conceptions of the 
good. He uses the term ‘sexist’ for the prevailing social norms that assign primary 
responsibility for (paid and unpaid) caring labour to women. Yet some people’s 
conceptions of the good surely include traditional gender roles for men and women. 
He implies that egalitarians who are committed to full equality of opportunity or 
access for men and women should be prepared to criticise not only ways of life that 
reflect the sexist norms but also the general practices of socialisation which transmit 
the norms from generation to generation. Phillips characterises this aspect of his 
work as Mason suggesting “what ought to matter” to people, and she doubts that
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“this strong intuition about what constitutes gender equality can be contained within 
the notion of opportunity equality” (2006: 26).51
Mason suggests that his argument has parallels with G.A. Cohen’s (1997) 
well-known essay about the concept of an egalitarian social ethos. The particular 
issue which motivates Cohen’s argument concerns the compatibility of incentive 
inequalities with the difference principle and with Rawls’s overall conception of 
egalitarianism. As noted in the thesis introduction, the difference principle says 
departures from income equality are allowed when they benefit the worst off. One 
common implication of this rule is that “talented people will produce more than they 
otherwise would if, and only if, they are paid more than an ordinary wage, and some 
of the extra which they will then produce can be recruited on behalf of the worst off’ 
(Cohen 1997: 6). Cohen argues that this justification for incentives conflicts with the 
idea that the people in Rawlsian society personally subscribe to the principles of 
justice. If so, they should not require incentives beyond what is strictly necessary to 
offset the burdens of the job; this is a form of economic blackmail. In refusing to 
work without those incentives, they flout the principles of justice they ostensibly 
hold. Cohen argues that by allowing for incentive inequalities (e.g. allowing some 
people to draw higher salaries than is strictly necessary to offset the burdens the job 
entails), the difference principle licenses more income inequality than it should.
This argument focuses on the distinction Rawls draws between the ‘basic 
structure’ of society and the conduct and choices of individuals acting within the 
basic structure. Rawls argues that justice judges the basic structure of society but not 
the private choices of individuals acting within those coercive structures. The basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice, Rawls argues, “because its effects are so 
profound and present from the start” (1999: 7). However, informal social institutions
57 In her own work, Phillips appears to have accepted that the egalitarian vision she promotes is also 
ultimately incompatible in some ways with luck egalitarianism. Comparing two of her recent essays 
is instructive. In a 2004 essay defending an equality of outcome norm against the more popular 
equality of opportunity framework of luck egalitarianism, Phillips nevertheless still appears to suggest 
that the two projects work together. She characterises her argument as taking “equality of opportunity 
as the primary objective, but [treating] equality of outcome as the test for identifying whether the 
objective is achieved” (2004: 9). However, in a 2006 essay which focuses more on luck 
egalitarianism’s implications for conceptions of individual autonomy, she seems less sure about the 
usefulness of luck egalitarianism’s strong notion of equality of opportunity. Much of this has to do 
with the fact that she believes that it is “hard to stretch equal opportunity sufficiently without calling 
into question the idea of people as responsible agents” (2006: 30). However, her evident sympathy 
for those arguments (such as Mason’s and also David Miller’s) which incorporate elements that are 
“not contained within the rubric of equality of opportunity” appears to be another reason she calls for 
a “more radical challenge” to the predominance o f the luck egalitarian model.
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and processes which are constituted by individuals’ private choices and acts also 
have effects which are profound and present from the start. The incentive 
inequalities demanded by “high-flying marketeers” (Cohen 1997: 5) is one example 
of this. Cohen argues that limiting the scope of justice to the basic structure takes for 
granted and preserves a distinction between public and private spheres, where 
‘private’ means both the civil and domestic spheres. If the basic structure is a subject 
of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start, then this is 
also a reason to include informal social institutions and processes, and the individual 
choices which serve to reproduce them, within the scope of justice. The implications 
of this, for Cohen, are that it is not enough that institutions are just for egalitarian 
aims to be achieved. A genuinely egalitarian society requires not only that the 
coercive basic structures are egalitarian but also that people’s voluntary behaviour 
and choices within those structures are also egalitarian. In other words, Cohen 
reaches the conclusion that a just society requires an egalitarian social ethos.
Cohen relates his argument to the feminist slogan that ‘the personal is 
political’ which encapsulates the feminist aim to challenge the traditional liberal 
distinction between public and private spheres. He has demonstrated one way in 
which egalitarians should be prepared to transcend the distinction in order to criticise 
the choices of individuals acting lawfully within the coercive basic structure for the 
ways in which their choices produce and reproduce inequalities. The power of his 
critique lies in exposing the arbitrariness, from an egalitarian point of view, of 
criticising only the conditions under which people makes choices when the choices 
themselves are often the main reason some inequalities persist. This seems to 
provide force to critics of luck egalitarianism, such as Mason, whose arguments 
imply that in certain cases of stubborn inequalities, gaining genuine equality of 
access means we cannot avoid criticising people’s choices directly.
If women’s and men’s autonomous choices reproduce gender inequality and 
gender hierarchy, then, as egalitarians, we may have to find some other way than the 
route offered by luck egalitarianism to tackle these. It is an uncomfortable fact, at 
least for liberals, that the route which presents itself implies the abandonment of 
liberalism’s neutrality towards ends. Some feminists have been more forthright than 
Mason that securing gender equality entails subscribing, if not to an explicitly and 
fully-worked out perfectionist account of human flourishing (Yuracko 2003), at least
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to an account of egalitarianism that prioritises equal outcomes in certain areas even if 
this means disrespecting existing people’s preferences (Levey 2005).
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Chapter  four  
Respect and  Types of Injustice
The  claim  th at  luck egalitarianism fails to treat everyone with respect may 
be the second most widely canvassed objection to the tradition, after concerns about
c  o
the centrality it accords to individual choice and responsibility. Accounts vary, but 
the general idea behind what we can call the ‘respect objection’ is that it insults some 
people because of the demeaning judgments it passes on their talents and abilities. 
One of the first to articulate this objection was Jonathan Wolff (1998). According to 
Wolff, luck egalitarian theories, which describe a “society which attempts to realise 
exact egalitarian fairness,” will “undermine the respect of at least some of its citizens 
by treating them precisely in the way that is inconsistent with respecting them, or 
allowing them to retain their self-respect” (1998: 107).59 In this chapter, I argue that 
the objection is valid. However, for it to have real force against luck egalitarianism, 
it must appeal to a dualistic or pluralistic conception of social justice. I argue that 
such an appeal is evident in the objection as it is developed by Wolff and Timothy 
Hinton (2002). The chapter begins by addressing why we might initially doubt the 
validity of the respect objection.
1. Lib er a l  D istr ibu tive  Ju stic e  a n d  Respect
The respect objection is a serious charge, and, it seems at first, a dubious one. 
Liberal political theory and Kantian notions of ‘respect for persons’ enjoy a 
longstanding association (Hill 2000: chapter 3; Rawls 1999). Contemporary liberal 
philosophers have demonstrated that citizens’ self-respect and respect-standing60 are 
important to justice. Dworkin, for one, frequently argues that modem political 
theories can only be legitimate if they purport to treat all citizens with equal concern
58 Arguments that luck egalitarianism disrespects or insults agents include Anderson (1999); Hinton 
(2001); McKinnon (2003); and Wolff (1998). For rebuttals, see Ameson (2000a; 2000b); Cohen 
(2003); Dworkin (2002); and Knight (2005). Several as yet unpublished manuscripts that I have 
reviewed or read have also contributed to my perception that the respect objection is nearly as 
prevalent as those relating to individual choice and responsibility.
9 Wolff uses the term ‘opportunity conception of justice’ not luck egalitarianism (his article pre-dates 
Anderson’s). But as he criticises the group of theories I have been calling luck egalitarianism, I shall 
substitute that term for ‘opportunity conception of fairness.’
601 borrow the categories of ‘self-respect’ and ‘respect-standing’ from Wolff (1998). Apparently 
taking the notion of ‘self-respect’ to be self-evident, Wolff does not define it. However, he writes that 
respect-standing refers to the “degree o f respect other people have for me” (107). I shall also use the 
term ‘status’ interchangeably with ‘respect-standing.’
113
and respect, while at the same time insisting that his own view, equality of resources, 
is particularly adept at realising this rule (Dworkin 2000: introduction; 2002: 106). It 
has become a commonplace in liberal political theory that government has a duty to 
treat each person with equal respect and concern (Kymlicka 2002: 3-4; Swift 2001: 
93). However, in this section, I want to complicate this view by suggesting that the 
liberal distributive justice tradition tends to confine its concern for respect issues to 
the socio-economic sphere, which is in line with the tradition’s overall orientation. 
This can begin to seem like rather a limited understanding and employment of the 
notion of respect, in light of the current interest in multicultural politics and cultural 
inequalities.
Accounts vary, but there is a widely shared view that the revival of interest 
amongst Anglo-American political philosophers in social justice theorising in the 
second half of the twentieth century coincided with political events to place the 
spotlight on questions about citizens’ social and economic rights and entitlements. 
Although the struggle for equal political and legal rights for all was not yet complete, 
in this era, it was assumed that the task for political philosophers was to articulate the 
moral foundations of the welfare state. For example, Brian Barry suggests that 
Rawls’s theory neatly exemplifies the concern amongst contemporary liberals to 
marry the traditional liberal commitment to universal citizenship, expressed through 
equal basic rights, to “social and economic elements” (2000: 7). “Rawls’s first 
principle of justice, which called for equal civil and political rights, articulated the 
classical ideal of liberal citizenship, while his second principle gave recognition to 
the demands of social and economic citizenship” (2000: 7). Liberal distributive 
justice theorists, in short, were turning their attention towards the social and 
economic preconditions necessary for citizens to truly enjoy and exercise their 
individual rights and freedoms.
The development of contemporary liberal distributive justice theory with its 
orientation towards socio-economic inequalities has implications for its treatment of 
the notions of self-respect and status. One implication evident in the contemporary 
literature is that the tradition tends to presuppose that respect issues arise primarily in 
relation to socio-economic inequalities. Somewhat paradoxically, a second 
implication is that respect issues do not get much attention at all. The implicit belief 
is that respect inequalities will disappear with the correction of unjust economic 
inequalities, so there is no need to theorise respect independently from economic
114
issues. I think the first but not the second tendency fairly describes Rawls’s work, 
while both tendencies are evident in Dworkin’s work. Unlike Rawls, Dworkin does 
not devote much attention to self-respect or respect-standing, and what he does say 
conforms with the general tendency in liberal justice to theorise respect inequalities 
as an aspect of economic injustice.
Rawls provides a rich account of self-respect in A Theory o f Justice. He 
suggests that self-respect has two aspects: first, it involves a sense that I consider 
myself and my life plans as worthy and having value; second, that I have confidence 
in my ability to achieve my plans (1999: 386). Social conditions that make it more 
likely that I possess self-respect, according to Rawls, involve having “at least one 
community of shared interests” to which I belong that will validate my sense of my 
own value and my plans’ value, as well as make it more likely that I can achieve 
these plans, presumably through moral and other kinds of support (388). Elaborating 
on the first aspect of self-respect, Rawls invokes what he calls the ‘Aristotelian 
Principle.’ This principle says: “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise 
of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity” (374). 
Elaborating on the social conditions of self-respect, Rawls describes the essentially 
interpersonal nature of self-respect: “our self-respect normally depends upon the 
respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is 
difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth 
advancing” (156).
Rawls famously argues that self-respect is the most important primary good 
(155-56). Given this premise, it is important that he explain what bearing his two 
principles of justice (52) have on individuals’ self-respect. Rawls suggests that the 
two principles are institutional ways for citizens to express their mutual respect.
There seem to be several significant aspects to that claim. First, the difference 
principle is meant to both symbolise and uphold citizens’ mutual respect and self- 
respect. “[B]y arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining 
from the exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social circumstance within a 
framework of equal liberties, persons express their respect for one another in the very 
constitution of their society. In this way they insure their self-respect as it is rational 
for them to do” (156). Here, Rawls justifies the distributive arrangements of the 
difference, or maximin, principle by appeal to the fact that the distribution of natural
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talents and abilities is “morally arbitrary” and should therefore be viewed as a 
“collective asset” (156). Second, Rawls also asserts that the first principle of justice 
-  the guarantee of equal basic rights and liberties -  is a basis for self-respect: “the 
effect of self-government where equal political rights have their fair value is to 
enhance the self-esteem and the sense of political competence of the average 
citizen”(205).
This second claim is worth exploring further. Rawls insists that the guarantee 
of equal basic liberties will be the foundation for citizens’ sense of self-respect in the 
well-ordered, ideal society that Theory describes. In non-ideal societies, he admits, 
differential incomes will likely affect people’s self-respect, roughly along the lines 
of: greater income and wealth, greater self-respect (478). However, in the well- 
ordered society, this income-and-self-respect link is severed, because of two key 
features of that society. First, “the basis for self-respect in a just society is not then 
one’s income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and 
liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status 
when they meet to conduct the common affairs of the wider society” (477). 
According to Rawls, then, citizens’ self-respect is lodged in the assurance of equal 
basic rights, which will mitigate or minimise any potential loss of self-respect that 
derives from the material inequalities that the difference principle permits. The 
principles of justice stipulate that the principle of basic liberties is primary, and that 
the liberties are equal or identical for everyone. Since our status is tied to this aspect 
of our identity (our equality as citizens), our self-respect levels should similarly be 
identical.
The second feature of the well-ordered society with a bearing on self-respect 
is the interrelation of the pluralism of communities of interest, the basic liberties and 
self-respect. Rawls argues that the equal liberties “allow” for the flourishing of a 
“full and diverse internal life of many free communities of interests” (477). The 
communities of interest are an important condition for the enjoyment and security of 
individuals’ self-respect. Rawls argues that a vertically-divided society of what he 
calls ‘noncomparing groups’ will develop (470). This social structure provides 
further protection against injuries to self-respect based on different levels of income 
and wealth. Rawls assumes that we will mostly compare ourselves to other members 
of our communities of interest, rather than with individuals in other communities 
(470). Because my identity and self-respect derive mainly from my community of
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interest, comparing myself to others from different groups, which may be richer than 
mine, will not be as “painful,” Rawls argues (470): “[T]he plurality of associations in 
a well-ordered society, each with its secure internal life, tends to reduce the visibility, 
or at least the painful visibility, of variations in men’s prospects” (470).
Rawls’s work is appreciated for its comments on self-respect formation and 
for his recognition that our self-respect crucially depends on others’ view of us. 
However, there are weaknesses in his account. First, Rawls is aware that, in the real 
world, socio-economic status affects self-respect and respect-standing. He writes, 
“The discrepancy between oneself and others is made visible by the social structure 
and style of life of one’s society. The less fortunate are therefore often forcibly 
reminded of their situation, sometimes leading them to an even lower estimation of 
themselves and their mode of living” (1999: 469). In light of this, his arguments that 
in the well-ordered society the link between socio-economic status and respect would 
be severed sound weak. Rawls asserts both that the better-off won’t parade around 
ostentatiously showing off their wealth to the worse-off (470), and that, in any case, 
everyone’s self-respect derives from their identical status as equal rights-bearers. 
Jeanne Zaino has scrutinised Rawls’s arguments about self-respect and socio­
economic inequalities (1998). She argues that “even Rawls [himself] seems not to 
fully accept his conclusion that there is no relationship between socioeconomic status 
and self-respect” (1998: 752).
Although I agree with many of Zaino’s conclusions, I also want to make a 
point about Rawls’s text which works at cross-purposes to hers. Paradoxically,
Rawls both recognises and fails to recognise the links between economic injustice 
and self-respect. However, Rawls makes no move towards articulating any links 
between cultural injustice and respect, in the real world or the ideal one. We can 
infer from his discussions about respect and pluralistic “communities of interest” that 
Rawls is aware of inter-group dynamics premised on racial, ethnic, or cultural 
differences rather than class ones.61 However, these implications do have to be 
supplied by the reader, and his analysis consistently theorises self-respect as an 
aspect of economic injustice, not cultural injustice.
61 As Ingrid Robeyns argues, “Rawls’s theory of justice was developed in the USA in the 1950s and 
1960s, an era with pervasive discrimination against black people, women, and gays and lesbians. In 
that specific social context, the primary political task was to advocate genuine equal rights. Rawls’s 
work gave a moral and theoretical underpinning to the civil rights movement” (2003a: 541).
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Though perhaps not quite as famous as Rawls’s argument that self-respect is 
the most important primary social good, Dworkin’s argument that any legitimate 
government must treat all citizens with “equal respect and concern” is widely cited 
(Kymlicka 2002: 1-7; Swift 2001; Gaus 2000a: 166-68). Dworkin holds that “a 
political community must treat all its members as equals, that is, with equal concern 
and respect, and it must respect that sovereign requirement not only in its design of 
economic institutions and practices, but in its conception of freedom, of community, 
and of political democracy as well” (2002: 106). Equality of resources is offered as a 
substantive component of this overarching egalitarianism. Thus, at a meta-level, 
Dworkin discusses respect when he discusses equality of resources, since he takes 
this to be a major component of his overall articulation of the theory of the sovereign 
virtue of government. However, I suggest that the importance apparently accorded 
to the notion of respect in this egalitarian slogan disguises the fact that Dworkin is 
somewhat imprecise and casual about respect in his theoretical work. For example, 
Dworkin is inconsistent in the expression of his egalitarian slogan. Although it is 
sometimes expressed as ‘government must show all equal concern and respect,’ as 
often as not, he simply asserts that government must show all citizens equal concern 
(see, for example, 1983; 2000: 107, 122, 128; 2002: 112). What should we make of 
this? Perhaps it is nothing more than an economy of words. However, according to 
Allen Buchanan, Dworkin does mean different things by ‘concern’ and ‘respect’ 
(Buchanan 1989). Buchanan argues that, for Dworkin, ‘concern’ points to fairness 
and ‘respect’ to autonomy. If, in fact, Dworkin does not treat the terms as 
synonymous, then it may be significant that he sometimes drops the term ‘respect’ 
but never the term ‘concern’ when he articulates the rule.
Furthermore, Dworkin’s egalitarian slogan does not reveal his views on the 
subjective aspects of self-respect. Because it is typically expressed as: ‘the 
government’ or ‘the state’ must show all citizens equal concern and respect, this 
gives us a state-centric view of respect. Whatever presuppositions Dworkin holds 
about human beings and their nature that presumably motivate the principle -  such as, 
human beings share an equal moral worth which must be respected -  cannot be 
inferred from the principle. Neither does the egalitarian slogan communicate 
Dworkin’s views about the notions of self-respect and respect-standing at a more 
concrete level. Clues about Dworkin’s beliefs here can be gleaned from various 
passages scattered around his work. For example, Dworkin challenges Rawls’s
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claim that the basic liberties provide a fundamental basis for people’s self-respect. 
Although this is surely not the position that Dworkin himself holds, he argues that 
“some philosophers and sociologists” believe that people are more likely to gain self- 
respect in a society that limits basic liberties (2000: 138). This view says that a 
conformist society, one with a great deal of moral and religious consensus, is better 
designed to ensure that people gain self-respect. In refuting Rawls, Dworkin does 
not explain his own view on these issues. Moreover, in these passages, Dworkin 
treats the concepts of “self-respect” and “self-confidence” as interchangeable. He 
also appears to believe that self-respect/self-confidence is something that a 
community, as well as individuals, can possess. Articulating the thesis of self- 
respect conditions that he says competes with Rawls’s equal liberties thesis, Dworkin 
writes that some “believe that a community can develop stable self-confidence only 
by at least aiming in the direction of moral and religious consensus” (2000: 139).
Do these remarks tell us anything important about Dworkin’s views on status 
and self-respect? On one hand, we know that he is simply articulating an alternative 
thesis about what social conditions and political institutions form the pre-conditions 
to self-respect. It is not a thesis that Dworkin himself supports. On the other hand, 
whether he supports the overall view or not is beside the point. What is relevant here 
is the way he characterises the internal components of the view. Dworkin usually 
takes great care in describing views he himself rejects, his extensive development of 
equality of welfare being an excellent case in point. The same care and attention is 
absent in this discussion. Self-respect and self-confidence are not identical concepts. 
The self-respect enjoyed by an individual and the self-confidence possessed by a 
community are also not interchangeable ideas. Despite the egalitarian slogan’s initial 
promise to assign respect a central role, Dworkin’s theory is uncharacteristically 
imprecise when it comes to respect issues.
Although I have so far characterised Dworkin’s theory as somewhat 
imprecise about the notion of respect, it is also evident that his work conforms with 
the general tendency in liberal justice to theorise respect inequalities primarily as an 
aspect of economic injustice. Let us return to Dworkin’s discussion of liberal 
community (2000: ch 5). He defends the notion of liberal tolerance, arguing against 
the view that the majority will should decide the “shape of a democratic
62 Dworkin argues against the view that the majority will should determine the “ethical environment” 
of the community, as will be discussed further below (2002: 212-36).
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community’s ethical environment” (213). Dworkin distinguishes the ethical 
environment of a community from the economic environment. The latter refers to 
the “distribution of property and preferences that creates supply, demand and price” 
(213). The former, while not defined, appears to refer to the shape and tenor of 
public opinion about what might broadly be called moral issues. For example, a 
“community that tolerates homosexuality, and in which homosexuality has a strong 
presence, provides a different ethical environment from one in which homosexuality 
is forbidden, and some people believe themselves harmed by the difference,” he 
writes. “They find it much harder, for example, to raise their children to absorb 
instincts and values of which they approve” (213).
Two points about Dworkin’s views on respect might be drawn from this.
First, he does not appear to lend much credibility to the notion that individuals are 
directly harmed by negative public views about themselves and their group. He 
writes, “some people believe themselves harmed by the difference” which suggests 
that it might be all in their minds. This seems weak, especially given the tangible, 
wholly non-imaginary differences in treatment that gays can expect in communities 
that embrace homosexuals and other sexual minorities, versus communities where 
they are vilified, harassed, beaten and murdered. Second, Dworkin asserts a 
hierarchy in the importance of ethical and economic environments on our lives: “The 
economic environment in which we live... affects us even more obviously than our 
ethical environment does” (213). As Will Kymlicka notes, the empirical evidence 
required to prove such a claim is elusive to non-existent (2002: 367). But if that is so, 
then it would seem wise to not simply assume, as Dworkin does here, that the 
economic environment is more important than the ethical environment in terms of 
shaping how my life goes. Kymlicka writes, “If you were a black parent, would you 
care more about ensuring your child achieve an average income or about ensuring 
your child was not subject to racial epithets? If you were the parent of a gay teenager, 
would you choose a school that would maximize the child’s economic prospects, or a 
school that would minimize his stigmization [sic] and persecution? It is far from 
clear that material inequalities are more important to the success of people’s lives 
than status inequalities” (367).
These reviews of Rawls’s and Dworkin’s work demonstrate that while there 
is diversity in the ways that liberal egalitarians theorise status and self-respect, the 
importance they attribute to them, and their relation to justice, there is also unity.
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Contemporary liberal egalitarians give prominence to socio-economic inequalities. It 
is unsurprising, then, that when issues of status and self-respect arise, they tend to 
address them within and through the predominant concern with economic hierarchy, 
rather than status or cultural hierarchy. This can begin to seem rather a limited 
understanding and treatment of respect, particularly in light of the current interest in 
multicultural politics and cultural inequalities. The next section discusses how 
respect issues are employed in the multiculturalism and cultural justice discourses 
through a specific focus on Nancy Fraser’s social justice theory.
2. N a n c y  F r a s e r ’s  D u a l is t ic  F r a m e w o r k  o f  Ju s t ic e
As noted in chapter two, Fraser presents a dualistic framework for 
understanding contemporary struggles for justice (1995; 1996; 1997a; 2001). She 
argues that we can discern two basic forms of injustice in western liberal 
democracies: the injustice of maldistribution, associated with a politics of class, 
redistribution, and equality; and the injustice of misrecognition, associated with a 
politics of culture, recognition, and difference. Fraser argues that the latter politics is 
currently predominant: “cultural recognition displaces socioeconomic redistribution 
as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle” (1995: 68). While she 
believes that both projects are necessary and worthy, she hopes to redress the 
perceived imbalance favouring recognition politics by developing a “‘bivalent’ 
conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality 
and defensible claims for the recognition of difference” (1996: 5).
Fraser’s political theory is used in this chapter mainly to provide an 
alternative and fresh perspective on the respect objection. It is not my main aim in 
this chapter to critically analyse all the beliefs and claims that give rise to, and 
constitute, Fraser’s social justice model. However, since my use of her work
63 There is a wealth of books and articles examining Fraser’s work. See Young (1997) for one of the 
first critical responses to Fraser. See Phillips (1997) for a comparative analysis of Fraser and Young. 
See Zum (2003) and Feldman (2002) for discussions of how Fraser’s position(s) on the 
redistribution/recognition dilemma of justice and the nature of cultural justice has changed over the 
years. See also Hobson (2003) for a collection of articles that, to a greater or lesser degree, engage 
with Fraser’s redistribution/recognition framework. See also Fraser and Honneth (2003). This work 
arguably sees Fraser in her most ‘distributivist’ mode as she articulates her ideas in conversation with 
Axel Honneth, who believes that distributive justice can be theorised as an aspect of cultural justice. 
Other important analyses and elaborations of Fraser’s work include Robeyns (2003a) and Kymlicka 
(2002).
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implies that I believe her reading of contemporary struggles for social justice and her 
understanding of the crucial task for political theorists are reasonable and 
perspicacious, a little must be said in defence of those views, and in particular, her 
interpretation of distributive justice theories.
Fraser contends that “standard theories of distributive justice” cannot 
“adequately subsume problems of recognition” (1996: 27). Although “many 
distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over and above material 
well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts” the results are “not wholly 
satisfactory.”64 According to Fraser, “most” distributive theorists
assume a reductive economistic-cum-legalistic view of status, 
supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to 
preclude misrecognition. In fact... not all misrecognition is a byproduct 
of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimination.
Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who 
cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a theory of 
justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to 
examine patterns of cultural value. It must consider whether 
institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and valuation impede 
parity of participation in social life (1996: 27-28).
There are two main claims of interest here. One is the characterisation of the 
distributive justice tradition as tending to treat misrecognition or cultural justice as 
secondary to the core injustices of material and legal inequality. To establish if this 
is a fair and accurate reading, we might recall the discussion of Brian Barry in 
chapter two. Barry’s view is that legal measures are “the only thing that is within the 
scope of legitimate political intervention” (2000: 275, italics added). He strongly 
rejects the politicisation of cultural identities, believing this to be counterproductive 
to advancing “the values of liberty and equality” (12). He argues that evidence 
suggests that “even the imperfect moves towards legal equality” will be “enough to 
eliminate over time the stigmatization of homosexuality” (275-76) and thus regards a 
distinctive cultural-recognition politics as unnecessary and dangerous. Or, to take 
another example, consider Dworkin’s response to a criticism of resource equality to 
the effect that it does not address non-economic inequalities: “Scheffler rightly
64 She cites work by Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen, indicating how she believes they individually attempt 
to build recognition issues into their distributive justice models.
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emphasises the importance of the contemporary debate about racial, gender and other 
forms of discrimination. But he underestimates, I think, the degree to which 
economic inequality both flows from and exacerbates these other challenges to equal 
citizenship” (2003: 197).65 This suggests that Dworkin believes that if we eliminate 
economic inequality, these other inequalities will fade away. Kymlicka notes that 
this view is popular amongst Marxists and ex-Marxists (2002: 333). However, he 
asserts, a “surprising number of liberals have also endorsed this view about the 
secondary and derivative nature of cultural inequalities” (2002: 333). One or two 
discrete comments, of course, are insufficient for constructing a complete picture of 
these theorists’ views. However, I hope that these remarks in addition to the analysis 
in section one go some way toward confirming Fraser’s assessment and my own.
Ingrid Robeyns (2003a) persuasively argues that Fraser oversimplifies the 
distributive justice tradition. Furthermore, Robeyns suggests that this 
oversimplification may have cost her the attention of those theorists. This is 
unfortunate, because more engagement between liberal egalitarians and theorists, 
such as Fraser, who defend a more complex approach to social justice would, in my 
view, be immensely fruitful. But this does not detract from the thought that Fraser’s 
characterisation of the tradition is, broadly, accurate. Indeed, the tendency to reduce 
injustice to specifically socio-economic injustices seems even more pronounced in 
the luck egalitarian versions. This is signalled not least by the fact that the examples 
employed by luck egalitarians are almost exclusively interested in whether agents 
have a fair chance to buy desired commodities or whether they possess the right 
talents to secure appealing jobs in the labour market. As Anderson remarks, “the 
agendas defined by much recent egalitarian theorizing are too narrowly focused on 
the distribution of divisible, privately appropriated goods, such as income and 
resources, or privately enjoyed goods, such as welfare. This neglects the much 
broader agendas of actual egalitarian political movements” such as gay and lesbian 
movements, and disability activists (1999: 288).
The second key claim in Fraser’s quote is that “a theory of justice must reach 
beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine patterns of cultural value.” I 
also subscribe to this view. Fraser’s example of the black Wall Street banker who is
65 Some of Samuel Scheffler’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism will be taken up in chapter five.
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unable to get a taxi to pick him up is a good one.66 More generally, as Phillips writes, 
“racist abuse does not stop when people become millionaires” (2003: 264). Another 
group whose justice claims seem to require a theory that ‘reaches beyond’ material 
inequality is homosexuals. As Kymlicka observes, “Gays cannot participate fully in 
the national culture, not because of any lack of education or material resources, but 
because of a status hierarchy within that national culture which demeans and 
degrades them, and treats them as less worthy of concern or respect” (2002: 330). 
Many more examples could be found that support the idea that some of the harms 
people suffer are not reducible to economic injustice, but I hope the point is made.
The upshot is that with Fraser and others, I believe that the traditional liberal 
approach to social injustice is inadequate for theorising all contemporary forms of 
injustice, and this suggests the need for alternative frameworks of analysis. While I 
do not want to be understood as saying that Fraser’s model is without flaw, I believe 
it is an important and valuable contribution to the literature.
It now remains to outline some of the main features of her approach. It 
should be noted that Fraser has altered her model over time. My account focuses on 
what I regard as its core features, which have remained largely the same despite 
certain refinements.67 Fraser’s model is closely bound up with thinking about 
injustice from a group-based perspective. Claims for economic justice normally
issue from social groups structured and defined by their class identity, their relatively 
low levels of income and wealth, and the relation to the means of production. The 
prime example is the “Marxian conception of the exploited class” (1997a: 17).
Fraser argues that in the case of economic injustices, what is normally called for is,
66 It is, perhaps, almost a cliche in American life. Recently, the news media commented on the fact 
that American film director Spike Lee’s latest feature film, Inside Man, did not focus as much on race 
relations as his earlier efforts. Nevertheless, one scene in the movie features an exchange between a 
Sikh man who has been released by hostage takers, and an African-American police officer, played by 
Denzel Washington, who is debriefing him. The Sikh man is complaining about his treatment by the 
police and by officials in general in the post-9/11 world, recounting how he is often mistaken for 
being a Muslim, not a Sikh, a piece of ignorance then compounded by others’ suspicion that he is an 
Islamist terrorist. Washington’s character sympathises, then makes a crack along the lines of “at least 
you can get a taxi to pick you up.” The point is, both characters have good jobs, wear nice suits or 
impressive uniforms, but still encounter disadvantage on account of their appearances.
67 Fraser’s account of the harm that cultural groups suffer has altered over time. She has shifted from 
an account of misrecognition that focuses on how majority judgments of cultural inferiority damage 
the identities of minority cultural groups to an account that focuses on how institutionalised patterns 
of cultural value subordinate some individuals and prevent them from participating equally with 
others in social life. See Zum (2003) and Feldman (2002) for discussions.
68 As noted in chapter two, in this respect, it resembles Young’s approach even though she and Young 
disagree about other issues.
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essentially, the elimination of difference. In the case of the exploited working class, 
for example, justice implies putting the group “out of business” as a group (1997a:
18). Economic injustice calls for remedies involving “political-economic 
restructuring of some sort,” ranging from redistributing income to the more radical 
reorganisation of the division of labour (1997a: 15). Cultural justice engages the 
symbolic and cultural arrangements of society. Claims for cultural justice normally 
issue from social groups who are defined as culturally different from, and inferior to, 
the dominant or majority cultural group. The social movement of gays and lesbians 
is a primary example of a group which demands cultural justice, since their 
oppression consists in the fact that they are subject to “shaming, harassment, 
discrimination and violence” (1997a: 18). Cultural injustice calls for remedies 
involving “some sort of cultural or symbolic change,” ranging from revaluing 
despised groups to the “wholesale transformation of societal patterns of 
representation, interpretation and communication” so as to challenge sedimented 
identities everywhere (1995: 73). Specific strategies aside, its general goal is a 
“difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural 
norms is no longer the price of equal respect” (1996: 14).
While Fraser offers a conceptualisation based on two basic types of injustice, 
she denies that this means the two categories are mutually exclusive or dichotomous. 
Instead, she emphasises that they are analytical categories only, useful for getting 
clear about the struggles and remedies before us, while in real life, the types of 
injustice are usually ‘interimbricated’ with one another (1997a). Moreover, in her 
more recent articulations of the model, she has stepped back from the rather stark 
characterisations above, depicting groups being mainly subject to one or the other 
injustice. She is now more careful to emphasise that the injustice suffered by 
members of all disadvantaged groups almost always includes both maldistribution 
and misrecognition.
An important aspect of Fraser’s approach is the way it exposes how remedies 
combating injustice may conflict or cancel each other out. The potential for conflict 
is less apparent for groups that experience mainly one type of injustice. Although in 
the real world, no group’s situation is as simple as the two archetypes initially 
proposed by Fraser, if it were, then, in theory at least, effective de-differentiating or 
difference-promoting remedies would be clearly indicated. However, the potential 
for conflict becomes more apparent when we consider social groups who occupy
125
lower positions in both economic and status hierarchies; groups, in other words, 
whose disadvantaged position derives both from maldistribution and misrecognition. 
Fraser suggests that groups based on gender and race occupy this position; she labels 
them “bivalent collectivities.”
The situation of bivalent collectivities brings us to the place where Fraser’s 
redistribution versus recognition dilemma is felt most keenly: “Whereas the logic of 
redistribution is to put ‘race’ [or gender] out of business as such, the logic of 
recognition is to valorize group specificity. Here, then, is the antiracist version of the 
redistribution-recognition dilemma: How can antiracists fight simultaneously to 
abolish ‘race’ and to valorize the cultural specificity of subordinated racialized 
groups? (1997a: 22).” Fraser considers various combinations of remedies until she 
finds the combination whose effects will reinforce rather than undermine one another. 
This combination calls for ‘transformative,’ rather than ‘affirmative,’ redistributive 
and recognition remedies. As Leonard Feldman summarises it, “A ‘transformative’ 
politics of economic redistribution (socialism) and a transformative politics of 
recognition (deconstruction) both engage the deep structures of injustice, avoid 
reinforcing the flows of resentment, and undermine group differentiation by 
transforming exploitative relations of production and deconstructing the hierarchical 
binary oppositions that sustain practices of cultural misrecognition” (2002: 413- 
14).69
Against what she perceives to the dominant tendency to prioritise one or the 
other paradigms of justice, Fraser endeavours to keep both in focus simultaneously. 
Moreoever, she argues that each form of injustice is primary and non-derivative: 
cultural inequalities cannot be reduced to or theorised as an epiphenomenon of 
economic inequalities, and vice versa. While far from uncontroversial, the most 
central claims underpinning Fraser’s work -  that egalitarian redistributive politics, 
while extremely valuable, are limited in their ability to recognise and address 
injustices that are not rooted in socio-economic arrangements; that cultural or 
recognition politics thus constitute a real and independent concern; that its aims may 
come into conflict with the aims of a universalistic egalitarian politics -  seem 
accurate and reasonable. We have seen that when Rawls and Dworkin address self­
69 The thought that multicultural politics threaten or destabilise the redistributive welfare state by 
promoting division and undercutting the social solidarity and identity required to sustain it has been 
explored by many authors. Two accounts include Hobsbawm (1996) and Wolfe and Klausen (1997).
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respect and status at all, they primarily conceptualise them as an aspect of 
distributive, economic injustice. Fraser’s arguments for the paradigm of cultural 
justice have changed (some might say ‘cooled’) over the years. Nevertheless, I think 
her most basic and original point endures even in her more recent work; namely, if 
contemporary discourses about justice and respect are largely confined to an 
economic justice paradigm, they will be conceptually inadequate because they 
overlook the important ways in which self-respect and respect-standing depend on 
establishing cultural justice. Moreover, as I shall try to demonstrate in the final 
sections, liberal egalitarian justice has not been immune to this perspective.
3 . T h e  Re s p e c t  O b je c t io n : W o l ff  a n d  H in t o n
It is now time to return to the respect objection briefly rehearsed in the 
introduction. Wolff develops his critique of luck egalitarianism in two articles 
(1998; 2002). The first expresses criticisms of the dominant egalitarian view, while 
the second sketches some of the positive elements he would substitute in an 
alternative theory. A better sense of what sort of ‘respect agenda’ Wolff is pursuing 
can be gained by considering both his critical and his constructive theory.
Wolff objects that, in order to fulfill the principle of fairness, the above 
account will violate another egalitarian principle: that all people are entitled to self- 
respect and equal respect-standing. It violates the respect condition by requiring 
judgments about what portion of an individual’s situation is due to her choices and 
what portion to bad luck, before it initiates any redistributive compensation to help 
her. Wolff argues that such an investigation to establish these facts will often destroy 
the self-respect of individuals because it requires them to admit embarrassing things 
about themselves; what he calls “shameful revelation”(1988: 109). They might, for 
example, have to admit that they are inherently untalented.70 Furthermore, in the tax- 
and-transfer schemes typically assumed by luck egalitarians, these judgments about 
individuals will be public since the redistribution must be justified (107-117). Wolff
70 Several people have suggested to me that luck egalitarian discourses contain culturally-specific 
assumptions about the sorts of things that cause individuals to feel ashamed and lose self-respect. 
Dependence on state benefits does not carry stigma in all societies, to take one obvious example. I do 
not discuss these issues here for reasons of space, but it should be noted that egalitarians are aware of 
this source of disagreement, and make certain assumptions about what causes loss of self-respect for 
the sake of the argument, not to assert that the causes are universally applicable. Thanks especially to 
Itai Rabinowitz for this point.
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argues that it is reasonable to expect that individuals will suffer not only loss of self- 
respect after shameful and embarrassing confessions of personal failure, but also 
public disrespect, or a loss of respect-standing, once this ground for redistribution is 
publicly known. He recommends adopting a policy of unconditional welfare benefits 
so that shameful revelation can be avoided by citizens who collect benefits.
Even though Dworkin and other egalitarians promote different currencies of 
equality, Wolff argues that the philosophical underpinning of their theories is the 
same: they all assert what he calls the “lexical priority of fairness thesis” which says 
that “egalitarianism is constituted by a lexically prior notion of fairness” (103). 
Another way of putting this is that Dworkin and others promote a “monistic” account 
of egalitarianism: the only authentically egalitarian value is fairness (118). Wolff 
argues that this is an implausible understanding of the egalitarian project. He holds 
instead that egalitarianism is best characterised by a “collection” of values including, 
centrally, fairness and respect, and that it is not “well represented” by a notion of 
lexical priority (118-19). Fairness and respect are both “authentic” egalitarian values, 
and he suggests, they are equally urgent or primary (97, 118).
In his work on addressing disadvantage, Wolff takes a different critical angle 
on luck egalitarianism. He argues that that tradition often simply assumes that 
financial compensation is the correct way to remedy injustice (2002: 208). This 
assumption is problematic:
Note the rhetoric in which people sometimes reject offers of financial 
compensation; that they refuse to be ‘bought off; for it is cheapening 
or degrading... [Tjhose who endorse the compensation paradigm 
must reply that this response is confused: there is no difference 
between correcting injustice and buying you off, for that is how 
injustice is corrected. Yet many will feel that this view misses out 
something important. There can be a type of disrespect involved 
which cannot easily be reduced to levels of preference satisfaction 
(2002: 212).
These observations prompt Wolff to elaborate a framework which sets out four main 
types of remedy for disadvantage, in which financial compensation -  the 
compensation paradigm, as he calls it -  is only one, and often, the least attractive one.
The easiest way to describe each of the four types of remedy might be 
through an example that Wolff uses himself. Suppose an individual does not have
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the use of her legs. This limits her mobility and makes her disadvantaged relative to 
non-disabled people, at least in the dimension of mobility, but probably in other 
dimensions as well. The remedy of “personal enhancement” would act on her 
“internal resources” or what are sometimes called ‘natural assets’ -  i.e. her physical 
and mental capabilities. Surgery to restore the use of her legs is an example. 
Compensation is the second type of remedy. It acts on the individual’s “external 
resources” by increasing her income or consumption share in the world. “We could 
offer the person a sufficient amount of money so that... she no longer minds 
immobility, if there is such an amount,” suggests Wolff (211). The third type is 
called “targeted resource enhancement.” This differs from compensation in that the 
resources are goods-in-kind. Rather than providing these resources as “general 
compensation, they could be provided for specific purposes: to improve mobility; 
either money with strings attached about how it might be spent, or use of equipment 
to improve mobility” (211). The fourth remedy, “status enhancement,” focuses on 
changing the social structure in which an individual lives so she can better function 
within it. In our example, status enhancement remedies might include public 
buildings with wheelchair ramps and media campaigns to educate the public about 
disability.
Like most philosophical egalitarians, Wolff believes that people with 
disabilities are entitled to extra resources just because of the special medial expenses 
they incur (1998: 117n). But unlike some egalitarians, Wolff holds that this is not 
where the story ends. What seems definitely wrong in the case of disability is 
financial compensation just by itself. “I do not know of an argument from within the 
disability movement that the special miseries of the disabled need cash compensation, 
and no doubt this would be considered deeply insulting,” he writes (2002: 211). His 
own view seems to be that a combination of all four types of remedies may be 
appropriate, depending on the disability and the social context.
In general, Wolff appears to favour status enhancement remedies because 
they assist the “nullification” of disadvantage. Nullification is the “permanent 
eradication of disadvantage, to bring a match between the person and the world in 
which they live” (212). Wolff argues that the “ultimate aim of social policy should 
not be so much to compensate for disadvantage, but to create circumstances in which 
there is no disadvantage that calls for compensation” (208).
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Through disability, Wolff demonstrates that we have different intuitions 
about the appropriate remedy for different sorts of disadvantage. These intuitions 
suggest that different remedies contain different assumptions and send different 
messages about the human good. The details of this argument, which represents a 
further aspect to Wolffs work, are beyond the scope of the paper. However, I want 
to underline three points about Wolffs arguments for addressing disadvantage. First, 
he argues that disadvantage or injustice is essentially plural. Second, remedies for 
addressing disadvantage are themselves plural. Third, a remedy may actually 
produce other forms of injustice or unfairness. If we try to help someone in a 
wheelchair by giving her money for an operation, we risk giving the impression that 
she is personally defective, and we also do nothing to alter public institutions and 
public attitudes about citizens with disabilities.
Wolff, therefore, has made a two-fronted attack on luck egalitarianism. One 
front directly engages the notion of respect by arguing that the method by which luck 
egalitarianism determines redistribution is inherently disrespectful. The other front 
criticises the tradition for typically assuming that compensation is the appropriate 
remedy for injustice.
Hinton (2001) attempts to finesse the dilemma articulated by Wolff about the 
conflict between respect and fairness that luck egalitarianism apparently produces.
He also offers independent reasons egalitarians should reject the Dworkinian view, 
and suggests an alternative model of justice they should embrace instead.71
To begin with, Hinton concurs with Wolff that respect is a genuine and vital 
egalitarian value. He also agrees that “a properly egalitarian understanding of 
respect is indeed inconsistent with implementing” a Dworkinian view (2001: 72-73). 
His broad agreement with Wolff that Dworkinian justice cannot uphold everyone’s 
self-respect and respect-standing leads into a proposal that that there are two 
components of Dworkinian justice which create the difficulty. One is its central 
aspiration to eliminate the effects of brute luck on distributive shares. This aspiration 
entails having to distinguish between what portion of a person’s condition is due to 
her choices, and what portion to chance. Hinton argues that this yields an overall 
egalitarian ethic or ambition in Dworkinian egalitarianism that says our “basic duty
71 Hinton argues that it is only those egalitarians who “work within a broadly Dworkinian framework” 
who must confront the respect objection. I shall use the terms Dworkinian egalitarianism and luck 
egalitarianism interchangeably here.
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injustice is to treat people as equals by holding them responsible only for those 
aspects of their fate that lie within their control” (79). But, Hinton insists, “our status 
as equals is undermined by efforts to distinguish the portion of our resources that got 
there by luck from the portion that got there by choice” (8In).
The second aspect of Dworkinian justice Hinton finds problematic is that it 
rejects Rawls’s difference principle because of what Dworkin and his followers 
consider its group-centred approach to justice. A group-centred approach courts 
unfairness and exploitation since the worst-off group may contain individuals who, 
though they are not disabled or otherwise unable to work, choose not to work, and 
therefore free-ride on the efforts of others. Thus, Hinton notes, luck egalitarians 
prefer a more fine-grained, individualistic approach, because this ensures exact 
fairness (81).
Hinton argues that only those egalitarians who embrace both aspects are 
susceptible to Wolffs dilemma of a trade-off between fairness and respect. He 
suggests substituting the two aspects of Dworkinian egalitarianism identified above 
with two alternative elements. The first is a restatement of the core ambition of 
egalitarian justice, what Hinton calls ‘equality of status.’ Equality of status says that 
our “fundamental egalitarian duty is to secure an equal status for all by eliminating 
two basic forms of injustice that attend human interaction, namely, economic 
exploitation and social domination” (80). The second element of Hinton’s 
alternative is a revised version of Rawls’s difference principle. Hinton suggests 
that the difference principle is especially appropriate for handling the respect 
objection because “it requires us to maximize the shares of income enjoyed by the 
least advantaged group of workers [so] implementing this principle would probably 
not require detailed information about people’s lives and choices” (82, italic added).
Hinton also accepts Wolffs suggestion that the state should implement a 
scheme of unconditional benefits (86). This would supplement Hinton’s difference 
principle scheme. People who receive the unconditional minimum are those who 
have the talents and are able to work, but who choose not to. Their income would be 
lower than the worst-off group of workers, who would benefit from difference 
principle-generated redistribution. Hinton argues that objections that the group
72 Briefly, Hinton would revise the difference principle to take into account disabilities. This revision 
acknowledges Dworkin’s criticism (1981a) that the difference principle would give everyone the same 
shares even though we can usually presume that individuals with disabilities can do less with the same 
bundle of goods than able-bodied people (2001: 82).
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receiving the basic minimum are exploiting the rest of us by getting something for 
nothing are addressed by his stipulation that everyone “shares a common pre­
political title to the resources of the external world” (85).
4 . Ty p e s  o f  In ju st ic e
To what extent are the respect-related objections articulated by Wolff and 
Hinton rooted in notions of cultural injustice? What are the parallels, if any, with 
Nancy Fraser’s view? And where do these authors diverge from one another? I 
argue that in objecting to the version of liberal justice associated with Dworkin and 
other luck egalitarians, Wolff and Hinton have drawn (perhaps unconsciously) on a 
dualistic conception of justice. Specifically, their use of ideals from the paradigm of 
cultural justice has crystallised around the notion of ‘respect.’ However, despite 
affinities with a dualistic approach to justice, the distributive paradigm frequently 
reappears in their work, eclipsing the cultural justice perspective.
Does Wolff conceptualise injustice as dualistic? His argument that “exact 
fairness” and “equal respect” represent two fundamentally important egalitarian 
values could be linked to discourses of distributive and cultural justice. At a concrete 
level, however, that link seems strained. Job-seekers are the main group through 
which Wolff demonstrates how luck egalitarianism threatens the self-respect and 
status of some individuals (110-15). His primary example concerns those who are 
involuntarily unemployed and the humiliations they face in revealing that they lack 
marketable talents. While surely a real concern for justice, these issues do seem to fit 
more naturally within a socio-economic perspective.
At a more abstract level, however, Wolffs theory of egalitarian justice does 
bear a resemblance to a dualistic approach. For one thing, he explicitly rejects what 
he calls the monist tradition of justice which gives lexical priority to the value of 
fairness. Wolff holds that fairness and respect are both fundamental egalitarian 
principles. Respect should stand as an equally urgent, and independent, concern for 
egalitarians (116-20). This is not dissimilar to Fraser’s position that the injustices of 
maldistribution and misrecognition are independent, irreducible and equally primary 
forms of injustice.
What about Wolffs sympathies for the situations of disabled people, and his 
argument that the best way to address them involves restructuring the physical world
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and encouraging people to alter their negative views of disability? This too seems to 
merge with themes emphasised by cultural justice theorists. Wolff discusses how 
laws requiring hotels to provide accessible rooms would be one way to cancel out or 
‘nullify’ the disadvantage that disabled people suffer. If everyone knew that all 
hotels made such arrangements, “no one need mention they are a wheelchair user 
when booking a room, for there is no fear of getting the wrong sort of room.” But 
we should also note another side to the problems faced by disabled people: the very 
fact that having a disability is considered shameful; not something you want to reveal 
to strangers. “Rather than spare people the humiliation of having to reveal their 
disability status, wouldn’t it be much better if we could arrange the world so that 
having a disability was never seen as shaming or embarrassing... Perhaps this is the 
case for many people already, but it is far from universally so” (2002: 214).
These remarks suggest that Wolff accepts that injustices of exclusion that 
disabled people face have both an economic or distributive side, and a cultural or 
symbolic side. Moreover, throughout his analysis, Wolff implies that he generally 
approves of the social model of disability over the medical model, the former 
conforming to his status enhancement type of remedy. Multiculturalism and 
recognition politics are usually regarded as comprising disparate social movements, 
include disability activists who promote the social model and criticise the medical 
model. One of the common threads for groups under the umbrella of recognition 
politics is to challenge notions of ‘normal’ body types and abilities, and to promote 
appreciation of diversity and difference, in bodies, as in other things. However, 
Wolff describes all four types of remedy, including status enhancement, as forms of 
“redistributive attention” to the disadvantaged (207). What others might view as 
cultural revaluation remedies for disabled people, Wolff absorbs into the language of 
redistribution, suggesting his primary theoretical orientation is towards the liberal 
distributive justice perspective.
Wolffs argument about the conflict between fairness and respect runs 
parallel with Fraser’s claim that the pursuit of one objective of justice can interfere 
with the pursuit of another. He writes that the “concern for fairness” and the “idea of 
respect for all” are both “authentically part of the egalitarian ethos” and “can come 
into conflict” (1998: 97). But the content of these structurally similar positions are 
strikingly different. Wolff betrays no sign that he considers the conflicting demands 
of justice for any social group but workers and people with disabilities. In Fraser’s
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view, this analysis would then overlook two groups -  women and people of colour -  
for whom the dilemma of justice is most acute. Ultimately, Wolffs work does not 
unambiguously embrace a dualistic approach to social justice, but his analysis clearly 
suggests that he is unsatisfied with the dominant approach.
For his part, Hinton explicitly subscribes to a dualistic conception of injustice. 
In setting out his “equality of status” alternative to Dworkin’s “brute-luck- 
elimination” ambition, Hinton insists that the fundamental egalitarian duty is to 
eliminate two basic forms of injustice: economic exploitation and social domination. 
He writes:
Plain examples of economic exploitation are provided by the way in 
which working-class people are paid at dismally low wages to 
perform repetitive or dangerous or distasteful work, or again by the 
way in which women are pressured to remain at home to perform the 
bulk of domestic labor while men do the ‘real work.’ Plain examples 
of social domination are provided by the way in which people of color 
are more often than not condemned to live in squalid conditions with 
the most meager of opportunities for education and health care, or 
again by the way in which gay men and lesbians are harassed or 
vilified for seeking to live the kinds of lives they want (2001: 80).
This passage demonstrates his recognition of both basic forms of injustice and a keen 
sense of the injustice of women’s undervalued labour and the heterosexist 
subordination of gays and lesbians. It also seems to imply a basic parity between the 
two types of injustice, in the sense that neither is more primary or urgent than the 
other. In this passage, Hinton also directly links the philosophical project of 
egalitarian justice to actual social movements, something other critics of Dworkinian 
justice have argued is sorely lacking in that tradition (see, for example, Anderson 
1999a).
Hinton criticises how luck egalitarianism represents the harms suffered by 
blacks in apartheid South Africa. The evil of apartheid, he writes, “did not consist in 
the fact that the color of one’s skin is largely a matter of brute luck.” What made it 
evil was the “way that black people were forced to live: their continual subjugation, 
humiliation, and deprivation...” (2001: 79). This resonates with my arguments in 
chapters one and two that the category of ‘bad luck’ is over-general. It implies that 
cosmic misfortune, intentional wrongdoing by individuals, structural barriers, and
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unintentional, socially-generated discrimination and oppression are morally 
equivalent harms, from the point of egalitarianism. While they may have other 
drawbacks, dualistic or pluralistic approaches to social justice are better equipped to 
represent the qualitatively different forms of injustice that individuals and groups 
suffer.
However, by the end of his analysis, Hinton’s concerns for the particular 
situations of women, homosexuals and oppressed racial groups seem to have 
disappeared. His defence of the difference principle as superior to Dworkin’s 
individualistic, fine-grained resource equality leads him into discussions of economic 
exploitation. The difference principle mandates redistributing resources from the 
well-off to the least-advantaged group, to the point where any remaining inequalities 
are to the advantage of the worst-off. Hinton’s justification of the difference 
principle is complex (81-85). Without going into every comer of it, what we need to 
know is that it rests in part on an assumption that we all have a “pre-political” 
entitlement to a fair share of the world’s resources. Hinton suggests that this 
assumption effectively neutralises objections from Dworkin and his followers that 
there is the potential for members of the worst-off group to exploit the efforts of 
better-off members of society.73 Hinton’s point is to reject the idea that a Rawlsian 
account of redistribution would permit economic exploitation of any members of 
society. My point is that, in laying out these arguments, Hinton’s other principle in 
his equality of status ideal -  eliminating social domination -  seems to vanish. In 
other words, if equal status has a cultural justice component mandating equal respect 
for everyone, not in spite of our differences but because of them, by the end of 
Hinton’s analysis, that concern takes a back seat to the need to affirm the “joint 
ownership in the world’s resources” (83). The privileging of a distributive economic 
justice perspective over one that is sensitive to non-economic harms reasserts itself in 
Hinton’s analysis.
Finally, Wolff and Hinton have also not done much to interrogate such value­
laden concepts as ‘talent,’ which are widely and uncritically employed by luck 
egalitarians. For example, Wolff makes the probably uncontroversial claim that, in
73 This aspect o f Hinton’s approach relates to wider debates in distributive justice. Some theorists 
who argue for an unconditional basic income for all citizens, regardless of their ability to work, their 
income or wealth from other sources, marriage status and so on, say that this universal benefit is 
justified because all human beings are automatically entitled to a share of the earth’s resources. For 
discussions of this issue, see Philippe van Parijs (1991; 1992; 1995; 1996).
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the real world, people do feel shame at being untalented: “the shamefulness of low 
talent is likely to be much more universal than, say, the shamefulness of an inability 
to grow the right sort of facial hair” (1998: 115). Hinton also uses phrases such as 
‘untalented people’ without problematising them (2001: 85). There is room here to 
ask, as Anderson does, why egalitarian justice should be in the business of ranking 
people’s characters and abilities:
[Egalitarianism] should promote institutional arrangements that enable 
the diversity of people’s talents, aspirations, roles and cultures to benefit 
everyone and to be recognized as mutually beneficial. Instead, [luck 
egalitarianism] reflects the mean-spirited, contemptuous, parochial 
vision of a society that represents human diversity hierarchically, 
moralistically contrasting the responsible and irresponsible, the innately 
superior and the innately inferior, the independent and the dependent 
(1999a: 308).
An ideal of human diversity, which Anderson invokes in this passage, is central to 
the project of cultural justice. As Fraser notes, its general goal is a “difference- 
friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no 
longer the price of equal respect” (1996: 3). It wants to disrupt, invert and 
deconstruct settled notions about which human characteristics, behaviours, and social 
practices are worthy and superior, and which ones are contemptible and inferior. In 
line with this ideal, Wolff and Hinton both argue that an ideally just society would 
not disparage and shun certain people, such as homosexuals and those with 
disabilities. But to the extent that they are sympathetic to ideals of diversity and 
difference, this commitment remains mostly implicit in their work.
Ultimately, Wolffs and Hinton’s analyses display more affinities with the 
project of cultural justice than is displayed in luck egalitarianism. On occasion, they 
each adopt what could be called a ‘cultural justice’ perspective insofar as their 
analyses recognize that remedies for injustice entail not only redistribution but also 
recognition. Their respect objection draws upon the dualistic approach to justice, 
both explicitly and more often, implicitly. A hallmark of Fraser’s approach is to 
insist that each paradigm of justice is fundamental and primary; neither should be 
subordinated to the other. In the work by Wolff and Hinton examined here, however, 
the socio-economic paradigm of justice often predominates. Thus, in general, it 
would be a stretch to say that their deployment of the respect objection brings an
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overtly cultural justice approach to bear on luck equality. However, in light of 
counter-responses by luck egalitarians to the objection, a more explicit appeal to the 
recognition paradigm may be necessary.
Some luck egalitarians believe that the respect objection boils down to a 
critique of the implementation of their ideal of equality, and therefore does not touch 
the core principles. For example, Cohen writes, “difficulties of implementation, just 
as such, do not defeat luck egalitarianism as a conception of justice, since it is not a 
constraint on a sound conception of justice that it should always be sensible to strive 
to implement it, whatever the factual circumstances may be” (2003: 244).74 Ideal 
theory and practical problems of implementation of a theory are distinct concerns, so 
criticising the latter does not imply a critique of the former. I believe Wolff and 
Hinton mean to criticise the theory of luck equality, not just its implementation. This 
is implied, for example, in Wolffs challenge to luck egalitarianism’s monism. 
Incidentally, this has parallels with Iris Young’s criticism, discussed in chapter two, 
that the distributive justice paradigm wrongly assumes that virtually all issues of 
justice can be formulated in terms of the fair distribution of material or non-material 
goods amongst agents. Hinton’s arguments about substituting the ambition of luck- 
neutralisation with an ideal of status equality also cannot be represented as mere 
quibbles about how an ideal is to be implemented. In order to drain the counter­
response by luck egalitarians of its force, in other words, Wolff and Hinton must 
show that there is genuine disagreement between their preferred conceptions of 
egalitarianism and luck equality. I believe this genuine disagreement lies in their 
greater receptiveness to a dualistic approach to justice which refuses to treat cultural 
hierarchy as less important than or derivative of economic inequality.
74 See also similar responses by Dworkin (2002: 116-117); and Ameson (2000a: 344-45).
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Chapter  F ive 
Relational E quality , C itizenship, and  D em ocracy
In c h a p t e r  f o u r , I situated Wolffs and Hinton’s respect objection to luck 
egalitarianism within a wider discourse identifying redistributive and recognition 
forms of justice. The respect objection, as well as the wider discourse of dualistic 
injustice, succeeds in validating the non-economic dimensions of disadvantage as 
serious objects of egalitarian concern, which is a welcome development. However, 
even as we shift to a new perspective on social justice that acknowledges the multi­
dimensional nature of disadvantage, one feature that has not altered is a tendency to 
assume that what defines an egalitarian society is a just distribution of goods, 
whether that is interpreted narrowly as material goods, or more broadly to include 
goods such as cultural recognition and respect. In harmony with the mainstream 
egalitarian discourse, the redistribution/recognition discourse also assumes that social 
justice refers primarily to adjustments to patterns of goods, which adjustments are 
likely carried out by the state as the main actor. In this chapter, I challenge this 
through the development of an alternative perspective that I call ‘relational equality.’ 
In essence, the relational equality approach suggests that equality is not primarily a 
distributive ideal achieved mainly by government, but rather is an ideal that governs 
social relationships between citizens. This is a rather general notion, so the question 
guiding my chapter is what theoretical work can the notion of relational equality do 
in describing a vision of egalitarian justice? I argue that several distinct projects or 
efforts can be identified in the texts of those who have endorsed this approach. 
Although these are promising, I argue that they are under-theorised, so I attempt to 
identify how they might be fruitfully developed.
1. T h e  R e l a t io n a l  Id e a l  o f  E q u a l it y
As noted in the thesis introduction, a central point of Anderson’s critique of 
luck egalitarianism is that it does not speak to equality as an ideal that refers to 
relations between citizens. She argues that the “proper negative aim of egalitarian 
justice is not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end 
oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is not to 
ensure that everyone gets what they morally deserve, but to create a community in
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which people stand in relations of equality to others” (1999a: 288-89). Anderson 
suggests that luck egalitarians’ aim of eliminating the impact of brute luck on what 
people end up with accounts for their failure to address the relational dimension of 
the ideal of equality. The tradition is “too narrowly focused on the distribution of 
divisible, privately appropriated goods, such as income and resources, or privately 
enjoyed goods, such as welfare” (1999a: 288). According to Anderson, inequality 
has historically referred “not so much to distributions of goods as to relations 
between superior and inferior persons. Those of superior rank were thought entitled 
to inflict violence on inferiors, to exclude or segregate them from social life, to treat 
them with contempt, to force them to obey, work without reciprocation, and abandon 
their own cultures” (312). Fundamentally, Anderson asserts, “egalitarians seek a 
social order in which persons stand in relations of equality,” and that democratic 
egalitarianism, her preferred view, represents a “relational theory of equality” while 
“equality of fortune is a distributive theory of equality” (313).
Samuel Scheffler echoes some of these points. He argues, “Equality, as it is 
more commonly understood, is not, in the first instance, a distributive ideal, and its 
aim is not to compensate for misfortune. It is, instead, a moral ideal governing the 
relations in which people stand to one another” (2003a: 21). Following Anderson, he 
criticises luck egalitarianism for putting so much stock in the chance/choice 
distinction -  a distinction he believes is “philosophically dubious and morally 
implausible” (17). This focus, he suggests, has contributed to an egalitarian 
discourse that focuses almost exclusively on questions of distribution, while 
simultaneously neglecting “fundamental questions” about the notion of equality that 
supports the whole project (17). He argues that luck egalitarians typically fail to 
anchor their accounts of distributive equality in a more basic ideal; they just have not 
bothered to defend at a fundamental level their views to people who are not 
persuaded by the tradition’s overall drift. He also argues that even where luck 
egalitarians can be interpreted as trying to root their distributive programmes in a 
more fundamental notion of equality, the one they implicitly rely on -  the notion of 
equal moral worth -  is too meagre or minimal (31-33). Equality, he insists, is “most 
compelling when it is understood as a social and political ideal that includes but goes 
beyond the proposition that all people have equal moral worth” (33). Scheffler 
maintains that any adequate conceptualisation of egalitarianism must anchor the
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project in a moral, social, and political ideal of equality which speaks to the sorts of 
relations we want between equal citizens.
Scheffler selects Dworkin’s account for detailed analysis because he argues 
that Dworkin does propose that equality of resources is one element in a more 
comprehensive account of equality. However, that account, which holds that the 
state must treat each citizen with equal respect and concern, does not satisfy 
Scheffler, who calls it an “administrative” egalitarian vision. He argues that 
“Dworkin’s ideal of equality, as applied to questions of distribution, is not itself a 
model of social or political equality at all; it is perfectly compatible with social 
hierarchy, inasmuch as it involves one relatively powerful party choosing how to 
distribute resources among those with relatively less power” (36). Furthermore, he 
contends, Dworkin explicitly rejects an equal distribution of power. In general, 
Scheffler’s chief complaint with regard to Dworkin’s egalitarian theory seems to be 
that it formulates equality not as an ideal governing the relations between citizens, 
but instead as an ideal that refers to the way the state treats its citizens.
Interestingly, these criticisms appear to echo points made by David Miller 
more than a decade ago. According to Miller, the notion of equality has two 
different meanings. Dworkin, Cohen, Ameson, and others are ‘simple egalitarians’ 
because they believe the ideal of equality directs us toward a question about the 
correct metric of distribution (resources, welfare, opportunities for welfare, and so 
on), which can be expressed in the simple idea of ‘equality of X.’75 The second type 
of equality is what Miller calls equality of status or social equality. This type of 
equality cannot be understood as something that is achieved when distributive 
fairness -  however understood -  is achieved amongst a group of individuals. The 
ideal of social equality is instead “a matter of how people regard one another, and 
how they conduct their social relations. It does not require that people should be 
equal in power, prestige or wealth, nor absurdly, that they should score the same on 
natural dimensions such as strength or intelligence” (1998: 31). When people talk 
about wanting a classless society, a society without pervasive social hierarchies, a 
society where people interact with one another as individuals not as members of 
particular classes, castes, or other social groups, they are referring, Miller suggests, 
to the visions that lie behind the notion of equality as a fundamentally relational ideal.
75 Some of Miller’s work on this pre-dates Anderson’s coining of the term ‘luck egalitarianism.’ 
Nevertheless, the writers he criticises are amongst the group to whom Anderson has applied the label.
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As one writer explains, social equality, on this account, is “an attribute of non- 
hierarchical social relations” (Mason 1998: ix) in society as a whole, not a form of 
individual, distributive equality. Although Miller uses the terms ‘social equality’ and 
‘status equality,’ his concerns seem sufficiently similar to Anderson’s and Scheffler’s 
to validate their inclusion under the term ‘relational equality.’
One small but arresting piece of evidence Miller offers is the ‘moral passage’ 
through time of the concept of condescension. Condescension used to be a virtue but 
is now considered a vice. In Samuel Johnson’s time, an upper-class person who 
willingly “sank” to the level of his or her inferiors was described approvingly as 
foregoing privileges to which he or she was entitled. By Jane Austen’s time, 
condescension was “morally ambiguous.” Miller writes:
Readers (or viewers) of Pride and Prejudice will remember the 
appalling Mr. Collins who is forever praising the condescension of his 
patron Lady Catherine de Burgh. Collins is both a comic and a pathetic 
figure, and Austen’s characterisation is plainly a satirical one, but she is 
describing a moral world in which it was still possible to regard 
condescension as a virtue. Today it is not possible: to describe someone 
as condescending is to condemn them. Condescension is a vice because 
there are no legitimate ‘privileges of superiority’ to depart from, so 
someone who behaves in a condescending way is claiming a superior 
status that he is not entitled to. The progressive acceptance of social 
equality as an ideal, I am suggesting, could roughly be measured by 
tracing the moral passage of the concept of condescension from virtue 
to vice (1999: 239-40).
The point, for Miller, is to underline the idea that equality in this sense is not, directly 
at least, about distributive fairness, but is rather centred on the way people regard one 
another and interact together. This understanding of equality is violated when 
modem society develops relationships of social hierarchy, despite guarantees of 
formal, universal, equality.
A number of important similarities emerge in these accounts. All three 
suggest that the imaginations of contemporary egalitarians are (or should be) fired by 
remembrances of historically acceptable hierarchies in social relationships we now 
find repugnant. Additionally, it is not clear to them, as it apparently is to luck 
egalitarians, why differences in genetic luck should take centre stage, and not the
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residues of historical, officially sanctioned social and political hierarchies and 
exclusions. In general, then, these authors express overlapping perspectives on what 
equality as an ideal fundamentally refers to, and problematic tendencies in the luck 
egalitarian perspective.
2. Is R e l a t i o n a l  E q u a l i t y  a  C u r r e n c y ?
Anderson, Scheffler, and Miller articulate a distinctive and, I believe, 
appealing vision that steers egalitarianism away from vexed questions about choice 
and chance, and the thought that equality as a value fundamentally refers to “how a 
distributor of good things should distribute them” (Gaus 2000a: 168). Despite the 
alternative emphasis on social relations and avoiding hierarchy, it seems quite 
difficult to escape the grip of “currency” thinking in egalitarian discourse, as a 
response from Richard Ameson demonstrates. Paraphrasing Anderson’s criticism of 
luck egalitarianism, he writes:
Anderson urges that the luck egalitarians wrongly focus their attention on 
the distribution of privately owned goods among individuals. Against this 
shopping mall egalitarianism, we should insist that the point of equality is 
creating and sustaining a community of equals. What matters is equality 
in certain human relationships. So says Anderson. The issue raised here 
is how the egalitarian should be measuring inequality among persons 
(2000a: 341).
Ameson then goes on to say that Anderson claims that we can compare people 
according to their stock of relationships with others. The problem with this is that it 
resembles the fetishism of the resourcist view: relationships themselves are 
“reasonably regarded as instrumental to well-being, not morally important in 
themselves” (342). He argues his own conception escapes the fetishism charge 
because what it posits as fundamentally important is how well someone’s life is 
going: “The egalitarian of well-being is concerned with the quality of human 
relationships that people sustain in a society, but these are evaluated by their impact 
on well-being” (2000a: 341). In other words, Ameson suggests that the notion of 
relational equality can be assimilated to the general luck egalitarian approach by 
treating relationships as analogous to other resources from which individuals derive 
welfare.
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It is true that regarding relationships as a component of one or the other main 
currencies of equality makes sense. The relationship that a crack-baby has with his 
addict mother certainly counts as a piece of very bad brute luck that would attract 
compensation on any luck egalitarian account. And, as Anderson observes, some 
versions of luck egalitarianism would award extra resources to those who are 
unlucky in love due to being ugly or socially awkward (1999a: 288; 305). This does 
not appear to be what those who advance a relational notion of equality have in mind, 
however. Indeed, anticipating an interpretation such as Ameson’s, Miller cautions 
that “Equality of status does not mean that there is some characteristic, viz. status, 
that is handed out in equal quantities to each person” (1990: 97-97; see also 1995: 
199).
While Ameson’s interpretation of relational egalitarianism is not 
unreasonable, it demonstrates a failure to remember that a main point of the 
objection is to show that equality, as an ideal, can be employed in a non-distributive 
fashion. The confusion seems to arise from the fact that Ameson insists on trying to 
read Anderson as offering a currency of equality. Consider the quoted passage by 
Ameson again. He correctly describes Anderson’s view of luck egalitarianism. He 
also correctly describes Anderson’s ethic: the point of equality is creating and 
sustaining a community of equals. The whole of that excerpt, except the last line, is a 
comparison of two visions of egalitarian politics. But it is not a comparison o f two 
currencies. This is where the confusion enters. In his summary statement of the 
comparison, Ameson says: “The issue raised here is how the egalitarian should be 
measuring inequality among persons.” No one can think that Anderson means to 
suggest that if I have ten high-quality relationships and you have ten, then we are 
equal. When equality is posited as a relational ideal, it should be understood as an 
attribute of a society as a whole, and not as a currency (or component of a currency) 
with which to perform interpersonal comparisons. The contrast is between two 
fundamentally different approaches to the egalitarian project, not, as Ameson seems 
to believe, between competing metrics of equality. There is a mismatch between 
what believers in equality as a relational ideal are arguing, and to what Ameson 
responds.
If relational equality does not conform to an ‘equality of x’ formulation, in 
what sense is it an expression of egalitarianism? The answer to this, particularly for 
Miller, relates to his adaptation of Michael Walzer’s (1983) theory of complex
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equality. As is well known, Walzer proposes a pluralistic approach to social justice 
that imagines social goods, such as money, power, honour, and love, as belonging to 
distinct spheres. He argues that the social meanings of these incommensurable social 
goods should determine their distributive principle. To take two examples, medical 
care should be distributed on the basis of need, while the distribution of romantic 
love is properly governed by free exchange between adults. On this view, a political 
morality that is egalitarian in a broad sense can nevertheless admit non-egalitarian 
principles such as need and desert, as well as equality. Walzer’s approach allows for 
inequalities within different spheres so long as those who are superior in one sphere 
are not allowed to convert that into advantage in other spheres. To take another 
example, we need not worry that some people are richer than others so long as the 
rich are not able to buy political power, for example, by buying up poorer people’s 
votes. The main threat to equality on this conception is not difference within 
particular spheres, but the potential for dominance across spheres.
Miller offers what he describes as a “revisionist” version of Walzer’s 
complex egalitarianism (1990: 95). His ideal, in harmony with Walzer’s vision, is a 
“state of affairs in which people regard and treat one another as of equal standing 
overall, despite the fact that in particular spheres achievements and holdings of goods 
are visibly unequal” (1990: 95). However, in contrast to Walzer, Miller believes that 
differences in two spheres -  money and power -  should be of direct egalitarian 
concern since great inequalities in these goods can “effectively swamp the other 
dimensions which in theory might serve to counteract them” (1990: 97). So whereas 
Walzer’s complex egalitarianism appears to be compatible with any degree of 
inequality within these spheres, Miller’s version calls for limits on inequalities in 
money and power. He believes that large income differences will “almost inevitably 
create a segregated society” where people with similar incomes associate almost 
exclusively with one another rather than mixing (1997: 96). In order for people to 
regard and treat one another as equals overall, we must prevent income inequalities 
from becoming too great.
While not denying that equality is an appropriate norm for some distributive 
practices, what emerges here is a vision of egalitarianism that says equality should 
also be employed as an overarching, but independent, value that regulates society’s 
affairs in a broad sense. Consider the terminology Miller uses in describing the 
relationship between equality as a social or relational ideal and distribution: “Social
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equality is not a distributive ideal in itself, but it does have distributive implications” 
(1998: 33); and “If we want our society to be egalitarian, then we will try to shape 
our distributive practices so that the emergence of hierarchy is discouraged” (1998: 
34). Suppose we can choose between a reward system that honours big financial 
donors and one that honours non-rich people who donate a large amount of their time 
to voluntary causes. Miller suggests that there is nothing inherently unfair about 
either system (so long, of course, as the competitions are procedurally fair), but 
equality as a relational ideal will give us reasons for favouring the latter. It spreads 
advantage around better, preventing the person who is already superior to others in 
terms of wealth to capture yet another good. On this understanding of egalitarianism, 
the ideal of equality functions primarily as an overarching independent standard, 
appealing to the sorts of relationships citizens enjoy, which then shapes or regulates 
many different kinds of distributive practices.
Anderson and Scheffler echo the idea that equality regulates distributions. 
Anderson writes that “democratic equality guarantees not effective access to equal 
levels of functioning but effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to stand 
as an equal in society. For some functionings, equal citizenship requires equal levels. 
For example, each citizen is entitled to the same number of votes in an election as 
everyone else. But for other functionings, standing as an equal does not require 
equal levels of functioning” (1999a: 318-19). ‘Regarding one another as equals,’ 
‘standing in relations of equality to others’ -  these are consistently cited as the 
standards against which the justness of particular distributions of goods are then 
assessed. In addition to the example of political citizenship, which requires strict 
distributive equality of one person-one vote, Anderson refers to many other areas of 
social life, such as food, which do not require strict equality. To regard one another 
as equals, she argues, people do not require gourmet spreads to be laid before them. 
But one cannot stand as an equal with other citizens if one has to seek one’s dinner in 
the dumpster (320). Even if he has brought his predicament on himself, Anderson 
argues that an egalitarian society provides a lifetime guarantee of access to dignified 
sources of nutrition. The appeal to what is required in order for citizens to stand as 
equals thus attempts to detour around impenetrable questions about choice and 
circumstance in order to focus on issues such as basic needs.
For his part, Scheffler argues that “questions about egalitarian distributive 
norms must be controlled by some broader understanding of equality” (2003a: 23,
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italics added); and that “the aim of enabling people to be fully cooperating members 
of society provides an independent standard forjudging which disadvantages should 
be compensated. By this standard, some disadvantages should be compensated even 
if they result from bad ‘option luck,’ whereas others should not be compensated even 
if they result from bad ‘brute luck”’ (30, italics added). An approach that starts from 
equality as a relational ideal is interested not primarily in questions about choice and 
chance, but rather in questions about the “nature of people’s ‘basic needs,’ the proper 
criteria for political institutions to use in distinguishing between genuine needs and 
what are merely very strong preferences... and especially, the degree of material 
inequality that is compatible with a conception of society as a fair system of 
cooperation among equals” (24). In harmony with Miller and Anderson, Scheffler 
suggests that rather than focusing exclusively on distributive fairness, defined in the 
luck egalitarian literature as the neutralisation of brute luck, an egalitarian who 
focuses more broadly on what is needed to sustain equal relations will ultimately be 
led to standards of distributive fairness that arise out of those prior intuitions and 
judgments.
This is a better reading than Ameson’s currency one of what the relational 
equality perspective implies for distributions in an egalitarian society. However, it 
faces at least two significant objections. When we appeal to a norm of relational 
equality to help “shape” or “control” distributive practices, it is evident that this 
standard permits a wide degree of latitude in what satisfies it. Let us focus on the 
issue of the distribution of income. The question is: what degree of income inequality 
is compatible with a society whose members stand in relations of equality? Miller 
offers two examples that appear to be indicative of his position on this. Drawing on 
his analysis of public opinion polls testing people’s attitudes to distributive justice, 
Miller argues that, in general, the empirical evidence shows that people believe 
current income differentials are too large (1992). So, he argues, “there is an 
opportunity to shape conceptions of wage fairness in the interests of social equality” 
(1998: 35). He suggests that people could be persuaded that the managing director of 
a company should earn no more than “three or four times” the wage of an unskilled 
worker in his company (1998: 35). Elsewhere, he recommends a maximum ratio of 
eight to one as the greatest degree of income inequality consistent with relational 
equality (1997: 94). Anderson appears to attribute less importance to narrowing 
income ratios, in the name of relational equality, than Miller. Citing Walzer,
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Anderson argues that the degree of acceptable income inequality depends on how 
easy it is to convert wealth into other advantages (1999a: 326). But, in principle, it 
seems, she sees no reason to impose the sort of income ceiling that Miller believes is 
required to preserve relational equality: “Although there is a spectacular wealth 
difference between my family and Bill Gates’ family, my family enjoys... a fully 
satisfactory level of prosperity.... I see no morally compelling reason to worry about 
wealth disparities between the prosperous middle class and super-rich, provided the 
super-rich don’t use their wealth to undermine democracy -  for example, by buying 
elections -  or to oppress other people” (1999b: 3). In suggesting that her ideal 
egalitarian society may include “super-rich” people, Anderson’s intuition of what 
level of income inequality is compatible with relational egalitarianism appears to 
conflict with Miller’s intuition. At the other end of the income spectrum, Anderson 
argues that her conception of the economy as a system of cooperative production 
wherein citizens “commission” one another to do the jobs they do, will mean that the 
meagre wages currently paid to low-skilled workers will not be publicly justifiable.
The ideal of relational equality will tend to recommend less income 
inequality than currently exists -  and, as Scheffler notes, this is not a point of 
disagreement with most luck egalitarians (2003a: 7n). But the range of income ratios 
that appear to be compatible with relational equality indicates that the “control” that 
ideal exercises over specific distributive inequalities is loose. Some egalitarians (e.g. 
Ameson 1995) believe this is grounds for rejecting the approach altogether.
However, I believe it points to the need for egalitarians who are attracted to this idea 
to come up with firmer guidelines on what degree of inequality (in income and other 
areas) is compatible with relational equality.77 Such guidelines will inevitably be 
context-dependent, as both Miller (1990: 96-96) and Anderson (1999b: 316-20) note, 
and there will be disagreements. But these disagreements will be no more intractable 
(and maybe less so) than disagreements about where to draw the line between choice
76 Indeed, some argue that Anderson’s democratic equality amounts to a form of sufficientarianism. I 
explore, and ultimately refute, this claim in chapter six.
77 Maureen Ramsay (2005b) makes a case for Britain’s New Labour government to impose a 
maximum wage tied to the current minimum wage. As of October 2005, the minimum wage is £4.85 
per hour. Calculated over a year, a fulltime minimum-wage earner would earn £10,088. Ramsay 
proposes the highest wage should be ten times this amount. Ramsay is also a critic of luck 
egalitarianism (2005a). It is interesting that proposals to put a ceiling on income inequality (as well as 
a floor) through wage-capping tend to come from those who distance themselves from the luck 
egalitarian approach.
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and chance in influencing people’s prospects and outcomes (Baker 1992: 106-07; 
Stark 2002).
A second objection holds that the appeal to the effects of inequality on 
relationships means that this approach ignores naked inequalities that obtain in the 
absence of any kind of relationship. Country A is overpopulated, resource-poor, and 
drought-stricken; many of its inhabitants are starving or malnourished. Country B 
has a small, prosperous population who enjoy the Suits of its abundant natural 
resources and temperate climate. Situated on opposite sides of the globe, Country 
A’s poverty is completely unrelated to Country B’s wealth as they have had no 
contact, for trade or other reasons. Egalitarians, the objection claims, should be 
moved by this bare inequality, but relational equality is not since no relations of 
domination or oppression obtain (Ameson 1995).
I agree that in the stated case, relational egalitarianism remains silent. And if 
many global and domestic inequalities were like this -  that is, springing fully formed 
from purely natural contingencies of resource-location -  then this would count as a 
strong reason for rejecting relational equality. The problem with the objection, 
however, is that it strains belief in an era of globalisation that the fate of any country 
could be completely unrelated to the fate of any other.78 The hypothetical example 
speaks to the reactions that egalitarians tend to have to cosmic inequalities, on the 
one hand, which is what the scenario speaks to, and inequalities caused by social 
factors, on the other. As egalitarians, we should, of course, respond to both types. 
Impatience with luck egalitarianism stems from its tendency to focus on cosmic 
inequalities at the expense of social ones, or perhaps more precisely, on its tendency 
to assimilate social inequalities to the category of cosmic inequality through the 
employment of the category ‘luck’ to name the effects of social phenomena such as 
class, race, and gender structures. Invocations of purely cosmic inequalities lose 
their impact and plausibility in the face of what we know to be a highly globally 
interdependent world (Seabright 2004). For an example such as the one above to 
continue to count against an approach to egalitarianism that includes relational
78 What also strains belief is Ameson’s claim that luck egalitarians have “placed at the centre of their 
concern” the “inequality of life prospects between someone bom into a family of poor peasants in 
Asia or African and someone bom into a family of wealthy notables in Europe or North America” 
(1995: 247). To my knowledge, all of the hypothetical examples employed in the main luck 
egalitarian texts are unmistakeably westerners, many of them apparently quite well-off since it is their 
inability to fund trips to Spain, champagne, or an education in fine Renaissance artwork that detains 
us, not poor peasants in Asia and Africa.
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equality as a norm, we will have to be able to convincingly demonstrate that the 
empirical assumptions hold.
3. R e l a t io n a l  E q u a l it y  a n d  C it iz e n sh ip
Anderson argues that a chief problem with luck egalitarianism is that it 
portrays generally unpleasant individuals: “beach bums, the lazy and irresponsible, 
people who can’t manage to entertain themselves with simple pleasures, religious 
fanatics;” “the stupid, talentless, and bitter people” (1999a: 288). Moreover, the 
literature fails to represent “actual egalitarian political movements” formed by 
women, blacks, gays and lesbians, the disabled; groups, that is, who have fought to 
become full citizens, with the legal, political, civil, and social rights and 
responsibilities that that status entails. In a more specific criticism, Anderson argues 
that luck egalitarians presuppose an individual citizen who is atomistic, egoistic, and 
self-sufficient (311).
Scheffler argues that Dworkin’s basic conception of equality is essentially a 
hierarchical one. He suggests that the opening example employed by Dworkin in his 
famous essay -  a father dividing his estate amongst his children -  does not depict a 
society of equals, but rather depicts one powerful party giving things to less powerful 
subjects. Dworkin brushes this off, accusing Scheffler of “deconstructive... critical 
maneuvers” (Dworkin 2003: 195). One’s reading of this example, and the 
significance to be attached to it, is somewhat immaterial anyway, since Scheffler has 
a broader, more thorough-going criticism that does not focus on one perhaps 
unrepresentative example. Scheffler argues that Dworkin’s abstract egalitarian 
principle itself (invoked repeatedly in his texts and therefore not dismissible as an 
unrepresentative example) also depicts hierarchy. According to Scheffler, Dworkin 
holds that “A ‘genuinely egalitarian’ community... is one that accepts the abstract 
principle that people should be treated as equals (or treated with equal concern) and 
whose ‘officials’ then administer social and political institutions in accordance with 
the best conception of what treatment as equals requires” (2003a: 37). Scheffler 
suggests that the ideal depicts government and governmental officials as the main 
actors or subjects who administer egalitarian justice to citizen-subjects. This seems 
troubling in itself, he suggests, but there is also a problem with what the abstract 
principle does not refer to or depict: “the ideal of equality applies to the relations
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among group members and not merely to the treatment of individuals by the group as 
a whole. A group may have policies that treat all of its members with equal concern, 
yet the relations among group members may continue to be structured by mutually 
recognized differences of rank or status” (2003b: 205). In sum, Scheffler maintains 
that Dworkin’s abstract egalitarian principle fails to grasp the whole meaning of the 
value of equality since it does not address interactions between citizens, refers only 
to government treatment o f  citizens, and in this vein, may even impart an 
understanding of equality as compatible with hierarchy and unequal power.
These criticisms simultaneously construct an alternative picture of the sorts of 
citizens that relational egalitarians want. First, of course, relational egalitarians want 
citizens who regard themselves as moral equals, not as persons ordered in some kind 
of implicit social hierarchy based on whether they possess the ‘right’ talents. As 
Miller puts it, quoting approvingly from Walzer, the ideal of social equality describes 
a ‘society of misters’: people use “common modes of address,” “shake hands rather 
than bow,” “choose their friends according to common tastes and interests rather than 
according to social rank” (Miller 1998: 31). Moreover, they want citizens to 
understand themselves as making claims on one another because of their 
fundamental equality as citizens (Anderson 1999a: 312; Scheffler 2003a: 22). 
According to Scheffler, for instance, equality as a political ideal “highlights the 
claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as 
citizens, without any need of a moralized accounting of the details of their personal 
circumstances” (2003a: 22).
In constructing an implicit account of what citizens are like in the ideal 
relational egalitarian society, some proponents go further than merely characterising 
citizens’ daily interactions to suggesting that the ideal citizen has a specifically 
public role and political consciousness. This feature seems strongest in Anderson’s 
account, weakest in Miller’s, with Scheffler falling somewhere in between.
Anderson describes a direct role for citizens in determining fair distributive shares. 
Citizens, not egalitarian planners guided by an ambition-sensitive, circumstance- 
insensitive distributive rule, decide what goods must be supplied collectively through 
a process of exchanging reasons and arguments. In Anderson’s terms, the goods that 
citizens agree to provide to one another socially must be the “object of collective 
willing” (1999a: 330), revealed through a democratic process: “Democracy is here
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understood as collective self-determination by means of open discussion among 
equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all” (1999a: 313).
For Miller, social equality emerges as a “by-product” of diverse performances 
in separate spheres, many of which are characterised by internal inequalities (1990). 
Miller’s vision evidently allows for greater variation in individuals’ political 
participation, including the possibility that some do not participate at all, whereas 
Anderson alludes to widespread or even universal citizen participation in decision­
making. Scheffler’s criticism of Dworkin’s conception of equality as an essentially 
‘administrative’ one implies that he believes an active role for citizens provides a 
better conception than one that constitutes citizens as passive recipients. Scheffler 
alludes to a vision of the citizen as an individual who is able and willing to play an 
active part in the discovery and negotiation of what are citizens’ basic needs; one 
who is not content to let officials on high determine the nature of these needs and to 
impose top-down policy solutions to fulfil them (2003a). However, unlike Anderson, 
Miller and Scheffler do not describe ways in which citizens will be actively involved 
in negotiating what citizens owe one another.
In general, then, relational egalitarians have engaged in a critique of the way 
luck egalitarians portray citizens. To a certain degree, this may have resonances with 
a civic republican critique of liberal citizenship. To take just one example, Mary 
Dietz argues that, “[ujnder liberalism, citizenship becomes less a collective, political 
activity than individual, economic activity -  the right to pursue one’s interests, 
without hindrance, in the marketplace” (Dietz 1998: 382). This criticism aptly 
summarises some of the points made by relational egalitarians. None of the three 
considered here, however, engages in a full-blooded civic republican-style critique of 
the liberal conception of citizenship which would represent a much more radical 
challenge to luck egalitarianism than we have seen here. Although there are 
resonances with this critique (in Anderson’s view especially), relational egalitarians 
do not follow civic republicans in suggesting that individuals’ political role is their 
most important identity. Less radically, relational egalitarians suggest that the luck 
egalitarian tradition tends to portray citizens as either incapable (because too passive 
or stupid) or uninterested (because too self-interested, and not public-minded 
enough) in engaging in public discourse about what citizens owe to one another, 
though this tendency is stronger in Anderson than in Miller or Scheffler.
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While it is clear that appeals to citizenship form an important strand of the 
relational egalitarian approach, what significance should be attached to this? Will 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994; 2000; see also Kymlicka 2002: chapter 7) 
argue that the 1990s saw a revival of the concept of citizenship. Several factors, both 
in real politics and in academic discourse, help to account for its new popularity. In 
real life, they suggest, the interest can be attributed at least in part to the fact that 
modem societies are increasingly culturally diverse. How might our standard 
notions of citizenship have to change in light of claims for minority rights and 
multiculturalism? In the philosophical literature, an important contributing factor is 
the “widely accepted” view that the attention to, and design of, just institutions 
(Rawls’s so-called ‘basic structure’) must be supplemented by an account of the 
“qualities and dispositions of the citizens who operate within these institutions and 
procedures” (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 6).
On one hand, Kymlicka and Norman credit the surge of interest in the 
concept of citizenship with opening up many new avenues of inquiry and debate. It 
has inspired, for example, a great deal of work on the concepts of deliberative 
democracy, civic virtue, and the accommodation of minority cultures within liberal 
societies. On the other hand, they argue, the academic literature concerned with 
citizenship rarely clarifies what is at stake between different views. Each school of 
thought tends to promote the sorts of policies with which it is traditionally 
associated: “the left favored democratizing the welfare state long before they 
adopted the language of citizenship, just as feminists favoured day care and the New 
Right opposed the welfare state. It is not clear whether adopting the perspective of 
citizenship really leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiar 
perspectives of justice and democracy” (1994: 368). Furthermore, Kymlicka and 
Norman suggest that concrete policy proposals are seldom forthcoming from this 
literature in any event. They assert, “Much recent work on citizenship virtues seems 
quite hollow. In the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate ways to 
promote or enforce good citizenship, many works... reduce to a platitude: namely, 
society would be better if the people in it were nicer and more thoughtful” (1994: 
369).79
79 In a reprise of this essay (see Kymlicka and Norman 2000), the authors repeat this conclusion but 
appear to distance themselves from it. They suggest that a “cynic” might reach that conclusion, and 
note in a footnote that this was an “uncharitable conclusion” on their part (Kymlicka and Norman
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To a certain extent, this verdict applies to the relational equality objection. It 
is all very well to say that equality as a relational ideal recuperates an aspect of the 
meaning of equality that is lost or ignored by luck egalitarians. But what practical 
import does this ideal have? Kymlicka argues that it is “obviously impossible to 
compel civility between citizens in less formal settings -  e.g. whether whites smile or 
scowl at an Asian family in the neighbourhood park” (2002: 301). It may be that this 
is precisely the sort of thing to which relational egalitarians gesture when they appeal 
to a “society of misters.” As Miller writes, “In objecting to inequality, we are 
objecting to social relations that we find unseemly -  they involve incomprehension 
and mistrust between rich and poor, for instance, or arrogance on one side and 
forelock-tugging on the other” (1998: 24). Yet what can we really do, consistent 
with protecting basic freedoms of association and expression, to prevent unpleasant 
interactions between citizens? The issue is not, presumably, that luck egalitarians 
and their relational equality critics disagree about a principle of non-discrimination. 
Both will agree that it is illegitimate for government to discriminate against citizens 
on the basis of race, gender, and other morally irrelevant characteristics. This 
prohibition has gradually been extended beyond government to include civil society 
as well. As Kymlicka notes, “the obligation to treat people as equal citizens now 
applies to the most common everyday decisions of individuals. It is no longer 
permissible for businesses to refuse to hire black employees, or serve black 
customers, or to segregate their black employees and customers” (2002: 301). Here, 
too, luck egalitarians and their relational equality critics will surely be united in 
approval of this extension of the norm of non-discrimination. The point might be 
that the relational equality view is trying to extend this even further, and it is unclear 
how that should be done, consistent with basic liberties, and whether these efforts 
will, in any event, be effective.
While I find myself in agreement with Kymlicka and Norman that, 
sometimes, appeals to citizenship seem toothless, as applied to the authors under 
consideration here, this is not entirely fair. It is more plausible, in my view, to 
understand the relational equality view as finding in the citizenship literature
2000: 7). However, it should also be noted that Kymlicka retains the passage in the latest edition of 
his Contemporary Political Philosophy (2002: 316). Thus it is not clear how much he, at least, means 
to distance himself from this cynical evaluation of the debates. Having been reproduced at least three 
times, it seems reasonable to hold that this is Kymlicka and Norman’s genuine evaluation, cynical 
though it may be.
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something valuable and interesting that is missing from the luck egalitarian discourse. 
For example, considering the passages from Anderson, Scheffler, and Miller quoted 
earlier, it is clear that the ideal world imagined by relational egalitarians speaks to 
people interacting on a daily basis, as citizen-strangers, whereas the ideal world 
imagined by luck egalitarians contains few if any references to this sort of interaction. 
As noted in chapter one, the individualistic nature of the examples employed by luck 
egalitarians is striking. Scheffler charges that “Dworkin gives no general 
characterization at all of the social relations among the participants” (Scheffler 
2003a: 36). A review of equality of resources largely confirms this. The auction 
conjures up images of a group of people bargaining for bundles of resources, which 
they will then take away and use individually, according to their own wishes.
Dworkin suggests that individuals under equality of resources are economically 
interdependent. The immigrants might, for example, come together occasionally to 
trade items; some apparently have a particular fondness for tomatoes. But, on the 
whole, they are portrayed as detached from one another, avoiding discussing their 
common life together even though “any likely rescue is many years away” (Dworkin 
1981b: 285). The same point applies to the versions articulated by Cohen and 
Ameson. The citizen who emerges from luck egalitarian accounts is problematic, 
mainly because the individual as citizen, rather than as private possessor of bizarre 
tastes and consumer of goods, is largely absent. On this reading, that strand of the 
relational egalitarian perspective that appeals to citizenship should be understood, 
more modestly, as an attempt to bring the citizenship and egalitarian literatures more 
explicitly into dialogue with one another. This is an area where those who are 
critical of the luck egalitarian approach could fruitfully concentrate their efforts.
4. D e m o c r a c y  a n d  E q u a l it y  o f  R e s o u r c e s
Part of Scheffler’s criticism of equality of resources as administrative, statist, 
and hierarchical focuses on Dworkin’s formulation of political equality. Scheffler 
does not go into much detail about the conceptions of democracy that Dworkin 
outlines -  noting only that Dworkin’s preferred conception allows for “equality of
80 Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality,’ first published in 1987, in University o f  San 
Francisco Law Review, vol. 22, 1987, pp. 1-30. References here are to Sovereign Virtue 2000, pp. 
184-210.
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impact” but rejects “equality of influence” -  before issuing this verdict of the essay: 
“the upshot is that Dworkin’s ideal of equality does not require or even permit an 
equal distribution of power; and the kind of equal distribution of resources that it 
does require is not incompatible with social hierarchy or even, as he himself says, 
with ‘benevolent tyranny”’ (Scheffler 2003a: 36-7). In other words, Scheffler 
suggests that the conception of democracy that emerges contributes yet more 
evidence of the overall approach’s tacit acceptance of hierarchy as compatible with 
egalitarian justice. Rather than ‘hierarchy,’ the better term here might be ‘anti­
democratic,’ though Scheffler does not use that term.
Scheffler?s discussion of Dworkin’s conception of political equality is too 
brief to justify the strong criticism with which it concludes. In my view, this is 
something of a missed opportunity to examine a question that has yet to attract much 
interest amongst luck egalitarians and their critics: namely, what is the connection
O 1
between luck egalitarianism and democracy? Do the various versions of luck 
egalitarianism address the democratic requirements and features of an egalitarian 
society, and if so, what are the results of this? In what remains, I propose to take 
some initial steps on this largely unexplored path by using Dworkin’s essay on 
political equality as my focus. More fleshed out, Dworkin’s conception of 
democracy has obvious attractions, which are not done justice by Scheffler. 
Ultimately, however, I argue that it is not fully satisfactory since it appears to be 
compatible with the political marginalisation of some social groups.
Dworkin argues that there are two main conceptions of democracy, which he 
labels the detached and dependent conceptions. The detached conception holds that 
each citizen should have the same degree of control or influence over a political 
outcome as every other citizen. He argues that most Americans favour the detached 
conception. Intuitively, it is very appealing. The hugely disproportionate influence 
in political affairs that, say, a Rockefeller enjoys provokes cries of indignation and 
unfairness from the American public, and the detached conception of democracy 
seems to provide an explanation for this reaction (195). Democratic legitimacy is 
deeply threatened when some people have much more control than others over 
political decision-making.
81 To my knowledge, Harry Brighouse (1996) has authored the only essay that specifically addresses 
luck egalitarianism and democracy, and the connections between the two.
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However, a problem that the detached conception immediately confronts is 
that some people care deeply about politics while others do not, and some people 
turn out to be good at political activities such as speech-making while others prefer 
to develop other talents such as gardening. The detached conception would appear to 
require that we equalise people in an area to which some people attach great 
importance, but others attach little or none. In order to ensure that everyone has 
equal influence or control, it seems that ‘political animals’ will have to be suppressed 
somehow. Dworkin argues that the detached conception regards the “greater 
influence of politically motivated or experienced or charismatic people as a defect in 
political organisation, and take[s] whatever steps [it] could to eliminate or reduce it 
(195-6). This view seems to entail suppressing or prohibiting democratic activities, 
such as pamphletting, signature-gathering and lobbying, that most of us approve of 
and think of as essential to a healthy, mature democracy.
What this suggests is that our indignation and sense of unfairness about 
Rockefellers is not directed at unequal political influence per se. Rather, it is 
directed at the unequal political influence that money buys. Imagine a society in 
which everyone has equal wealth. If some people in this society have greater 
political influence, it derives from other sources besides money, such as charisma or 
wisdom -  sources we do not find objectionable. Dworkin suggests that we care 
about people’s level of political influence today because we know that this inequality 
is an effect of unfairness in economic distribution. But, considered on its own, 
independent of economic injustice, we have no reason to expect or endorse equality 
in political power. Political influence is simply a good in the vast array of goods in 
the world in which people innocently differ in tastes and preferences. In other words, 
according to Dworkin, one reason we should reject a principle of equal political 
influence is that it is not our real concern, but rather parasitic on our concern that 
unequal wealth buys unequal political influence. If some people happen to have 
more power than other people, we should not jump to the conclusion that there is any 
unfairness.
Furthermore, if we turn our attention to outcomes, a conception of democracy 
defined as equality of political influence looks even less attractive. Suppose a 
political community faces a zoning decision. It can choose to zone a particular house
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as a refuge for battered women or as a nursery for children.82 Thirty percent of the 
community favours zoning for the refuge. Seventy per cent are opposed because 
they worry about the effects it will have on the community -  it might, for example, 
bring the violent ex-partners of the refuge’s occupants into the area. The majority 
does not have a strong preference for the nursery, because the neighbourhood has 
many nurseries -  but they certainly do not want the refuge. Among the minority who 
favour the refuge are some individuals who are passionately committed to this option. 
On the detached conception, the likely outcome will be that the neighbourhood 
decides in favour of the nursery and against the refuge since it forbids those who are 
strongly in favour of the refuge from using whatever talents they have for persuading 
the others to come around to their way of thinking. The detached conception of 
democracy supplies an input test for political equality, but not an outcome test 
sensitive to whether or not the results of an equal political process treat citizens 
equally.
Dworkin argues that we should thus look for a different way to conceptualise 
political equality. Part of his preferred conception, the dependent version, has 
already been hinted at: it conceives of political equality as interlocking with an ideal 
of economic equality. Dworkin argues that “it is unjust that some people have as 
much money as a Rockefeller because that violates the distributive principles of 
equality... and the disproportionate influence their wealth gives them is a particularly 
deplorable consequence of the injustice because it allows them, among other things, 
to perpetuate and multiply their unfair advantages” (195). The dependent conception 
of democracy is thus conceptually linked to an ideal of equality of resources in the 
economy. If background unfairness in economic power is eliminated, we should not 
object to inequalities in political power since these will only be a function of 
innocent differences such as a zeal for politics or talent for public speaking. 
Inequalities in political power traceable to these sources are acceptable from an 
egalitarian point of view, but inequalities traceable to economic inequalities which 
are anyway condemned by equality of resources are not.
Linking political equality to equality of resources in the economy ensures 
what Dworkin calls the ‘distributive goals’ of democracy are met. But democracy 
also has ‘participatory goals’ that need to be addressed. Participatory goals refer to
82 This is not Dworkin’s example, although his essay does contain a hypothetical example of a 
community deciding whether to “build a new sports center or a new road system” (204).
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how citizens conceive of themselves as political agents and whether or not they 
perceive themselves as politically effective. Since the dependent conception 
approves of unequal political influence that derives from unobjectionable sources, 
someone might object that this could lead to a world where a few highly motivated 
individuals effectively drown out the voices of the majority of citizens by their sheer 
(and legitimate) enthusiasm, and not because they have an unfair monopoly on 
broadcast media. Patterns could develop where the participatory goals of the society 
are endangered because some citizens are extremely active and influential while the 
rest gradually subside, feeling marginalized and ineffective. Dworkin argues that 
“We do not engage in politics as moral agents unless we sense that what we do can 
make a difference, and an adequate political process must strive, against formidable 
obstacles, to preserve that potential power for everyone. It must, that is, insure a 
degree of political leverage for each citizen” (202). Anticipating that some may 
wonder if he is trying to smuggle an ideal of equal political influence (already 
rejected as part of the detached conception) into his own preferred account, Dworkin 
emphasises that his conception argues for “the opportunity for some influence -  
enough to make political effort something other than pointless -  rather than on the 
opportunity to have the same influence as anyone else has... That is a threshold 
notion, and nothing in it takes equality of influence to be an ideal toward which we 
should strive” (203). Concretely, Dworkin recommends that participatory goals of 
democracy can be “served only by providing everyone enough access to influential 
media, if he or she wishes, to give each person a fair chance to influence others if he 
or she can” (202).
To sum up, Dworkin argues that input and output conditions define the 
dependent conception of political equality (186). Input conditions concern the power 
that private citizens have, relative to one another, to influence public affairs, and 
Dworkin’s position is that everyone is entitled to a threshold amount of political 
power, such as access to influential media, if they want it. Output conditions refer
83 It should also be noted that the dependent conception requires equality of impact within voting 
districts. This is the uncontroversial principle of ‘one person, one vote’ of democracies everywhere 
which extend universal suffrage to adult citizens. In addition to this, the dependent conception 
“presumes equality of impact across” districts (203). This refers to the fact that in political practice in 
the US (and elsewhere), unequal political impact across districts is permitted, in the sense that the 
ratio of voters to elected representative is not identical from district to district. Although a perfectly 
identical ratio is the symbolic standard -  it symbolises the idea that all citizens have exactly equal 
standing -  for practical and historic reasons, it must actually be flexible enough to allow “deviations” 
(200). Practically, maintaining an identical voter-to-representative ratio in all electoral districts is
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to the substantive outcomes of decisions taken by elected representatives, asking 
whether or not these treat all citizens with equal concern.
Dworkin’s democratic conception seems unlikely to impress someone who 
does not accept that equality of resources describes or delivers a fair economic 
environment. I have suggested elsewhere reasons why we should doubt that the 
economic distribution recommended by equality of resources should be regarded as 
just from an egalitarian point of view. For example, equality of resources appears to 
do little to address income inequalities related to the valuations currently attached to 
different occupations, apparently carrying into the theory intact the wage inequalities 
of our own society. Although this is not a point I have argued, Scheffler suggests 
that equality of resources would shield from taxation lottery winnings provided 
people had equal chance to exercise this sort of option luck. Scheffler argues that 
this implication departs from the prevailing political morality (2003a). The point is, 
if these economic inequalities are not regarded as just, then the unequal political 
influence that may flow from them is correspondingly not acceptable.
However, this objection merely returns us to disagreements about Dworkin’s 
conception of economic fairness. Are there any reasons independent of its reliance 
on equality of resources to object to the democratic ideal? To answer this, we 
assume that the economic arrangements generated by equality of resources are 
perfectly fair according to one’s favourite vision. Despite this, intuitively, it still 
seems problematic if I exercise a hundred times more political influence than you do 
over a political decision. If this disparity were repeated across many political 
decisions, our uneasiness would likely increase. The intuition seems to be related to 
the minimalist notion of political power guaranteed to citizens in Dworkin’s 
conception. For reasons of the participatory goals of democracy, everyone should 
enjoy a minimum level of political power -  for example, through guaranteed access 
to the media -  if they want it. As he notes, this is a threshold notion of political 
power: citizens should have access to enough political power so that their efforts are 
not “pointless.” That my share of political influence can be just more than pointless
impossible as people migrate, die and reach voting age. Historically, unequal ratios -  therefore 
unequal political impact across districts -  is permitted without thereby calling into question our equal 
concern for all citizens. Giving inner-city citizens somewhat more impact than they otherwise would 
have, for example, is compatible with the abstract ideal of symbolic equality, even though it is 
incompatible with perfect numerical equality of impact across districts (201).
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but acceptable from the point of view of Dworkin’s conception delivers a rather 
skimpy notion of democratic equality.
It is interesting that luck egalitarians typically place the mantle of 
‘egalitarian’ on those who favour (some form of) equality in material and economic 
goods. They tend to be severely critical of theorists they suspect of promoting 
sufficiency or threshold arguments in this domain. Dworkin asks: “Would it be 
enough for a community to secure a minimal level of nutrition, housing, and medical 
care for everyone, and then to take no further interest in whether some citizens have 
vastly more wealth than others?” (2000: 2). He answers the question himself in his 
reply to Scheffler’s criticisms: “It is hardly enough to say (although many political 
philosophers apparently think it is enough) that society owes everyone care for their 
most basic needs, but not economic equality” (2003: 198; see also Ameson 1995). 
Despite this disdain for a threshold approach in some domains, Dworkin believes that 
a threshold level of political influence is acceptable. This seems out of step with a 
more encompassing understanding of egalitarianism. As Harry Brighouse remarks, 
Egalitarian political movements (as opposed to philosophers) have not 
distinguished the demand for more democracy and that for more 
material equality as separate demands, only one of which justified their 
designation as egalitarians. Yet most contemporary egalitarian 
philosophers have either ignored democracy as a dimension of equality, 
or have claimed that it has only a dependent or instrumental role: that it 
is desirable only insofar as it serves the independent requirements of 
egalitarian justice (1996: 118).
Democracy is one vitally important way that we express to one another our moral 
equality and recognise one another as equally qualified to participate in our 
collective self-government (Dahl 1989). This expressive function of democracy 
seems to be eroded if some citizens regularly enjoy much more control than others 
over our collective affairs, no matter how politically innocent are the sources of that 
inequality. Dworkin argues that “the best form of democracy is whatever form is 
most likely to produce the substantive decisions and results that treat all members of 
the community with equal concern” (186). This instrumental justification for 
democratic government does not accord any inherent value to democratic 
participation, and this seems to short-change it as a value.
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This is still to assess Dworkin’s dependent conception of democracy from the 
perspective of individuals’ fates, however. When we shift to a group-based 
perspective, another worry comes into view. At one point in his discussion of the 
detached conception, Dworkin presents this scenario: “Imagine a society in which 
economic, social and cultural discrimination against women has been removed. If 
the average power of men and women is unequal in such a society -  as it might be, in 
either direction -  would that fact, just in itself, count as a defect in social 
organization?” (196). As Dworkin notes, this image is supposed to “tempt [readers] 
away from the ideal of equality of power” (196). But for me, the opposite happens. 
Would Dworkin be as comfortable with the scenario if we substituted ‘blacks’ and 
‘whites’ for ‘women’ and ‘men’ here? His conception of democratic equality seems 
particularly unfortunate when it is viewed not from the perspective of individual 
variations in influence (derived, as his analysis invites us to think, from innocent 
differences in people’s taste and talents for politics), but rather from the perspective 
of social groups, a perspective Dworkin himself invokes in the passage. He 
effectively suggests that his conception of democracy is compatible with the 
marginalisation or exclusion of social groups from political power, provided the 
substantive outcomes of the political process treat individuals with equal concern.
Many and good arguments have been advanced for the notion that social 
groups should enjoy an equal or proportional share of power in democratic societies. 
Many of these arguments have issued from feminist quarters.84 This is unsurprising 
since, as Dworkin’s example inadvertently reminds us, many people have regarded 
the near total exclusion of women from formal democratic power as perfectly 
compatible with an understanding of women and men, individually, as political 
equals. I am not suggesting that Dworkin believes women’s real under­
representation in politics is acceptable. However, the standard liberal view with 
regard to democracy -  a view that Dworkin’s remarks exemplify -  is that, provided 
unjust background inequalities in economic resources are rectified, then a gender (or 
racial) imbalance in who our representatives are is perfectly acceptable. Thus, the 
liberal approach forecloses thinking about political inequalities in terms of the 
relationships between social groups, rather than between individuals. It is committed 
to a view that, absent background injustice, gender disparities in political
84 Key contributions to this debate include Jane Mansbridge (1999); Phillips (1991a; 1993; 1995;
1998; 2004); Melissa Williams (1998; 2000); and Iris Marion Young (1990; 1998; 2001);
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representation are acceptable, whereas for feminists, such disparities are indicative of 
historical and contemporary unjust background inequalities between women and men. 
As Phillips puts it, “Failing some weird stretch of DNA that attaches sex and race to 
the capacity to make speeches or deliberate on public affairs, the only explanation for 
under-representation is that something is blocking the way. At this point, it is not 
hugely significant whether the obstacle is a male conspiracy to exclude women or the 
sexual division of labour: whichever it is, there is some illegitimate process of 
exclusion” (2004: 8). In this view, gender equality in political representation 
becomes a litmus test for equality in general since feminists believe it is not 
primarily innocent differences in taste and talents for politics that keep women out, 
and propel (mainly white, in this country) men into the halls of power, but rather 
complex and deep-seated structures of inequality.
There is a huge debate around the arguments for gender and racial equality in 
political representation, and I do not intend to enter this debate here. Feminists who 
argue for equal gender representation are well aware of the difficulties with this 
position, and frequently do as good a job articulating the significant objections to it 
as they do the arguments in favour. Rather than getting into substantive reasons that 
are traded for either supporting or opposing equal gender representation in 
government, my aim here is simply to point to the debate itself as representing one 
promising way in which the relational equality view can be taken forward. Miller, 
Anderson, and Scheffler have argued that luck egalitarianism neglects an 
understanding of equality as an ideal concerning relationships between citizens. 
Although they develop the objection in some interesting ways, I suggest that one of 
the most promising elaborations of the notion of relational equality has been virtually 
neglected by its proponents. If we focus on democracy, the relational equality ideal 
easily points to one of the most glaring forms of contemporary relational inequality: 
the inequalities of political power between women and men, and between minorities 
and whites.
However, reaching this conclusion produces a tension with my starting place.
I have suggested that the relational equality perspective attempts to shift attention 
away from questions of distribution and state-led egalitarian initiatives and towards 
relationships between citizens. But we have now arrived at an argument for the fair 
distribution of political power. This tension cannot be fully resolved here. While I 
believe that ‘mirror’ or proportional representation is a constitutive element of a truly
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egalitarian society, you do not need to agree with me on that specific issue to accept 
the more general point of my analysis: discussions about the nature of the 
democratic systems in an ideal egalitarian society are largely absent in the luck 
equality literature. This seems problematic since our democratic arrangements are 
one of the most important ways available to us as citizens to express our belief in our 
fundamental equality. The existence of a permanent political underclass, as much as 
an economic underclass, is incontrovertible proof that our society is not an 
egalitarian one. We should take a direct interest in which citizens tend to hold power, 
and which citizens do not. Even if the radical argument for proportional 
representation is left for another day, there is still plenty of room to explore how an 
egalitarian society can be made a more politically inclusive one.
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Chapter  Six
Sufficiency , Priority , and  Pluralistic E galitarianism
Pr ev io u s  chapters  h a v e  established the legitimacy of at least some of the 
criticisms of luck egalitarianism, while suggesting areas of ambiguity and potential 
development. But there is an important objection -  voiced especially by Ameson -  
that the alternatives offered by some critics of luck egalitarianism collapse into a 
non-egalitarian sufficiency view. I address this objection in this chapter, and argue 
that the alternative conceptions presented by Anderson and Martha Nussbaum are 
best understood not as sufficientarianism, but as a pluralistic egalitarianism that 
upholds an attractive political morality superior to Ameson’s prioritarianism.
1. Eg a lita r ia n ism  v e r su s  Su fficiency
Harry Frankfurt’s essay (1987) on sufficiency is widely regarded as a major 
reference point in the debates (Clayton and Williams 1999: 460; Crisp 2003: 762; 
Kekes 1997: 667; Phillips 1999: 6; Rosenberg 1995; Temkin 2003: 65).85 Frankfurt 
construes sufficiency specifically as a doctrine about money, whose central principle 
holds that “what is morally important with respect to money is for everyone to have 
enough” (1987: 22). This contrasts with egalitarianism, which he defines as the 
“doctrine that it is desirable for everyone to have the same amounts of income and of 
wealth (for short, ‘money’)” (1987: 21). The main aim in Frankfurt’s analysis is to 
show that the reasons often given for supporting egalitarianism actually turn out to be 
reasons for supporting sufficientarianism instead. This leads Frankfurt to conclude 
that the doctrine of sufficiency is morally superior to egalitarianism. He ends with an 
attempt to articulate the notion of having “enough” money.
85 Pre-dating Frankfurt’s contribution is JR Lucas’s (1971), who takes a similarly dim view of 
egalitarianism, particularly because he believes it will require or induce a dull uniformity: “We regard 
ourselves as individuals, each one different, each one a whole person, knobbly, not fitting exactly into 
any mould: and we do not like it if, in the name of Equality or anything else, we are wrapped up and 
put in a carton and labelled, indistinguishably from a lot of others” (1971: 151). I disagree with 
Lucas’s point about the implications of egalitarianism, but I like his prose.
86 It should be noted that Frankfurt’s account involves a double oversimplification, equating first 
‘money egalitarianism’ with ‘economic egalitarianism,’ and then the latter with egalitarianism in 
general. This causes him to adopt the false view that controversial utilitarian assumptions that ground 
welfarist versions of equality -  such as the principle of diminishing marginal utility -  appear in all 
other versions. While I do not take up these aspects of Frankfurt’s analysis, see Rosenberg (1995) for 
a discussion.
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At least three significant objections to egalitarianism can be distinguished in 
Frankfurt’s critique. First, he complains that egalitarianism is alienating. It invites 
people constantly to compare their situation with that of their neighbours, thereby 
diverting a “person’s attention away from discovering -  within his experience of 
himself and of his life -  what he himself really cares about and what will actually 
satisfy him” (23). Given people’s variety, there is not one level of wealth that is 
right for all. Accordingly, people should instead turn their attention inwards, and ask 
themselves what truly matters to them, and form their “economic goals” (23) on that 
basis, rather than on the basis of what the Joneses have. Frankfurt’s second objection, 
known as the argument from ‘egalitarian confusion’ (Ameson 2002: 180) says that 
egalitarians’ real concern for sufficiency masquerades as concern for economic 
equality. We think gaps in wealth between very poor and middle class families are 
bad, but an identical-sized gap between rich and super-rich families does not concern 
us. Ultimately, it is absolute, not relative, poverty that matters. He singles out 
Ronald Dworkin as making this mistake, arguing that what Dworkin “actually 
considers to be morally important” is not that some “Americans have smaller shares 
than others” but rather that the “members of this minority do not earn decent 
Iivings”(Frankfurt 1987: 33-34, italics in original). The third objection says that 
egalitarianism is fetishistic, in that it focuses on means to ends, rather than on ends 
themselves. Again, what ultimately matters morally is how well people’s lives go, 
not the amount of money they have. Frankfurt aims this criticism directly at Rawls’s 
primary goods metric of equality (41-43). According to Frankfurt, even though 
Rawls acknowledges that primary goods are only means to ends, he nevertheless
on
insists that the rational thing is for a person to want as much of them as possible.
87 For a response that defends Rawlsian egalitarianism against this criticism, see Robert Goodin 
(1987). Goodin argues that Frankfurt conflates money fetishism and equality-of-money fetishism.
The first is bad since money is simply a means to ends, so fixating on money for money’s sake is 
fetishistic. But money is a necessary means to ends. People will want to have some idea of the 
absolute amount of money they need to satisfy their ends. In addition, people will also need to know 
how their bank account compares with their neighbours’ accounts. “It may well be none of my 
business how many widgets others have, or how well off they are in consequence. But it certainly is 
my business how much money others have with which to bid against me for widgets. The size o f their 
bankrolls relative to my own will determine how many widgets I can purchase, and ex hypothesi those 
widgets are required in order for me to do something that morally matters” (1987: 46-47). Thus, 
Goodin argues, it turns out that we do need to interest ourselves in comparative wealth. “Fixing your 
eye on some ultimate end, and ignoring altogether oncoming traffic, is hardly a recommended way of 
arriving at your chosen destination,” he remarks (1987: 47). For his part, Dworkin readily agrees that 
we ultimately care about how people’s lives go. Nevertheless, he insists, we should not make the 
mistake of skipping over comparisons of resources and move straight to welfare, since that view 
encounters problems (2000: chapter 7).
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This ignores the fact that money and things can be anxiety-inducing for people, 
insofar as it requires them to spend “more time and effort in managing [them] and in 
making decisions concerning [their] use” (42). This leads back around to Frankfurt’s 
first thought that the pursuit of equality causes people to become distracted from 
focusing on their personal needs and desires for a fulfilling life.
These criticisms then lead into Frankfurt’s attempt to construct an account of 
sufficiency, which depends on defining when someone is content with what they 
have. He notices there are two general cases when it would make sense to say that a 
person is content with the amount of money he has. In the first case, the person has 
enough money when he is suffering “no substantial distress or/satisfaction” and is 
generally content with his life. In the second case, the person is not content with his 
life, but money would make no difference, since the source of his unhappiness 
cannot be fixed by more money -  he may, for instance, be unlucky in love. Frankfurt 
then elaborates on the first case. The account he gives is complex, but the basic idea 
is that I have ‘enough’ when I have no “active interest” in getting more (39). This 
level of sufficiency is consistent with my knowing that I could have more, even with 
my knowing that my life might be better if I had more (39). The key ingredient is 
that I am content with what I have and do not have an interest in striving for more. 
Frankfurt anticipates that some will find this strange, and will wonder what kinds of 
reasons a person could give for eschewing having more, when they in fact know that 
they could have more (40). He argues that such a person has a very good reason to 
hand: “he is satisfied with the amount o f satisfaction he already has. Being satisfied 
with the way things are is unmistakably an excellent reason for having no great 
interest in changing them” (40, italics in original). Frankfurt allows that some may 
think such a person is dull and unambitious, but he counters this with the thought that 
contentment with what I have “may be based upon a conscientiously intelligent and 
penetrating evaluation of the circumstances of [my] life” (41).
A complication in the general doctrine of sufficiency that Frankfurt addresses 
but does not resolve concerns the issue of ‘being content with’ my wealth. He notes 
that sufficiency can include two variants: it can say that I have sufficient money 
when I declare myself content with my lot; or that I have sufficient when it would be 
reasonable for me to be content with my lot. Frankfurt notes that this is a “very 
important question” but then proceeds in the rest of the analysis to drop the latter 
interpretation (38). The two variants are likely to yield very different distributive
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outcomes, and the first one, which makes sufficiency entirely subjective, is open to 
the expensive tastes problem, among others. It is unfortunate that Frankfurt does not 
make more of an attempt to settle this question in relation to his own position.
One point made by Frankfurt that writers from various points on the political 
spectrum concede is the fact that once someone has a reached a certain level of 
wealth, more money on top of that is counterproductive. Frankfurt makes this point 
in the language of distraction, noting how the drive to keep up with my wealthier 
neighbours can become an unhealthy obsession, preventing me from imagining my 
own ideal life on my own terms. Citing Aristotle, Martha Nussbaum agrees, 
suggesting that there is a point of negative returns on wealth: “after a certain ‘limit,’ 
wealth becomes counterproductive, a distraction from things that matter” (2000:
Q Q
86). A second point that some egalitarians concede is that the gap between the rich 
and super-rich, or even between the comfortably well-off and the rich, is not morally 
troublesome, or at least, not particularly urgent. For example, Anne Phillips ventures 
that the “images of poverty in the midst of wealth are what give greatest urgency to 
egalitarian politics, and... these images are far more compelling than the fact that 
some people drive Jaguars while others make do with the cheapest of Fords” (1999: 
62; see also Anderson 1999a; 1999b). On this view, it can seem a bit disingenuous 
of egalitarians to arrive at a moral concern for the poor via otiose notions of 
inequality, when we can get to the same place directly by saying we should attend to 
the poor.
So Frankfurt’s admonition that we shouldn’t ‘mind the gap’ is validated to a 
certain extent. However, we can agree with the claim that gaps between the rich and 
super-rich are not bad without being compelled to agree that nothing besides 
“avoiding grim conditions of life” (Ameson 2002: 196) matters morally. The part 
that Frankfurt gets right is that one reason justifying forced transfers from rich to 
poor is that the lives of the poor are (usually) just plain bad. But such transfers can 
be grounded on a prioritarian principle of justice as well as a sufficientarian one, and
88 A different counterproductivity argument against egalitarianism is to be found in a critique by Jan 
Narveson, who says it is bad to redistribute money from rich to poor since the rich are obviously the 
productive people in society, and the poor are self-evidently unproductive: “Forced transfers from rich 
to poor, from capitalists to proletarians, will worsen the lot of the poor even as it decreases the wealth 
of the rich. Not only is egalitarianism biased, but the particular people against whom it is biased are 
the productive... It is not too much to say, even, that egalitarianism is a conspiracy against those it 
claims to be trying to help” (Narveson 1998: 92, italics in original). As provocative as it is, I do not 
intend to take up this contention here.
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the former has certain advantages that sufficiency lacks. This, anyway, is part of the 
case that Ameson develops in favour of a prioritarian approach to justice. But before 
considering those issues, we should clarify in what ways egalitarianism is better than 
sufficiency, where both doctrines are considered in their basic forms.
Whether on weaker equality of opportunity versions (e.g. Jacobs 2004) or 
stronger equality of outcome accounts (e.g. Phillips 2004), egalitarianism provides a 
benchmark defining standards of fair and equitable treatment for all persons. This 
seems particularly important in areas where people are still forming their ideas about 
what they want out of life, including their “economic goals.” So, for example, a 
principle of equality in primary and secondary education is uncontroversial in liberal 
societies. We do not think it is okay if white children get Cadillac educations and 
black children get ‘good enough’ educations -  say, educations that make them 
functionally literate and numerate but skimp on music, physical education, and art.89 
We think that educating children to an equal level is intrinsically as well as 
instrumentally important since it is a good that conditions access to many other 
goods in life. So far as is possible (and taking into account children with special 
needs), everyone ought to get roughly the same as a matter of justice, and it is not 
enough to say that some people require only threshold or basic educations.
While the strengths of egalitarianism are showcased through educational 
inequalities, it should be noted that this might have less force against a more complex 
form of sufficiency. As Adam Swift notes, the following demands can emerge from 
a sufficiency position: “‘All our children have a right to a roof over their heads, three 
meals a day, decent health care, and an education that will prepare them to 
participate in the political life of their society and equip them with the skills they 
need to compete in the job market”’ (Swift 2001: 121). There is a tendency to 
assume that sufficiency doctrines always take the form of setting monetary 
thresholds (this seems to be the presumption, for example, in Ameson 2002). This 
might be due to the influence of Frankfurt’s contribution, which is couched explicitly 
in terms of money sufficiency. But, as we shall see later, other theorists favour 
thresholds that are not only monetary. This different emphasis changes the balance 
between egalitarianism and sufficiency.
89 For an interesting recent account of race-based educational inequalities in New York City, see 
Jonathan Kozol (2005). Never mind ‘frills’ such as art and music, Kozol documents the way public 
schools dominated by black children frequently do not even have adequate toilet facilities.
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Another way equality is better than sufficiency is with regard to the problem 
of deformed or adaptive preferences. By insisting that everyone should have equal 
resources or money, egalitarianism detours around such problematic figures as the 
‘submissive housewife’ and Tiny Tim -  individuals, that is, who settle for much less 
than their due. Sufficiency, on the other hand, might take these individuals’ 
declarations that they are ‘content,’ that what they have is ‘good enough,’ at face 
value. It might then seem indifferent to the deprivations associated with gender 
hierarchy and other entrenched inequalities. Of course, this picture is too simple. 
There is little consensus amongst egalitarians about the bearing of people’s expressed 
desires on just distributions (see chapters one through three). As has repeatedly 
emerged through my discussion, there are also serious doubts that egalitarianism -  
including specifically its dominant luck egalitarian variants -  is properly sensitive to 
deformed preferences either.
What does seem uncontroversial is that the average egalitarian philosopher 
gives this issue more consideration than Frankfurt. He alludes to the problem of 
deformed preferences only once, in a footnote, remarking that, “People often adjust 
their desires to their circumstances. There is a danger that sheer discouragement, or 
an interest in avoiding frustration and conflict, may lead them to settle for too little.
It surely cannot be presumed that someone’s life is genuinely fulfilling, or that it is 
reasonable for the person to be satisfied with it, simply because he does not 
complain” (1987: 41). This truncated treatment of deformed preferences is a 
problem for a view that makes what a person is entitled to receive depend on her 
sense of when she has enough. This problem could be alleviated if we had clear 
guidelines about what people need, so that we avoid the problem of giving too little 
to those with distorted understandings of their needs and interests. But as already 
noted, while deeming the issue “very important,” Frankfurt evidently thinks it not 
important enough to warrant developing such an account.
Egalitarianism condemns discrimination but Frankfurtian sufficiency does not. 
In one formulation, Frankfurt writes that the “only morally compelling reason for 
trying to make the worse off better off is, in my judgment, that their lives are in some 
degree bad lives” (35n, italics added). If A has a top job and B is stuck at the bottom 
because of racist discrimination, but nevertheless earns a living wage and does not 
have a ‘bad’ life, then it appears B has no grounds for complaint under Frankfurt’s 
view. But, as Larry Temkin writes, the “injustice of discrimination does not
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disappear just because someone is ‘sufficiently’ well off (Temkin 2003a: 66). It may 
be objected that Frankfurt’s opposition to sexist and racist discrimination goes 
without saying. Indeed, in the contemporary literature, most philosophers who 
articulate theories of distributive justice both (a) emphasise that they mean to address 
social arrangements for an ideal society, where sexist and racist discrimination is 
presupposed to be absent; and (b) explicitly state that they hold such discrimination 
to be illegitimate. However, even though these stipulations may go without saying, 
most writers nevertheless still do attach them to their accounts. Frankfurt does not, 
and without stipulations to this effect, it is left open whether Frankfurt regards 
economic inequalities that are traceable to discrimination morally objectionable.
Note that this is not a problem that necessarily afflicts all sufficientarian theories. If 
I say that guaranteed thresholds of capability are constitutive of social justice, for 
example, does this mean I must bite my tongue on the issue of racist and sexist 
discrimination? Of course not, and as we shall see in the discussions of Anderson 
and Nussbaum, their views explicitly prohibit such discrimination on grounds of 
justice. The wider point is that, at minimum, a non-discrimination principle must be 
welded to sufficiency if it is going to be an adequate approach to distributive justice.
The fact that sufficiency’s normative goal is to get everyone to a particular 
threshold provokes several further interrelated concerns. How, for example, can we 
settle on a threshold in a non-arbitrary way? As Phillips notes, “what we regard as 
sufficient is itself conditioned by what those richer than us enjoy... In a society 
where access to the common culture has come to depend on watching the same 
programmes on TV, having a television set becomes a necessity rather than a luxury” 
(1999: 62). Even on the more plausible, reasonability-standard version of sufficiency, 
there are still problems with identifying a non-arbitrary threshold. This is because 
there are still bound to be large variations in the amounts of money it is reasonable 
for different people to be satisfied with. Ameson paints a picture of the richest man 
in the world -  “let us call him ‘Bill Gates’” -  who develops ambitious plans, which it 
is quite reasonable for him to have, and which he is actively interested in pursuing. 
“Frankfurt’s construal of what it is for a person to have enough money then yields 
the conclusion that in this sort of case the richest man in the world might not have 
enough” (2002: 182).
Wherever it is set, sufficiency also seems to invest the threshold with more 
moral weight than it can bear. First, there are cases involving individuals who fall
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just either side of the line. Suppose that I have £49 and you have £51, and the 
income sufficiency threshold has been set at £50, which affords a person a minimally 
decent life, but by no means a comfortable life. This means that I attract aid, but you 
do not, which seems unfair to you since you are unlikely to be dramatically different 
to me in overall welfare. (In social policy terms, any threshold may lead to the 
problem of the ‘poverty trap,’ where individuals who move above the threshold lose 
forms of support that previously maintained a more reasonable quality of life.) 
Second, there may be difficulties regarding individuals who are below the 
sufficiency threshold, and those who are well above it. Imagine a situation where we 
can choose to move one individual who is just barely below the threshold to just 
barely above it, or use the same resources to move millions of people who live 
moderately good lives above the threshold to absolutely “blissful” lives (Ameson 
2002: 188). Sufficiency, at least on its strictest versions, must help the lone 
individual.90 Third, there could be difficulties involving agents who are just barely 
below the threshold and those who are far below it and in fact can never be brought 
to the level of sufficiency. Here is Ameson again: “Suppose millions of people are 
leading lives of hellish quality, perhaps at the level of concentration camp victims. 
Suppose further that they can be raised to at best a moderate quality of life, close to 
the threshold, but [not actually reaching it]... We could instead take one individual 
whose prospects are currently just below the threshold level and boost her prospects 
by a tiny bit, so as to place them at the threshold” (2002: 188-89). Again, a view that 
accords strict priority to sufficiency must chose the single individual over the 
suffering millions.
What should we say about these issues? It should be noted that they do not 
actually tout the merits of egalitarianism, but rather call into question some of the 
basic implications of sufficiency. I do not find the last worries about conflicts 
between threshold-impinging actions and non-threshold-impinging actions as 
troubling as the earlier objections, since their empirical assumptions are so far­
fetched that it is unlikely they would ever crop up in real life. The issue of a non- 
arbitrary threshold remains, but I postpone discussion of this to the next section, 
where it can be engaged in the context of examining Elizabeth Anderson’s and 
Martha Nussbaum’s approaches to social justice.
90 More will be said about strict and moderate sufficiency theories below.
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In summary, I have tried to demonstrate ways in which egalitarianism 
emerges as a more plausible approach to social justice than sufficiency, when those 
views are understood in their basic forms, and particularly when egalitarianism is 
understood as requiring equality of outcome. However, I have also suggested several 
ways in which that judgment is complicated when the comparison involves the 
considerably more complicated forms of luck egalitarianism that currently dominate 
the field. The next section moves to a related but significantly different comparison 
between prioritarianism and moderate sufficiency.
2. P r io r it a r ia n is m  v e r s u s  M o d e r a t e  S u f f ic ie n c y
In several recent articles, Ameson has suggested that the more interesting and 
pressing debate occurs between the doctrines of priority and sufficiency, rather than 
equality and sufficiency. The basic norm behind the prioritarian view is that 
“benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are” (Crisp 2003: 751; 
see also Parfitt 1998: 12). Its affinity to sufficiency, which holds that everyone 
should have enough for a decent life, is clear. As Swift explains, sufficiency 
resembles prioritarianism insofar as it directs our attention to “those who have least.” 
However, unlike prioritarianism and other ‘diminishing principles’ of distribution, 
sufficiency “operates with a cut-off point. Rather than people’s claims diminishing 
gradually, as a more or less smooth function of what they already have, this approach 
posits a sharp cut-off point or discontinuity” (Swift 2001: 121).91
Ameson criticises sufficiency doctrines “in large part by touting the merits of 
an alternative theory of justice” (2006: 19), namely, his responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism (RCP). RCP constitutes a weighted prioritarian view, not the simple
Q9one just described. Ameson gives the following characterisation of RCP:
According to the priority family of moral principles, one ought always 
to maximize a function of human well-being that gives weight to two
91 Prioritarianism also resembles egalitarianism, but there are important differences. One reason 
prompting some theorists to move from egalitarian to prioritarian doctrines is that the latter avoids the 
levelling down objection (for discussion, see Crisp 2003; Parfitt 1998; Temkin 2003). Prioritarians 
permit advantages to go to people who are already better off so long as they do not worsen the 
situation of the worse off, whereas egalitarianism forbids this. As Ameson notes, prioritarianism 
welcomes a “random meteor shower [that] confers benefits costlessly on some already advantaged 
people to the status quo ante in which well-being is less for some people and better for none, but more 
equally divided” (2000: 34In).
92 For discussions of simple and weighted priority views, see Crisp (2003); Parfitt (1998).
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factors: the greater the well-being gain for a person that one can 
achieve, the greater the moral value of the gain; and the lower the 
person’s lifetime well-being level would be in the absence of this gain, 
the greater the moral value of the gain.... To arrive at a specific moral 
principle within this family, it is necessary to set weights on the 
comparative value of increasing aggregate well-being and obtaining 
well-being gains for the badly off’ (2006: 27).
Thus, even though RCP “tilts in favour of the worst off,” (2000a; 2006), the worst 
off may not always be the ones to receive the benefit. It all depends on the numbers 
and the weighting given to the various concerns. Ultimately, RCP holds that 
“institutions and practices should be set and actions chosen to maximize moral 
value” (2000a: 343). Thus, as Ameson observes, the basic character of RCP is 
utilitarian and act-consequentialist (2006: 26-31; 2002: 196). Suppose we face a 
choice between saving a life or giving bites of chocolate to people who are very well- 
off. According to RCP, the right choice “depends on the numbers.” But “if the 
number of beneficiaries is large enough on the side of the chocolate-bite eaters and 
small enough on the side of those severely disadvantaged persons... the prioritarian 
must say that the right answer is to stuff the extremely well off with chocolate”
(2006: 30).93
Two other features of Ameson’s view should be noted. First, the above 
passage omits another factor that Ameson considers morally relevant to distributive 
justice: personal responsibility. Adding the factor of individual responsibility to the 
foregoing account, RCP holds that it is “morally more valuable to provide a gain in 
well-being of a given size for a person with a given well-being prospect if she is less 
rather than more responsible for her present condition (if it is bad)” (2000a: 344). 
Second, RCP employs an objective account of well-being: what matters is “the 
quality of life that individuals reach... in other words their level of well-being, where 
this is identified neither with bare preference satisfaction nor enjoyment but with 
achievement of what is objectively worthwhile or choiceworthy in human life” 
(2000a: 341).
We already have a pretty good idea of the basic sufficiency doctrine. In 
Ameson’s words, sufficiency represents the “principle that the distribution of
931 believe the chocolates-versus-life-saving choice first appears in Crisp (2003).
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resources in society is just if and only if everyone has enough” (2002: 173).
Provided that “everyone has enough, that some people have more income and wealth 
than others violates no fundamental principle of justice or morality” (2002: 173).
This can be understood as the strict form of sufficiency. Ameson argues that 
moderate forms have proved more popular in recent years. He suggests that the 
moderate sufficiency view is characterised by the following three claims:
“(a) there is a good enough level of well-being gains for those who are 
below the threshold; (b) the further an individual is below the 
threshold, the greater the moral value of securing a well-being gain of 
a given size for that individual; and (c) above the threshold, well-being 
gains and losses count for something in determining what to do, but 
achieving a gain or avoidance of loss for any person below threshold 
has strict lexical priority over achieving instead any gain or avoidance 
of loss of any size for any number of individuals who are and always 
will be above the threshold” (2006: 28-29).
Moderate sufficiency preserves a key feature of strict sufficiency by recognising a 
threshold level of wellbeing or flourishing to which governments should aim to bring 
all citizens (claim (a)). It resembles prioritarianism in tilting towards the worst off 
(claim (b)). In cases where our choice of action or policy affects only individuals 
who are below the threshold, according to Ameson, “moderate sufficiency just is 
priority” (2006: 29). Moderate sufficiency departs from strict sufficiency in that it 
recognizes that non-threshold impinging-actions also have moral value; specifically, 
that improvements in the lives of those who are above the threshold “count for 
something” (claim (c)).
Ameson characterises Elizabeth Anderson’s democratic egalitarianism and 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as sufficiency views (2002; 2006). He 
notes that Anderson’s approach says that government should guarantee equally to all 
citizens “the capacity to achieve a threshold acceptable level in these three domains, 
the generic human, the sphere of association, and the political” and that “inequalities 
above the threshold are not deemed per se morally undesirable” (2000a: 347). As for 
Nussbaum, her theory “identifies the level of sufficiency as being a good-enough 
level of positive freedom. On her account, the person who has enough possesses the 
capability to function at an acceptable level in all of the ways that are individually
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necessary and together sufficient for a decent quality of human life” (Ameson 2002: 
174; see also 2006: 19).
Ameson seems somewhat ambivalent about precisely how to characterise 
Anderson and Nussbaum’s views. On one hand, he explicitly says they are moderate 
sufficientarians. On the other hand, his characterization of Anderson’s view brings it 
more in line with what he understands to be the strict version: it stipulates a threshold 
and it says that inequalities above the threshold are not morally relevant. If we are 
choosing between a tax policy that favours the working-class and one that favours 
the rich in a population where, despite the inequality, all are above the threshold, 
democratic equality says “the issue is a ‘don’t care’ from the standpoint of justice” 
(2000a: 347). Furthermore, he says that even though these writers adhere to 
moderate sufficiency, it is right to analyse their views as though they are strict 
sufficiency views. So it is unclear why Ameson seems to feel the need to distinguish 
moderate and strict versions of sufficiency if he feels that there is no real difference 
between them at the end of the day.94
Whatever the status of particular theories as strict or moderate sufficientarian, 
Ameson argues that moderate sufficiency is still vulnerable to the two most trenchant 
objections that strict sufficiency encounters. First, the threshold remains, and 
therefore moderate sufficiency still requires but lacks “some plausible justification of 
why the sufficiency line is drawn in one place rather than somewhere else and why 
this particular line is morally significant” (2006: 29). Second, it is still a 
discontinuous moral theory. Making a tiny improvement, threshold-impinging or not, 
to a sub-threshold individual, is always more important than improving the prospects 
of those who are above the threshold, even if this improvement could be great. 
Ameson characterises this as “a jump in our moral response” and argues that no 
justification for such jumps can be found (2002: 194).
The good-enough level for a decent life is not self-evident, so a concern for 
many is how sufficientarians are going to identify a non-arbitrary threshold. I find 
this objection somewhat mysterious. To my knowledge, neither Anderson nor
94 There are other unfortunate ambiguities and slippages in Ameson’s claims about sufficientarians.
In one analysis, Ameson states that he means to consider a Walzerian version of sufficiency and a 
‘generic’ version. However, he then goes on to discuss Frankfurt’s articulation of the ideal for several 
pages, while Walzer’s theory gets only a few mentions, and the ‘generic’ sufficiency theory 
disappears altogether. This tends to suggest that he regards all of these -  Walzerian ‘spherical’ 
justice, Frankfurtian sufficiency, and generic sufficiency -  as essentially interchangeable, but he has 
offered no arguments for this improbable position.
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Nussbaum have ever claimed that the thresholds identified by their theories as the 
normative goals for societies are non-arbitrary. Both readily admit that what is 
considered ‘enough’ is relative to the society in question; that it varies, for example, 
with cultural norms, the natural environment, and individual circumstance.
Anderson sketches an example which says that what counts as enough in the area of 
food, for people like us is, negatively, sufficient money to avoid eating out of a 
dumpster, or positively, sufficient money to buy food fit for consumption in social 
gatherings (1999a: 320).
However, specific examples aside, both are somewhat evasive about an 
overall approach to determining thresholds for the different capabilities. Nussbaum 
appeals to the idea of enjoying capabilities at a level that is “worthy” of being human 
(2000: 73), but this does not shed any additional light on the issue. Anderson 
suggests that in some cases, the threshold level is easy to determine since it is equal 
and therefore identical for everyone: “For some functionings, equal citizenship 
requires equal levels. For example, each citizen is entitled to the same number of 
votes in an election as everyone else. But for other functionings, standing as an 
equal does not require equal levels of functionings. To be capable of standing as an 
equal in civil society requires literacy. But in the US context, it does not require 
literacy in any language other than English, nor the ability to interpret obscure works 
of theory” (1999a: 318-19). In general, she suggests, the thresholds can be decided 
through a democratic process. Handing the threshold issue over to democratic 
assemblies raises another set of issues that might be controversial, such as tyranny of 
the majority. However, at least this move returns the issue to the realm of politics, 
rather than leaving it in the realm of metaphysics (Stark 2002).
The negative implications of thresholds seem most forceful when pursued at 
the abstract level of hypothetical examples, such as those favoured by Ameson 
(should we choose the option that moves “billions and billions” from a “modest 
existence to perfectionist bliss” or the one individual who is just shy of the 
threshold? (2006: 28)). Though the choice is striking, it is unlikely ever to 
materialise in a choice between public policies for real societies. The point is, 
Anderson and Nussbaum propose approaches to justice that feature thresholds 
because they believe these offer realistic and relatively tangible goals at which real 
governments and societies can aim. In societies where most do not have sufficient 
for living a good life, the appeal to a threshold simply tries to set a realistic target of
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achievement. As Nussbaum writes, in relation to the question of what principled 
stance the capabilities approach takes to equality, “almost all world societies are very 
far from even providing the basic minimum of truly human functioning, where many 
or even most women are concerned; I therefore leave the debate about levels of 
equality for a later stage, when the differences become meaningful in practice”
(2000: 86). This response does not dispute the apparent unfairness in the 
hypothetical scenarios, but does remind us that the empirical assumptions which 
ground the latter ones are completely implausible. Sufficiency is an urgent project 
because millions of people do not have enough to live on, and we should not let these 
fictitious people who are apparently denied lives of ‘bliss’ distract us from that 
reality.
Finally, it might be worth pointing out that, under certain conditions, the 
threshold is not always as arbitrary as the counterexamples to sufficiency like to 
suggest. Frankfurt describes a case where 40 units of medicine must be divided 
amongst 10 sick people. Unfortunately, each person needs five units to survive. The 
egalitarian, it seems, will condemn everyone to death by assigning them equal units 
of medicine, whereas the sufficientarian will divide the medicine to ensure that eight 
people survive. Biological facts about human health and medical facts about the 
power of drugs combine here to point to a non-arbitrary threshold. To be sure, both 
scenarios have very unpleasant consequences, but I submit that most people will be 
prepared to say that the sufficiency option is morally preferable.
3. A r e  A n d e r s o n  a n d  N u s s b a u m  S u f f ic ie n t a r ia n s ?
Thus far, I have accepted the terms of Ameson’s argument that Anderson and 
Nussbaum’s theories can be characterised as sufficiency theories. In this section, I 
argue that they are not plausibly regarded as sufficientarians, if by that we mean they 
espouse a view that says the only morally important thing is to ensure that people 
have enough. In my view, Nussbaum and Anderson argue for sufficiency as part of a 
broader package of principles for achieving social justice. In this sense, their 
approaches are not unlike those of other egalitarians who argue that the egalitarian 
project comprises several normative aims and principles; that it is fundamentally
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pluralistic. My argument begins by noting that Ameson himself is ambivalent about 
the basic character of these theories.95
I have already noted that Ameson asserts what is evidently an inconsequential 
distinction between strict and moderate sufficiency since he ultimately assesses all 
theories as though they are strict. He also seems to waver on what theories belong to 
that (unstable) category in the first place. For example, Ameson sometimes suggests 
that Amartya Sen’s capability approach is a “representative liberal egalitarian view” 
(1995: 247n; 1989) but at other times suggests that it is a sufficiency doctrine (2006). 
What can explain this double, and seemingly contradictory, classification? My 
explanation is that, sometimes, Ameson assesses competing theories in their capacity 
as general approaches to social justice, acknowledging that they comprise a family of 
normative aims and principles and concerns. At other times, he reduces competing 
theories to what he takes to be their single most important commitment, and assesses 
them on the basis of that principle alone. This is what he does, somewhat 
defensively, in the essay which contrasts several sufficientarian theories to RCP 
(2002). He notices that “the sufficientarian doctrine that everyone should have 
enough might be proposed at a lower level of abstraction and intended to serve as a 
rough-and-ready public policy guide. The idea of this practical sufficiency norm 
would be that whatever exactly a just society is, it does not allow people to languish 
in readily avoidable abject misery and poverty...” (2002: 175). He suggests that 
various moral outlooks converge on this practical sufficiency norm. Nevertheless, he 
continues, “this essay assesses sufficientarianism as a candidate fundamental moral 
principle -  as a statement of what ultimately matters morally” (175), indicating that 
he believes Frankfurt, Walzer, Nussbaum, and Anderson have proposed 
sufficientarianism as appropriate at this fundamental level. “My critique,” he 
concludes, “is not an attack on a view that no one defends” (175).96
95 Ameson is, of course, entitled to his own interpretation of what Nussbaum and Anderson’s theories 
amount to. But as far as I know, he is alone in asserting that they give primary importance to 
sufficiency thresholds in their approaches to justice, establishing that they are therefore, ultimately, 
sufficientarian in nature. To take just one example of an alternative interpretation, Peter Vallentyne 
(2002: 530) argues that Frankfurt defends a sufficiency view, while Anderson is a “social status 
egalitarian,” more in line with David Miller.
96 Specifically with reference to Nussbaum’s view, Alexander Kaufman writes that “Ameson focuses 
on the approach’s commitment to securing threshold levels of basic capabilities. The centrality o f this 
commitment, he argues, establishes that the theory is sufficientarian” (Kaufman 2006: 10). Kaufman 
disputes his characterisation.
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The notion that Nussbaum and Anderson’s theories are ones which say that 
the only morally important thing is to ensure that people have enough is a reductive 
treatment of those views, yielding a (mis)characterisation that even Ameson seems 
uncomfortable with. There are, arguably, three core constitutive features that 
Anderson and Nussbaum can lay claim to in virtue of their approaches to social 
justice: (1) they say that there are certain substantive goods that individuals should 
have in order to live good human lives; (2) they say that governments should 
guarantee these goods unconditionally to all citizens; in other words, citizens have 
rights and entitlements to certain things; and (3) they say that governments should 
ensure that each citizen is able to access a threshold level of these goods, if she 
chooses. Ameson has focussed on the third of these three central constitutive 
features out of proportion to the other two. Anderson and Nussbaum do assert that 
there are threshold levels of functioning that all citizens should reach. But to focus 
on this in isolation from the other two constitutive claims of justice distorts their 
views. The reasons that the assurance of a threshold is important are contained in the 
other two central claims. So some of the justificatory “story” that Ameson is 
searching for with regards to the notion of a threshold (2006: 29), and which he 
claims cannot be adequately told by sufficientarians, will be found in these two areas.
A Substantive Goods Approach to Social Justice
The first and perhaps most striking core constitutive feature of Anderson and 
Nussbaum’s approaches to social justice is that they are universalists, arguing that all 
human beings need certain goods in order to live truly human lives. Each attempts to 
identify in a substantive way what these goods are. As is well known, Nussbaum has 
drawn up a list of ten “central capabilities” that she believes are universal goods for 
humans, and as such, ought to be guaranteed to all citizens by their governments.
The current list is as follows: (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) 
senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) 
other species, (9) play, and (10) control over one’s environment (2000: 78-80; see
Q7also 1999: 41-2). Anderson also adopts the language of capabilities in her account.
97 Details of what is meant by each term are provided; for example, the capability of life means “being 
able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is 
so reduced as to be not worth living”; and the capability of emotions means “being able to have 
attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love us and care for us, to
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She suggests that the central capabilities can be organized into three general areas of 
individual functioning: “as a human being, as a participant in a system of cooperative 
production, and as a citizen of a democratic state” (1999: 317). Her account is at 
once vaguer and more specific than Nussbaum’s. It is vaguer because she does not 
suggest, as Nussbaum does, that the list is finite. Appealing to three general realms 
of human functioning leaves it open as to how many specific capabilities might be 
part of each realm. Her account is more specific than Nussbaum’s because, through 
examples, Anderson indicates particular capabilities that she regards as essential and 
others that she regards as non-essential. For example, she notes that while some 
people hold card-playing and Tahitian vacations as very important in their lives, 
these things are not essential to any of the three general realms of human functioning. 
However, basic civil and political rights, such as voting, free speech, and having the 
right to enter and participate in the public institutions of civil society, are central 
capabilities and thus should be guaranteed to everyone.
To avoid the thought that people will be forced to perform activities that they 
personally object to or are indifferent about, both Nussbaum and Anderson argue that 
the normative goal is to ensure that everyone has access to the central capabilities, 
not that each must actually function in those areas (Nussbaum 2000: 87; Anderson 
1999: 318). Government must ensure that everyone has the capability to do and be 
various things, not that people are actually functioning in that way. In addition, both 
follow Rawls in asserting that the central capabilities are analogous to his primary 
goods -  that is, they are things that most people will want, no matter what else they 
want.98
In saying that the substantive goods feature is a core constitutive element of 
their approaches, of course I do not mean to suggest that the lists and their items are 
uncontroversial. The opposite is true.99 My point is merely that this is a core and
grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified 
anger” (2000: 78).
98 It should be noted that Nussbaum and Anderson identify capabilities as the appropriate space for 
interpersonal comparisons. This distinguishes their positions from Frankfurt, who seems to be allergic 
to interpersonal comparisons since they alienate and distract people from what really matters. 
Nussbaum and Anderson, on the other hand, suggest that interpersonal comparisons in the space of 
central capabilities are what alert us to issues of unfairness and equity.
99 For example, in relation to Nussbam’s work, issues about the central capabilities that have proved 
controversial include her claim that they are universal goods, and whether this means her approach is 
perfectionist (see contributions to the October 2000 issue of Ethics devoted to Nussbaum’s political 
philosophy).
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dominant feature, at least as central and important in their projects as is the assertion 
of thresholds of sufficiency.
Unconditional Entitlements
The second core constitutive feature of their approaches is that they insist 
citizens have rights or entitlements to access the central capabilities. According to 
Nussbaum, the “basic goods supply a set of political constraints -  citizens should be 
provided with these, whatever else politics also pursues. There is a very close 
connection between the account of central capabilities and an account of basic 
human rights; indeed, the capabilities account is one way of further fleshing out an 
account of human rights” (148-9). Anderson tends not to use the language of rights. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from her account that she believes that citizens are 
unconditionally entitled to certain basic goods just in virtue of being citizens and 
human beings. She argues that there are “certain goods to which all citizens must 
have effective access over the course of their whole lives.... And starting-gate 
theories, or any other principles that allow law-abiding citizens to lose access to 
adequate levels of these goods, are unacceptable” (1999: 314).
In invoking citizens’ basic rights and entitlements as an element and 
condition of social justice, Nussbaum and Anderson appeal implicitly and explicitly, 
and on various points, to Rawls’s social contractarian tradition of justice. As is well 
known, Rawls developed his contractarian approach to justice, which gives priority 
to the basic rights and liberties in part as an explicit rejection of utilitarian justice 
(Rawls 1999, especially 27-30, 52-56). Rawls rejects utilitarianism because it fails to 
treat each person as an end in herself, and is prepared to sacrifice some individuals’ 
rights to maximize utility. Nussbaum follows Rawls (as well as Kant and Marx) in 
specifying a principle of ‘each person as end.’ Nussbaum disagrees with Rawls on 
the issue of articulating a definite list of human goods -  she says we need one and 
should not be shy about it; Rawls refrains from this, particularly in his later work. 
They agree, however, on the idea that governments should guarantee to all citizens 
certain things, and that this guarantee should be the achievement of a specifically 
political agreement, rather than a comprehensive one.
For her part, Anderson appeals to Rawls in motivating her account of what 
the ideal of equality points to in terms of social arrangements between real persons. 
Citing Rawls, she writes that the ideal of equality asserts “that all competent adults
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are equally moral agents: everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise 
moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to 
shape and fulfil a conception of their good” (Anderson 1999a: 312). Her account of 
justice echoes Rawls’s, too, in applying a standard of public justifiability in 
determining what citizens owe to one another. Again, citing Rawls, she writes that 
“democratic equality regards two people as equals when each accepts the obligation 
to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take 
mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted” (1999a: 313).
Finally, she also follows Rawls’s view in political liberalism: democratic equality 
says it promotes the goods it promotes not because they are objectively the best or 
most important goods, but “in virtue of being a possible object of collective willing. 
Neutral goods are the goods we can reasonably agree to collectively provide, given 
the fact of pluralism” (1999a: 330). Again, as with Nussbaum, Anderson’s 
convergence with Rawlsian contractarian tradition does not preclude disagreements. 
Most obviously, while she believes that incomes ought to be more equal, she does 
not accept the difference principle’s commitment to forbidding all income 
inequalities that do not improve the position of the worst off (1999a: 326; 1999b:3).
The adherence to a generally Rawlsian contractarian tradition is further 
strengthened by the fact that each unequivocally rejects the utilitarian approach to 
social justice (Nussbaum 2000: chapter 2; Anderson 1993; 1999b). As is well known, 
utilitarian approaches that take the maximisation of utility as their normative goal 
tend towards egalitarianism since, on the assumption of diminishing marginal utility, 
they recommend that money be redistributed from the rich to the poor. However, 
this tendency to egalitarianism is just a contingent by-product, given certain 
conditions. If utility would be maximised by depriving a few innocent people of all 
their belongings and throwing them in prison for no reason, then utilitarianism would 
recommend that course of action. This is not the place to rehearse all the problems 
with utility-maximising approaches to social justice.100 Suffice it to say that I 
endorse these criticisms, and as a consequence, I believe that utility-maximising 
approaches should be rejected.
As mentioned earlier, Ameson’s RCP is a maximising form of utilitarianism. 
He has noted as a conflict between his approach to social justice and those of
100 For two representative accounts, see Kymlicka 2002: Chapter 1; Jean Hampton 1997.
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Nussbaum and Anderson that his sanctions the violations of individuals’ rights if that 
would maximise utility (2000; 2006). To revisit his earlier example, Ameson 
demonstrates that, depending on the numbers, his theory recommends “stuffpng] the 
extremely well off with extra chocolate” at the cost of ignoring “severely 
disadvantaged persons who stand to gain an incredible windfall benefit” (2006: 30). 
The “tyranny of aggregation should be accepted, not resisted,” Ameson concludes, 
noting that if we accept it, it will seem like “legitimate government, not tyranny” 
(2006: 30).101 Or, to take a more realistic conflict, Anderson holds that all citizens 
have a right to participate in the democratic institutions of their society. Sufficient 
access to these democratic institutions is an inviolable right of all citizens. Making 
this right a real one for some citizens might prove expensive, for example, because 
they have disabilities, such as deafness and immobility, which require special 
arrangements. If faced with the choice, we must choose the policy that will protect 
the democratic rights of all citizens, even if this causes an overall loss of welfare to 
society, including the welfare of disabled citizens in whose interests the policy was 
drawn up to protect in the first place. Ameson believes this is the wrong choice; we 
should choose the policy that maximises overall welfare, even if this comes at the 
cost of “restricting some people’s democratic rights” (2000a).
Ameson’s awareness of the fundamental normative clash in their views sits 
uneasily with a different argument he makes. In his treatment of them as 
sufficientarians, Ameson claims to shown that Nussbaum and Anderson’s moderate 
sufficiency is vulnerable to the aggregation objection in the same way that RCP is. 
And he takes this as proof that if we are moderate sufficientarians, we should 
abandon that and adopt RCP instead (2006). The basic idea of Ameson’s analysis is 
that the feature of moderate sufficiency that ostensibly makes it more attractive than 
strict sufficiency -  i.e. that it moves from a single principle of sufficiency to a set of 
principles, which reduces the stringency of the priority it nevertheless still gives to 
getting people to the threshold -  does not do so since it ends up transforming 
moderate sufficiency into an aggregative doctrine, which is something its proponents 
want to avoid. But this argument has to overlook the different fundamental 
assumptions and normative commitments grounding contractarian-based approaches
101 “Aggregation is the claim that for any loss or evil, however great its magnitude, that befalls one 
person, there is a greater loss or evil constituted by the sum of much smaller losses or evils suffered 
by a large number of persons” (Ameson 2006: 41).
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to justice and utilitarian ones. A moderate sufficientarian, such as Anderson or 
Nussbaum, moves to RCP on pain of abandoning one of her central tenets: namely, 
that each person is an end in herself, possessing fundamental rights and entitlements 
that must not be sacrificed for any other social goal. Ameson seems to forget or 
overlook this fundamental difference in his recent analysis, which, again, may be a 
result of his overly narrow interpretation of their views.
To return to the main issue, Nussbaum’s and Anderson’s view that an 
adequate conception of social justice includes the commitment that people, just by 
virtue of being citizens and human beings, are entitled to certain things, resonates 
more widely in the debates around luck egalitarianism. Strict adherence to the luck 
egalitarian line on individual responsibility is widely regarded as yielding a view that 
contradicts deep-seated egalitarian intuitions that a just society should help the needy, 
even if they have brought their neediness upon themselves through bad choices. The 
“fact that a person’s urgent medical needs can be traced to his own negligence or 
foolishness or high-risk behavior is not normally seen as making it legitimate to deny 
him the care he needs,” Samuel Scheffler observes. “Still less do people 
automatically forfeit any claim to assistance if it turns out that that their urgent needs 
are the result of prudent or well-considered choices that simply turned out badly” 
(2003: 18-19). More generally, Andrew Mason writes that luck egalitarianism seems 
to “entail giving up the idea that a commitment to equality requires us to meet certain 
needs regardless of how they came about” (2000: 227). These observations contain 
both a criticism of luck egalitarianism for its apparent willingness to abandon needy 
people whose neediness derives from their own choices, as well as a suggestion that 
egalitarianism should be committed to meeting “certain needs” of all citizens 
“regardless of how they come about.” In general, many egalitarians are now 
expressing doubts about the essentially conditional aid that luck egalitarianism offers 
to citizens (for example, Armstrong 2003; 2005).
Equality, suggests Mason, requires us to meet certain needs. Recall from 
chapter three Mason’s argument that society has a duty to pick up at least some of 
the tab for the financial needs of women who choose, out of moral convictions in 
harmony with gendered social norms, to sacrifice their careers in order to raise their 
children themselves. Beyond this specific (but common) case, Mason does not offer 
any guidance as to which needs of its citizens society ought to provide for 
collectively. Nussbaum and Anderson do, however, provide guidance on these
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questions. So it is on this account -  their attempt to try to specify precisely what 
citizens are entitled to as a matter of right -  that Nussbaum and Anderson may be 
distinguishable from other egalitarians. But they evidently join many other 
egalitarians on the basic idea that it is a fundamental constituent principle of 
egalitarianism that we should meet people’s basic needs.
According to Ameson, at least two commitments must be in place for a view 
to qualify as sufficientarian: (1) it must hold that morally, the most important thing is 
to get everyone to the threshold, and (2) it must hold that, provided everyone is at or 
above the threshold, the division of resources above it is not morally important. It is 
implausible to attribute this to either Nussbaum or Anderson, for their approaches are 
motivated by several normative aims, only one of which addresses itself to the issue 
of thresholds. There is no question that they do appeal to sufficiency thresholds as 
one goal of social justice. But asserting this as a goal in no way commits them to 
saying that that is the only morally important thing about a society’s division of 
resources, or even that it is always the most important moral consideration.
Asserting that a society should aim to get everyone to a decent threshold of 
capabilities also does not commit them to saying the division of resources above the 
threshold is a ‘don’t care’ from the perspective of justice. Both explicitly argue that 
a principle of non-discrimination is an essential condition of social justice, and this 
principle represents at least one way morally to ground criticism of above-threshold 
divisions. Anderson writes that “If having the capabilities needed to avoid 
oppression were all that mattered, then egalitarians would not oppose discrimination 
among the relatively privileged -  for example, the glass ceiling for female executives. 
But egalitarians also aim at enabling all citizens to stand as equals to one another in 
civil society, and this requires that careers be open to talents” (1999a: 316-17). This 
implicitly says that sufficiency is not “all that matters” to justice. This is but one 
example of a place wherein these theorists appeal to the idea that there are multiple 
normative aims within a project of social justice.
4 . P l u r a l ist ic  E g a l it a r ia n is m
In the previous sections, I tried to problematise Ameson’s characterization of 
Nussbaum and Anderson’s approaches to justice as sufficientarian by arguing that 
the notion of a threshold represents only one of three core, constitutive features of
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their theories. In giving the appropriate weight to the other important features of 
their views, we are nudged towards the idea that they adopt a pluralistic
109interpretation of the demands of social justice. Justice is not appropriately
conceived as consisting in only one distributive aim or principle; rather, it consists in 
multiple ideals and principles. In this sense, their accounts have parallels with the 
views of several theorists whose status as egalitarians is evidently not under dispute.
Proposals to establish unconditional basic income (UBI) schemes in liberal 
societies are at the centre of a lively debate, at both philosophical and practical levels, 
which extends well beyond the immediate context of luck egalitarian debates (see, 
for example, Farrelly 1999; Parijs 1996, 1995, 1992, 1991; Robeyns 2001; Segall 
2005). Nevertheless, UBI proposals have also emerged explicitly in philosophical 
debates over the plausibility and attractiveness of luck egalitarianism. Several 
egalitarians have proposed UBI explicitly as an antidote to luck egalitarianism 
(Hinton 2001; McKinnon 2003; Wolff 1998). Recall from chapter four that Jonathan 
Wolff and Timothy Hinton criticised luck egalitarianism on the grounds that it fails 
to show equal respect to all citizens. They believe that it treats some citizens 
disrespectfully because it requires intrusive scrutiny of (mainly poor) individuals’ 
lives, and passes demeaning judgments about the use that citizens have made of their 
personal talents, or lack thereof. The upshot for them is that this aspect of luck 
egalitarianism is deeply unattractive and can be avoided by eliminating the processes 
that involve the disrespectful treatment. Wolff argues that “egalitarian legislators” 
and “egalitarian philosophers” (1998: 120-121) should be committed to 
“unconditional welfare benefits” (97; 121) in order to genuinely treat all citizens with 
equal respect. He grants that unconditional benefits schemes may be abused by some 
citizens, but argues that it is overall preferable from an egalitarian point of view to 
have a social safety net, represented by unconditional income, that protects all 
citizens’ self-respect and respect-standing.
Wolffs case for UBI rests on the thought that it is required by a view of the 
egalitarian project that caters to the principles of fairness and respect -  a view he 
calls the ‘egalitarian ethos.’ He notes that this is a different reason for supporting it 
than a reason from justice, such as Hillel Steiner’s (1994) view that justice requires
102 In her earlier work on the ethical limitations of the market, Anderson (1993) explicitly invokes a 
pluralist as opposed to a monistic understanding of value. In this work, however, she does not directly 
address questions of equality.
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“UBI as a consequence of our joint ownership of the earth” (Wolff 1998: 121). It 
also differs from the reason from efficiency: the idea, that is, we should have a 
system of UBI because it is cheaper than an egalitarian system which requires data 
collection and enforcement (1998: 121).
In the course of establishing the case, Wolff argues against what he takes to 
be the interpretation of egalitarianism shared by luck egalitarians, regardless of 
currency. They all hold the ‘lexical priority of fairness’ thesis, which says that 
“egalitarianism is best constituted by a lexically prior notion of fairness” (103). This 
entails a commitment to the view that “there is one prior value -  fairness -  and that 
all other egalitarian values are either means to, or subordinate to, fairness” (106). 
Wolff categorically rejects this, arguing that egalitarianism comprises “a collection 
of values, which may sometimes conflict and among which there are no universal 
priority rules” (118). In this analysis, Wolff tends to suggest that the “collection” of 
values is dominated by two: fairness and respect (106). He does not indicate what 
other values might form part of the collection.
The crucial problem with this understanding of egalitarianism is that if 
egalitarianism is constituted by a collection of values and normative goals, how do 
we know which one is more important when it appears both cannot obtain in social 
arrangements at the same time? This is a problem which is said not to afflict ‘lexical 
priority of fairness’ egalitarianism (hereafter, LPFE). As Wolff notes, “monist or 
lexically priority views are often popular for the apparent theoretical rigor that they 
offer. If we believe, say, that the single or lexically prior egalitarian value is fairness, 
then it appears that we have a decision procedure to cover all possible cases.
Without that we have to rely on intuitionistic balancing, and different individuals’ 
intuitions may differ, leaving us without public standards of justification” (118).
Wolffs mounts two responses to this implicit challenge. The first rejects the 
premise that LPFE can always identify the right course of action and never confronts 
dilemmas or conflicts in value. There are two lines of argument here, one relating to 
resourcist versions of luck egalitarianism and one relating to welfarist versions. In 
the case of resourcism, Wolff argues that there is internal incoherence. Resourcists 
are committed to the lexical priority of fairness thesis and to a resourcist thesis which 
asserts that the best conception of equality is equality of opportunity for resources. 
However, self-respect or the lack of it is only sensible as a welfarist concept: belief 
in “lowered respect-standing” is not the lack of a resource, internal or external” (116).
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Thus, if we are going to acknowledge self-respect as a concern for egalitarians, we 
have to accept that it is a welfarist concern. But resourcists maintain that they are 
unmoved by welfarist concerns. So, according to Wolff, resourcists cannot hold onto 
both theses -  lexical priority of fairness thesis and the resourcist thesis -  
simultaneously. As for the other case, Wolff argues that welfarists are drawn into a 
position that involves two forms of fairness in conflict. On one hand, welfarists will 
say that data collection is unfair since it requires people of low talent to reveal 
shameful things about themselves. On the other hand, if they do not collect such data, 
they will be exposed to other forms of unfairness -  namely, the free-rider problem. 
From a welfarist perspective, the problem of shameful revelation means that 
“fairness requires both close scrutiny and for us to refrain from close scrutiny”
(1998: 117-8). The point of this is to undermine the claim that LPFE approaches are 
principle-governed and therefore avoid intuitive balancing of conflicting 
principles.103
Wolffs second response implicitly accepts that egalitarianism must be a 
project driven by “intuitionistic balancing” (118) at some level. This is suggested by 
his argument that egalitarianism “needs a dynamic balance” so that social institutions 
are characterised both by fairness and by avoidance of disrespect (1998: 120). This 
response accepts that our social arrangements will not always cater first and 
exclusively to the value of fairness. Sometimes, they will cater to issues of respect. 
Part of what helps to achieve the ‘dynamic balance’ of fairness and respect is the 
unconditional welfare benefits scheme he endorses. Thus, according to Wolff, UBI is 
one element in the pluralistic egalitarian project that he envisions.
Hinton proposes a social justice scheme that combines Rawlsian maximin 
distribution for workers and a UBI for those who are either unable to work or choose 
not to work at their most productive occupation. The justification for such a scheme 
is at least three-fold. First, he follows Wolff in endorsing the egalitarian reason of 
showing respect for all. Second, he also appeals to the notion that we all enjoy a pre­
political entitlement to the world’s resources; there is “joint ownership in the world’s
1031 also argued in chapter one that Cohen’s response to Dworkin’s example of Jude reveals that his 
equality of access to advantage theory appears to have no way to establish how much money Jude is 
owed in principle, suggesting that the amount Cohen wants to award him in compensation is arbitrary 
from the point of view of equality.
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resources” (83).104 Third, he appears to appeal to the concept of need, but mixes this 
with the concept of equality or equal standing: “equalizing access to health care is... 
not grounded on the need to ameliorate the effects of brute luck. But it is grounded 
on the need to promote and sustain an equal standing for all. Those who are disabled 
and infirm share joint ownership with the rest of us. A proper acknowledgement of 
their status necessitates ensuring that they receive the medical care and other special 
resources that they need.” (2001: 83, italics added). This passage reveals a mixture 
of justifications, in particular, mixing a justification for redistribution on the basis of 
equality with justification on the basis of need. It also has clear parallels with 
Anderson’s claims that the positive aim of egalitarian justice is to ensure that 
everyone has access to the capabilities that enable them to stand as equals with 
everyone else (1999).
We have now assembled an analysis of Anderson’s and Nussbaum’s 
approaches to justice, which notes that they appeal to (1) a notion of universal, 
substantive human goods; (2) the idea that citizens have unconditional entitlements 
and rights to these central goods; and (3) that a threshold of sufficiency in some of 
these areas is an appropriate goal at which governments may aim. We have also 
assembled an analysis of Wolff s and Hinton’s approaches, which similarly admit of 
multiple values and aims within egalitarian justice. The juxtaposition is designed to 
demonstrate that the concerns that so-called sufficientarians and so-called 
egalitarians have, in the context of social justice, admit of a great deal of overlap and 
similarity. This calls into question the desire to pigeon-hole particular theorists, 
particularly when their approaches explicitly appeal to several different normative 
goals and ideals.
In a recent analysis of Anderson’s democratic egalitarianism, Alexander 
Brown (2005b) has argued for a reconciliation between, and combination of, what he 
calls the ‘traditional egalitarian concerns’ embodied in Anderson’s analysis, with the 
luck egalitarian concerns. He identifies the ‘traditional egalitarian concerns’ as 
including the “struggle to eliminate extreme poverty, exploitation, oppression, and 
lack of access to valued functionings” (2005b: 331). He identifies the luck 
egalitarian concern as the attempt to “mitigate the influence on people’s lives of 
bmte luck, [and to] attribute the costs of voluntary choices to the individuals
104 Thus, Hinton appears to share Steiner’s left-libertarian justification for UBI. For more on the 
various ideological justifications for UBI, see contributions to Van Parijs (1992).
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themselves wherever possible” (2005b: 331). Ultimately, he argues, this yields a 
“pluralistic view of justice as equality” (331). Following Brown, I would 
characterise Anderson and Nussbaum’s approaches as pluralistic egalitarian views. 
Each is constituted by several distinct principles and ideals. Prominently among 
these are: (1) a belief in the fundamental equality of human beings which requires 
that human beings be treated in certain ways; (2) a belief that strict equality is 
sometimes required by justice, such as in the realm of basic political and legal rights; 
and (3) a belief that justice requires other things -  such as meeting basic needs or 
treating people with respect -  whose achievement may see greater material equality 
emerge as a by-product.
Some may object that this plays too fast and loose with the notion of 
egalitarianism. For example, by arguing that a principle of justice which does not 
aim at equality directly but sees it emerge as a by-product of some other aim can be a 
constitutive element of a pluralistic egalitarian view, I fall foul of Joseph Raz’s 
interpretations of egalitarianism. Raz defines strictly egalitarian principles as those 
which take the following form: “All Fs who do not have G have a right to G if some 
Fs have G” (1988: 225). According to Raz, there are at least two unique things about 
strictly egalitarian principles. One is that equality is not only their result but also 
their purpose (225). This compares to non-egalitarian principles which may realize 
equal distributions as a by-product, but where other, non-equality-related, reasons for 
action drive the redistribution (230). The other thing is that strictly egalitarian 
principles are strictly indifferent about two courses of action for achieving equality; 
that is, they are indifferent between (1) depriving those who have G of G so that now 
none have G, or (2) transferring some G to those who do not have G so that now all 
have some G. This indifference stems from the fact that strictly egalitarian principles 
do not believe that people who happen to have something have a right to it. From the 
point of view of strictly egalitarian principles, instead of “achieving equality by 
giving the benefit to those who lack it, one can equally... achieve it by denying the 
benefit to those who have it, thus preventing the right under the principle from 
coming into being” (Raz 1990: 227).
Temkin argues that too many different positions have come under the label 
‘egalitarianism’ (Temkin 2003b: 766-67). As far as he is concerned, genuine 
egalitarian views adhere to the following tenets: “it is bad for some to be worse off 
than others through no fault or choice of their own” but “egalitarians are not
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committed to thinking that deserved inequalities are as bad as undeserved ones. In 
fact, I think that deserved inequalities, if there are any, are not bad at all” (2003b: 
767).
Of course, reasons of rigour and precision might steer us towards these 
narrower understandings of the egalitarian project. However, I do not detect much 
enthusiasm for this in the recent debates (Schmidtz 2002). Both of these narrower 
interpretations of egalitarianism include commitments that are unappealing: the 
indifference to rights and to the choice between the courses of action in Raz’s 
description; and the thought that deserved inequalities are not bad at all in Temkin’s.
I believe that a pluralistic egalitarian approach is an acceptable expansion of the 
basic doctrine since it includes more of the issues that are of fundamental concern to 
egalitarians.
RCP is not the best approach to social justice, since, as a maximising form of 
utilitarianism, it sanctions the violation of individuals’ rights if that course of action 
maximises utility. Nussbaum’s and Anderson’s views, on the other hand, are both 
rooted in a broadly Rawlsian social contractarian tradition and therefore uphold 
individuals’ fundamental rights and interests. Ameson’s characterisation of 
Nussbaum and Anderson’s views as dominated by a sufficientarian ethic is reductive, 
and it is more plausible to interpret them as pluralistic egalitarians. Sufficiency, 
defined as the commitment to divide resources so that the basic needs of all citizens 
are met, is a genuine and integral part of the egalitarian project, not antithetical to it.
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Conclusion
When I started my research, my general aim was to defend the importance of 
the political value of equality to contemporary feminist political thought. My 
perception was that contemporary academic feminism was in danger of misplacing 
the ideal of equality in pursuit of the politics of difference, and influenced as I am by 
liberal and socialist feminism, I wanted to help reverse this process. I therefore 
turned to authors engaging in the most lively, penetrating, and agenda-setting 
discourse of equality in contemporary theory: the post-Rawlsian liberal egalitarians 
discussed here. However, upon becoming more familiar with this literature, I found 
that I myself was unconvinced. This was unfortunate for my initial project. If the 
object was to make equality broadly appealing to feminists again, then it was a shaky 
start if the putative champion of equality was not persuaded by the dominant 
discourse.
As I became immersed in the research, my initial perceptions of both 
contemporary feminist and egalitarian liberal thought changed. Feminist thought 
was not as dismissive of the ideal of equality as I had sometimes imagined, and 
liberal -  by now, luck -  egalitarianism revealed itself to be a deeply interesting and 
challenging project. As should be obvious by now, I still believe, on balance, that 
luck egalitarianism poorly reflects some aspects of the modem ideal of equality, that 
it appeals to some morally dubious principles, and employs concepts still disfigured 
by the traditional male-bias of liberalism. But my research now suggests where 
reformulation of luck egalitarianism is possible, and demonstrates how such 
reformulation would benefit from closer engagement with feminist perspectives.
My object, in the thesis, has been to clarify and test out three key objections 
to luck egalitarianism and one counter-objection pressed by luck egalitarians to a 
rival approach. For each objection, I have identified both what mainstream critics do 
claim is wrong with luck egalitarianism, and what they could additionally say in 
order to realise the full force of their objection. The implication here is that while 
there are genuine disagreements between luck egalitarians and their critics about the 
ideal of equality, the critics have not always been clear enough about what is at stake. 
Employing key feminist arguments and perspectives, I have shown how the
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objections to luck egalitarianism also represent staging grounds for adding new 
elements to a theory of equality.
The first objection notes that the chance/choice distinction is a problematic 
basis for an egalitarian political morality. Any aspect of a person’s condition mixes 
choice and chance in a way that seems utterly resistant to disentangling, even in 
principle, and certainly in political practice. On occasion, luck egalitarians recognise 
this. Nevertheless, they are still prepared to give choice make-or-break significance 
in determining what individuals, injustice, are owed. Inequalities apparently 
traceable to responsible choice are more complicated than typically represented by 
luck egalitarianism because of the pervasive influence of gender conditioning on 
choices. Following Cohen, Mason suggests that an egalitarian social ethos may be 
necessary to ensure full equality of access for men and women. The appeal to an 
ethos calls into question the traditional liberal distinction between public and private 
because it implies that the achievement of an egalitarian society requires not only just 
social institutions but also that people’s choices and conduct within institutions 
promotes equality. As Mason’s analysis reveals, this implies non-neutrality between 
conceptions of the good; for example, between inegalitarian and egalitarian parenting 
arrangements. Nussbaum, Anderson, Yuracko, and other feminists are forthright that 
some goods seem to be more important than others from the point of view of social 
justice, and they are prepared to accept the non-neutrality towards ends that this 
implies. I did not address the complex issues around comprehensive versus political 
forms of liberalism, nor arguments for perfectionism. But if we want to get away 
from a choice-centred egalitarianism, we cannot avoid these issues.
The second objection sees the luck egalitarian literature as preoccupied with 
morally arbitrary variations of talent and native abilities amongst individuals, and 
neutralising these through compensation. Wolff, Hinton, and other critics believe 
this demeans those are represented as having Tow’ talents and ‘undesirable’ mental 
and physical features. I share this objection, but have argued that it needs to be 
connected to the politics of recognition in order for it to have real force against luck 
egalitarianism. Otherwise, it can be dismissed as merely an objection to the way in 
which the ideal of luck equality is implemented. The politics of recognition claims 
that society remains divided and less than just not only because of class divisions but 
also because of cultural ones. Cultural as well as economic hierarchies prevent 
people from regarding one another as equals and enjoying full citizenship. While
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society can be made fairer by wider and deeper enforcement of equal opportunities 
for men and women, this very enforcement can mask and legitimise unexamined 
cultural stereotypes and hierarchies of value. Getting more women into non- 
traditional jobs is an economic victory for gender equality, but if the wages attached 
to jobs traditionally coded as ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ remain unchallenged, then 
full citizenship for men and women on equal terms is still unmet. There are 
resonances in Wolffs and Hinton’s more focussed respect objection to luck equality 
with this deeper challenge to egalitarian liberal ways of conceptualising the 
remaining challenges to equal citizenship in post-industrial welfare state democracies.
Third, luck egalitarianism has also been criticised for treating equality mainly 
as a matter of distribution. Anderson, Scheffler, and Miller challenge the tendency to 
see equality in terms of how a ‘distributor of good things distributes them to 
individuals,’ arguing that equality is better understood as an ideal governing the 
social relationships between citizens. This too is an important and valid objection, 
but suffers from ambiguity. I have argued that it leaves itself open to the claim of 
displacing fundamental issues of economic inequality for misty-eyed appeals to civic 
virtues that are easy to knock down. One promising way to deflect this interpretation 
is to bind the ‘relational equality’ view more tightly to arguments for substantive 
political equality. The relationship between luck egalitarianism and democracy is 
under-studied. I took significant steps toward filling this gap by querying Dworkin’s 
democratic conception. I showed that his instrumentalist justification for democracy 
is compatible with the political marginalisation of some social groups and thus 
should be rejected. The ideal of equality refers not just to people in their capacity as 
consumers and producers, but also as citizens with the right to be recognised as 
effective political actors. The relational equality critics of luck egalitarianism appeal 
to this idea, but the implications of their criticism have yet to be fully clarified.
Some feminists have suggested that the full meaning and value of democratic 
inclusion implies proportional political representation for women and men and 
majority and minority ethnic groups in legislative bodies. I have argued that this is 
one direction in which the relational equality perspective could be more fruitfully 
developed.
In their basic forms, equality, priority, and sufficiency are competing 
programmes for distributive justice. In chapter six, I addressed an objection from 
luck egalitarians that some of their opponents, particularly Anderson and Nussbaum,
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are basically sufficientarians. If true, this would be a serious objection. But I have 
argued that this is a reductive characterisation of Anderson’s and Nussbaum’s 
theories, which appeal to several different substantive components of social justice. 
They affirm people’s fundamental rights; they condemn and prohibit sexual and 
racial discrimination; they uphold equality of opportunity; and they advance 
propositions about what goods ought most to matter in an egalitarian society so that 
we can then talk about how these should be fairly distributed. In short, I show that 
these are rich moral theories, expressing recognisably egalitarian political moralities, 
that are more pluralistic than luck egalitarian ones. We should not, I argue, 
pigeonhole theories of social justice as supposedly expressing just one major 
principle.
As the critical evaluation of luck egalitarianism and formulation of alternative 
egalitarian theories continue, I regard the following as some of the main outstanding 
tasks. It has been suggested that luck egalitarianism may be supplemented in various 
ways in order to mitigate what might seem to be its harsh treatment of the imprudent 
and reckless. It may be possible, for example, to supplement it with an egalitarian 
ethos, or appeal to moral duties independent of justice to meet people’s needs. These 
possibilities warrant further investigation to determine to what extent they are 
compatible with the overall luck egalitarian approach. A more decisive break with 
the luck egalitarian tradition also seems a real possibility, given the dissatisfaction 
expressed about many of its central elements. I believe a pluralistic approach to 
egalitarianism is promising, but much work remains to be done in this area. As it 
stands, non-luck egalitarians believe that meeting basic needs; prohibiting racist, 
sexist and other forms of discrimination; showing respect for all citizens in their 
diversity; and the inclusion of citizens in democratic deliberation about what they 
owe one another, are all genuine egalitarian ideals that should be combined with the 
emphasis on fairness in distribution. Egalitarians are united in the belief that a more 
equal society is a better society, but there is little to be gained by insisting that only 
some version of equality of resources or welfare provides the answers to the many 
problems of human inequality that we face.
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